TELEPATHY
475
TELEPATHY
operations and its tf^ndonoy to wliat is suitable to
itself" (tSt. Thomas, "Contra Gentiles", IV, xix).
Accordingly, God does not direct creatures to their
ends from outside, but through their own nature.
This teleological view does not suppose that every
efficient cause in the world is directed immediately
by an intelligence, but by its own natural tendency.
The Divine plan of creation is carried out by the
various beings themselves acting in conformity with
their nature. When, however, this finality is called
immanent, this expression must not be understood
in a pantheistic sense, as if the intelligence which the
world manifests were to be identified with the world
itself, but in the sense that the immediate principle
of finahty is immanent in every being.
II. Thus understood the principle of teleology seems almost obvious. Activity is essential to every being, and the same substance, placed in the same conditions, always acts in the same way. Its effect, therefore, does not happen by chance, for chance cannot account for fixity and stability. Within the substance itself must be found a principle of deter- mination. Now what is a determination but an adaptation and an orientation toward an end? The fact that the world is governed by laws, far from giving any support to the mechanistic conception, is rather opposed to it. A law is not a cause, but the expression of the constant manner in which cau.ses produce their effects. To say that there are laws is simply to state the determinism of nature, and it is precisely to this determinism that St. Thomas appeals to establish teleology. "Every active cause acts for an end, otherwise from its activity one effect would not result rather tlian another, except by chance" (Summa Theol., I, Q. xliv, a. 4). And again: "It is necessary that every active cause should act for an end. For in a series of causes, if the first be removed, the others also are removed [i. e., fail to produce their effects]. But the final cause is the first of all causes. The reason is that matter does not receive a form [i. e., does not change] except through the influence of an active cause. For nothing of itself passes from polcnlia to acltis [see Actus et Potentia], and the active cause does not act except in conse- quence of the intention of an end. Otherwise, if the active cause were not determined to produce some particular effect, .it would not produce this rather than some other. In order to produce a determined effect, it must, therefore, be determined to something in particular which serves as an end. As in rational beings this determination takes place through the rational appetite or will, so in other beings it takes place through a natural inclination which is called natural appetite" (Summa Theol., I-II, (J. i, a. 2).
Efficient cau.ses are not indifferent, and their effects are not fortuitous. As a matter of fact, from the many individual .activities of the various beings of the world orfler and harmony result in the universe. And wlien different forces converge toward a har- monious result , their convergence cannot bo explained except by admitting that they tend to realize a plan. Life is essentially teleological. There is a co-ordina- tion of all the organs, the fimctions of every one depending on those of the others, and tending to the welfare of the whole organism. Little by Uttle the primitive cell develops according to the gener.al typo of the species and evolves into the complete organism. To Aristotle's statement that "nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the organ" (De partib., animal., IV, xii. f)94b, V.i), Lucretius replied: "Nothing in the body is made in order that we m.ay use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use" (De nat. reruni, IV, 833; cf. 822-50), — an objection which had been presented more forcibly by Aristotle himself (Phys., II, viii, 198b). The funcrtion, it is true, is the result of the organ; the eye sees because it is an eye, and, in
general, every function is an effect of active causes.
But what is not explained by mechanism is the con-
vergence of many different causes toward a given
result. If organs are so many mechanisms, it remains
to be indicated how these mechanisms were organized.
If appeal is made to evolution, it must be remembered
that evolution is not a cause, but a mode of develop-
ment, and that organic evolution rather accentuates
the need of final causes. In the inorganic world,
the constancy of the laws of nature and the resulting
order of the world manifest the existence in every
being of a ))rincipk' of direction and orientation.
The fiuidaniental defect of mechanism con.sists in giving exclusive attention to the analyzing of every event into its causes, and in forgetting to look for the reason of their synthesis. If we take a clock to pieces, we discover in it nothing but springs, wheels, pivots, levers etc. When we have explained the mechanism which ultimately causes the revolutions of the hands on the dial, shall we say that the clock was not made to keep time? The intelligence that designed it is not in the clock itself which now obeys its own laws. Yet in reality we have an adaptation of means to an end. Thus the unconscious finality in the world leads to the conclusion that there must be an intelligent cause of the world. The whole preceding doctrine is well summed up in the following passage from St. Thomas (Summa Theol., I, Q. ciii, a., ad Sum): "The natural necessity inherent in things that are determined to one effect is impressed on them by the Divine power which directs them to their end, just as the necessity which directs the arrow to the target is impressed on it by the archer, and does not come from the arrow itself. There is this difference, how- ever, that what creatures receive from God is their nature, whereas the direction imparted by man to natural things beyond what is natural to them is a kind of violence. Hence, as the forced necessity of the arrow shows the direction intended by the archer, so the natural determinism of creatures is a sign of the li.i' II mill 111 iif nivine Providence".
1 ' ' ' 'itnledfrracte etde la puissance O^hf^A-t
I':iri ; I ; .// (London. 1889) ; GcTBERLET, .4H(/c-
miin' 1/ !, I . [901'}): iDl^^t. Dcr meclianischc Monis'
mils- a^"l'i!' .1 '■ '■•-■J I. '• ' '- • Ihi.ilfs (I'lirig. 1882), tr. bv Afh mi I I ' I ' ]- ■ I I , ,, K, Mrlaphi/yiiiur. gi-
niralr(\jm\ ■" •■ I' / i.lal, .,,.,, hi, r „.,luTalis
(Frcil)urg, I^mi:; S- m-I'im lhommi , m, liirHKT, Lr pnMime des causes firinlrs (I'ari.i, I'JOi;); ni; \i.K.;i;-i. Cni/sp effirienle et cause finale (Paris. 1889) ; Baldwin am. Moohi; in Did. of Philos. and Psychol. (New York, 1901). s. v.; Eisi.kr. \V.,rl,rbuch der phi- losophischen Begriffe (Berlin, 1910), a. v. Zwcrk, rt.-.
C. A. DUBRAY.
Telepathy (t^Xc, far, and wafletv, to experience), a term introduced by F. W. H. Myers in 1882 to denote "the ability of one mind to impress or to be impressed by another mind otherwi.se than through the recognized channels of sense" ((Jurney, "Phan- t.asms of the Living", I, 6); or: "the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another, independently of the recognized channels of sense (Myers, "Human Personality", I, xxi).
I. The term telepathy is sometimes u.sed, in con- formity with its derivation, to mean the direct com- munication between minds at a great distance. .Such terms as thought-transference, mind-reading, or mental suggestion would then apply to the direct eonitiiunicution between minds in the same room or at a small ilistance. (ienerally, however, at least in English, telepathy connotes only the exclusion of the recognized channels of sensation, irrespective of the distance. It supposes that, in some cases, the usual signs by which ideas are manifested — speech, writing, gestures, muscular contraction, facial expres- sion, etc. — may be dispensed with, and that minds are able to communicate, if not directly and immediately, at any rate through some medium which is distinct from the ordinary medium of .sense-perception. Thus understood, telepathy includes two classes of fact?.
