CERTITUDE
540
CERTITUDE
the axioms of geometry, is greater than our certitude
of a proposition demonstrated by a long and com-
plex series of proofs, and that our certitude of such
a fact as our own existence or our own state of feel-
ing (gladness or health) is greater than our certitude
of the existence, for instance, of a republican form
of government in this country, though we are certain in
both cases. We are more certain when we assent to a
truth as certain which falls in with our inclination than
when we are forced to a conviction. It should be
noted, too, that in the common opinion of theologians
there is a greater certitude in Divine faith than in
any human science.
There are several kinds of certitude. In the first place, it is divided into metaphysical, physical, and moral certitude. Metaphysical certitude is that with which self-evidently necessary truth is known, or necessary truth demonstrated from self-evident truth. The demonstrative sciences, such as geometry, pos- sess metaphysical certitude. The contingent fact of one's own existence, or of one's present state of feeling, is known with metaphysical certitude. Phys- ical certitude is that which rests upon the laws of nature. These laws are not absolutely unchangeable, but subject to the will of the Creator; they are not self-evident nor demonstrable from self-evident truth; but they are constant, and discoverable as laws by experience, so that the future may be in- ferred from the past, or the distant from the present. It is with physical certitude that a man knows that he shall die, that food will sustain life, that electricity will furnish motive power. Astronomers know be- forehand with physical certitude the date of an eclipse or of a transit of Venus. Moral certitude is that with which judgments are formed concerning human character and conduct : for the laws of human nature are not quite universal, but subject to occa- sional exceptions. It is moral certitude which we generally attain in the conduct of life, concerning, for example, the friendship of others, the fidelity of a wife or a husband, the form of government under which we live, or the occurrence of certain historical events, such as the Protestant Reformation or the French Revolution. Though almost any detail in these events may be made a subject of dispute, espe- cially when we enter the region of motives and try to trace cause and effect, and though almost any one of the witnesses may be shown to have made some mistake or misrepresentation, yet the occurrence of the events, taken in the mass, is certain. Father John Rickaby (First Principles of Knowledge) ob- serves that certitude is not necessarily exclusive of all misgiving whatsoever (such as the thought of the bare possibility that we may lie mistaken, for we are not infallible), but of all solid, reasonable misgivings. The term moral certitude is used by some philosophers in a wider sense, to include an assent in matters of conduct, given not <>n purely intellectual grounds of evidence, but through the virtue of prudence and the influence of the will over the intellect, because we judge that doubt would not be wise. In such a case, we know that an opinion or a course of action would ho right as a rule, let us Bay, in nine- cases out of ten, though we cannot shut our eyes to the possi- bility that (lie particular case which we are consider- ing nun/ lie the exceptional ease in which such a judgment would 1"- wrong Other philosophers say that in such a case we are not certain, but only judge
it wise to act as if we were certain, and put doubts aside because useless. But it seems clear that in such a case we are certain of something, whether
that something be described as the truth of a propo- sition or the wisdom of a course of action. This certitude might perhaps better be called practical Certitude, .since it mainly concerns action. Hence, it is said that in cases in which it is necessary to act, in which great issues are involved, and yet the evidence,
when logically set forth, would seem to amount to
no more than a higher probability for one course than
for another, the standard of judgment, or criterion,
is the judicium prudentis viri, the judgment of a wise
man, whose mind is unclouded by passion or preju-
dice, and who has some knowledge derived from
experience of similar cases. Such a judgment is
totally different from the spirit of the gambler's
throw, which is reckless not only of certainty but
even of probability.
Certitude is likewise divided into natural certitude (termed also direct, or spontaneous) and philosoph- ical. Natural certitude is that which belongs to "common sense", or the spontaneous working of the judgment, which is common to all men not idiots or insane. This certitude belongs chiefly to self-evi- dent truth and to the truths necessary for the con- duct of life. e. g. the existence of other beings besides ourselves, the duties existing between husband and wife, parents and children, the existence of a Supreme Being deserving of reverence. To these and similar truths the mind comes with certitude, without any special education, in the ordinary course of life in human society. Philosophical (or scientific) certi- tude is that which results from a process of reflection, upon an analysis of the evidence for and against our convictions, a perception of the reasons which sup- port them and of the objections which may be urged against them, together with an examination of the powers and the limits of the human intelligence. The term natural certitude is sometimes used in another sense, in contradistinction from the certi- tude of Divine faith, which is supernatural certitude, and which, according to theologians generally, is greater than any degree of certitude to be had in science, because it rests not upon human reason, which is liable to be mistaken, but upon the authority of God, who cannot err. (St. Thomas, Summa, I,Q. i,a. 5.)
A great part of philosophy is taken up with the questions whether certitude is possible, what is the extent of the sphere of certain knowledge, and by what tests or criteria truth may be certainly distin- guished from falsehood, so that we may know when we have a right to be certain. A few philosophers in ancient and modern times have, seriously or not, denied the possibility of attaining certitude on any subject whatsoever, and professed universal scepti- cism. Such are Nicholas of Cusa, Montaigne, Char- ron, and Bayle, the last of whom aimed at producing the impression that everything is disputable by show- ing that everything is disputed. Literally universal scepticism is impossible, for it is a profession of knowledge to assert that nothing can be known, and to believe that there can be no belief. It is thus a contradiction in terms. A sceptic should in con- sistency be sceptical as to his own scepticism; but no attention would be given to such a sceptic unless as one attends, for amusement, to a jester. Never- theless, universal scepticism may practically produce pernicious consequences, because its universality is overlooked, and its arguments are viewed as if they applied only to some particular sphere in which the reader (if it so be) is tempted to doubt. Thus. sceptical objections against the principle of causa- tion may be employe,! against the proofs for the existence of God. while the reader is not warned, and does not remember, that they would equally avail against taking food and sleep for the restoration of strength, or against the anticipation that the sun will rise to-morrow. It should be added that some Christian apologists, in endeavouring to prove the
necessity of Divine revelation, have used language
differing but little from that of scepticism, to the disparagement of human reason. A noted example is Suet, "Traite de la faiblesse de J'esprit hunuiin" (Paris, 1723).
What ia more common than a profession of univer-
