CERTITUDE
541
CERTITUDE
sal scepticism is a scepticism as to the possibility of
philosophic certitude. Many who have no doubt as
to natural certitude, or the certitude acquirable by
"common sense", the natural, spontaneous action of
the unsophisticated mind, regard philosophy as more
apt to open questions than to settle them, anil to
raise objections than to solve them. This seems to
have been the position of Pascal, who says: "Reason
confounds dogmatists, ami nature confounds scep-
tics"; and, "The heart has reasons of its own which
the understanding does not know". This seems to
have been the position also of a very different man,
David Hume, who says: "Fortunately since reason
is incapable "I dis h lling these clouds, nature herself
suffices for that purpose and cures me of this philo-
sophical delirium" (Treatise on Human Nature, I,
297). He said to a friend who spoke to him concern-
ing the future life and the existence of God: "Though
I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned
and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not
think so differently from the rest of the world, as
you imagine." And he gives his idea of scepticism
in a remark upon Berkeley's arguments against the
real externality of the sensible world: "That these
arguments are in reality merely sceptical appears
from this, that they admit, of no answer, and pro-
duce no conviction: their only effect is to cause that
momentary amazement and irresolution and confu-
sion, which is the result of scepticism." (Inquiry Con-
cerning Human Understanding, ch. xii, note 4.) Kant s
system, which denies that the speculative reason can
attain to real knowledge, and admits only practical
certitude, and consequently denies the possibility of
any system of metaphysical philosophy, is virtually
the same view. It is needless to say that, in
a philosopher, such a view is self-contradictory.
Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", as well as his
other works, was an exercise of the speculative
reason. If certitude of knowledge is not obtainable
on any subject by the speculative reason, how could
he indulge in such positive and dogmatic proposi-
tions? If we consider this view of philosophy, as it
is held by some men of sense and virtue, who point
to the disputations and wranglings of philosophers,
the variety of opinions, the number of infidel philos-
ophers, and the general suspicion felt by earnestly
religious people, the answer to it is, that this view
has some measure of truth, but is a great exaggera-
tion. It is quite true that philosophical inquiries
concerning morals and religion, if not conducted
with proper moral dispositions, an- likely to terminate
in doubt. If there be any bias, whether conscious or
unconscious, against the obligations of morality and
religion, there can of course be only one issue. If
the understanding seeks to know everything: if it
rejects facts, however well attested, because it does
font they can be so; if it will accept no truth,
however firmly demonstrated, unless the harmony
with every other part of a system can be madi
clear; if the mind makes itself "the measure of possi-
bility; if it claims to see through and through the
universe, and its origin, and its end; if it refuses to
submit to mystery, or to acknowledge that it is
limited; and il cannot know everything,
it will proudly not consent to know anything, of course with such a disposition philosophizing cannot in philosophic certitude. Hut that is not the fault of philosophy, nor of reason: and the abuse cannot take away the use, but only be a warning
t lie misuse of philosophy.
Methodic doubt", that is, provisional doubt of
every truth, was put forward l.\ Di cartes as the propercour.se for the discovery of truth. This philos- opher teaches that in ord. r to be certain of the truth of our convictions we should begin by doubting everything, except one thing: "I think, and there- fore 1 mi" lb professes to hold that every other
truth may be doubted and needs proof. He suggests
that we may doubt whether we can discover the
truth on any other point whatsoever, for it may
appear possible that we have been created by a
malign or mischievous being, who so constituted our
mind that we must invariably be mistaken. The
Cartesian method is self-contradictory. To make
the supposition that possibly the human intellect
cannot know the truth, on any point whatsoever,
is to assume that this supposition may be true,
and that there is such a tiling as truth, and that it
can be known. To attempt to disprove the suppo-
sition, to undertake to show the veracity of the
cognitive faculties, presupposes their veracity or
power of knowing the truth on some points at least.
In fact, Descartes proved the veracity of the cog-
nitive faculties from the veracity of God. The
veracity of God, however, is known as the result of
a demonstration of some length and complexity;
and the undertaking of such demonstration shows
a previous belief in the power of the mind to dis-
cover the truth. In fact, the very doubt on sucha
subject is a self-contradiction; for doubt as well as
certitude is correlated to truth. To doubt whether
a particular view may not be false is to suspect that
the opposite may be true. To doubt that the intel-
lect can know any truth is to question whether it
may not be true that we are ignorant. Hut this
implies that there is such a thing as truth, and that
the truth, at least about our own power of knowing,
can be discovered. Without such a presupposition,
thought cannot, be carried on at all. Nor is it a
blind presupposition, or animal instinct. For in the
perception of first principles, or truths evident by
their own light, there is implicit the perception dial
there is such a thing as truth and knowledge. The
error in Descartes' method is its exaggeration. It
is wise to be on our guard against the prejudices, or
opinions, peculiar to a particular time and place,
the place of birth or education, the class or party
to which our early associations have attached us;
but the principles which are self-evident, or which
are accepted by the human race, should be exempted
from doubt. It must be remembered, too, that lite
Church teaches that a Catholic cannot without sin
entertain doubts against the Faith: though, of
course, he may lawfully doubt whether it is true that
a particular doctrine is taught by tin- Church, or
whether he has correctly apprehended what the
Church intends to teach, and whether a particular
teacher expounds it correctly or, again, he may
investigate the evidences of Christianity and of
Catholicism, and may doubt whether a particular
argument is valid proof, lint the method of doubt,
taken as a whole, has been condemned by the
Church.
Since, then, some things can be known with certi- tude, some things can be seen to be probable, and some things must remain forever a matter of doubt; and since the human reason is liable to error, the need has been fell for some criterion or criteria by which we may know that we really know, and by which genuine certitude concerning the truth may be distinguished from the spurious certitude of
delusion.
The proper lest of truth is evidence, whether the evidence of a truth in itself or by participation in the evidence of some other truth from which it is proved. Many truths, indeed, have io be accepted on authority; but then it has to be made evident that such authority is legitimate, is capable of know- ing the truth, and is qualified to teach in the particu- lar department in which il is accepted. Many truths which are at first accepted on authority may after- wards be made evident to the reason of the di Such in fact is the ordinary way in which learning and science are acquired. The error of Donald's
