ETHICS
560
ETHICS
ward von Hartmann, though the latter regards culture
and progress merely as means to the ultimate end,
which, according to him, consists in delivering the
Absolute from the torment of existence.
The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good of mankind to be the end and criterion of mora! conduct, was renewed on a positivistic basis in the nineteenth centurj- by Auguste Comte and has counted many adherents, e. g., in England, John Stuart Mill, Henrj' Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; in Ger- manv, G. T. Fechner, F. E. Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) sought to effect a compromise between social Utilitarianism (Altru- ism) and private Utilitarianism (Egoism) in accord- ance with the theory of evolution. In his opinion, that conduct is good which serves to augment life and pleasure without any admixture of displeasure. In consequence, however, of man's lack of adaptation to the conditions of life, such absolute goodness of con- duct is not as yet possible, and hence various com- promises must be made between Altruism and Egoism. \Vith the progress of evolution, however, this adapta- bility to existing conditions will become more and more perfect, and consequently the benefits accruing to the individual from his own conduct will be most useful to society at large. In particular, sjanpathy (in joy) will enable us to take pleasure in altruistic actions.
The great majority of non-Cliristian moral philoso- phers have followed the path trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption that man, by a series of transformations, was gradually evolved from the brute, and therefore differs from it in degree only, they seek the first traces and beginnings of moral ideas in the brute itself. Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these lines, and Spencer did not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on the pre- human justice, conscience, and self-control of brutes. Present-day Evolutionists follow his view and attempt to show how animal morality has in man continually become more perfect. "With the aid of analogies taken from ethnology, they relate how mankind orig- inally wandered over the face of the earth in semi- savage hordes, knew nothing of marriage or the fam- ily, and only by degrees reached a higher level of morality. These are the merest creations of fancy. If man is nothing more than a highly developed brute, he cannot possess a spiritual and immortal soul, and there can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the future retribution of good and evil, nor can man in consequence be hindered from ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the well-being of others only in so far as it redounds to his own profit.
As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of evolution from their ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base their observations on scientific principles, but on social and economical considerations. According to K. Marx, F. Engels, and other exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of history", all moral, religious, juridical, and philosophical con- cepts are but the reflex of the economical conditions of society in the minds of men. Now these social relations are subject to constant change; hence the ideas of morality, religion, etc. are also continually changing. Every age, every people, and even each class in a given people forms its moral and religious ideas in accor- dance with its own peculiar economical situation. Hence, no universal code of morality exists binding on all men at all times; the morality of the present day is not of Divine origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make room for another -system of morality. Allied to this materialistic historical in- terpretation, though derived from other sources, is the system of Relativism, which recognizes no absolute and unchangeable truths in regard either to ethics or to anything else. Tho.se who follow this opinion aver that nothing objectively true can be known by us.
Men differ from one another and are subject to change,
and with them, the manner and means of viewing the
world about them also change. Moreover the judg-
ments passed on matters religious and moral depend
essentially upon the inclinations, interests, and charac-
ter of the person judging, while these latter in turn
are constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from
Relativism inasmuch as that only is to be considered
true which is proven by experience to be useful; and,
since the same thing is not always useful, unchange-
able truth is impossible.
In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it need not surprise us that, as regards ethical problems, scepticism is extending its sway to the utmost limits, in fact many exhibit a formal con- tempt for the traditional morality. According to Max Nordau, moral precepts are nothing but " con- ventional lies"; according to Max Stirner, that alone is good which serves my interests, whereas the common good, the love for all men, etc. are but empty phan- toms. Men of genius and superiority in particular are coming more and more to be regarded as exempt from the moral law. Nietzsche is the originator of a school whose doctrines are founded on these principles. According to him, goodness was originally identified with nobility and gentility of rank. Whatever the man of rank and power did, whatever inclinations he possessed, were good. The down-trodden proletariat, on the other hand, were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without any other derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a gradual process that the oppressed multitude through hatred and envy evolved the distinction between good and bad, in the moral sense, by denominating the character- istics and conduct, of those in power and rank as bad, and their own behaviour as good. And thus arose the opposition between the morality of the master and that of the slave. Those in power still continued to look upon their own egoistic inclinations as noble and good, while the oppressed populace lauded the " instincts of the common herd", i.e. all those qualities necessary and useful to its existence — as patience, meekness, obedience, and love of one's neighbour. Weakness became goodness, cringing obsequiousness became humility, subjection to hated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant patience. "All morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely re-arranged. Intellectual superiority is above and beyond good and evil as understood in the traditional sense. There is no higher moral order to which men of such calibre are amenable. The end of society is not the common good of its mem- bers; the intellectual aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its behalf the common herd, the "too many", must be reduced to slavery and decimated. As it rests with each individual to decide who belongs to this intellectual aristocracy, so each one is at liberty to emancipate himself from the existing moral order.
In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which has manifested itself far and wide: name- ly, the effort to make morality independent of all re- ligion. It is clear that many of the abo\'e-mentioned ethical systems es.sentially exclude all regard for (!od and religion, and this is true especially of materialistic, agnostic, and, in the last analysis, of all pantheistic systems. Apart, also, from these systems, " independ- ent morality", called also "lay morality", has gained many followers and defenders. Kant's ideas formed the basis of this tendency, for he him,self founded a code of morality on the categorical imperative and expres.sly declared that morality is sufficient for itself, and therefore has no need of religion. .Many modern moral philosophers — Herbart, Eduard von flartniann, Zeller, Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and a number of others — have followed Kant in this respect. For several decades practical attempts have been made
