ETHICS
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ETHICS
tc emancipate morality from religion. In France
religious instruction was banished from the schools
in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This
tendency manifests a lively activity in what is known
as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly
speaking, is in the United States. In 1876, Felix
Adler, professor at Cornell University, founded the
"Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City.
Similar societies were formed in other cities. These
were consolidated in 1887 into the " Union of the
Societies for Ethical Culture". Besides Adler, the
chief propagators of the movement by word of
mouth and writing, were W. M. Salter and Stanton
Coit. The purpose of these societies is declared to
be " the improvement of the mora! life of the members
of the societies and of the community to which they
belong, without any regard to theological or philo-
sophical opinions". In most of the European coun-
tries ethical societies were founded on the model of
the American organization. All these were combined
in 1894 into the "International Ethical Association".
Their purpose, i. e. the amelioration of man's moral
condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneous
to suppose that any such moral improvement can be
brought about without taking religion into consider-
ation. In fact many members of the ethical societies
are openly antagonistic to all religions, and would
therefore do away with denominational schools and
supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction.
Even upon purely ethical considerations such attempts
must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that
even in the case of adults moral instruction without
religion, without any higher obligation or sanction, is
a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so
is it in the case of the young? It is evident that,
judged from the standpoint of Christianity, these
efforts must meet with a still more decided condem-
nation. Christians are bound to observe not only the
prescriptions of the natural law, but also all the pre-
cepts given by Christ concerning faith, hope, love.
Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. The
Christian, moreover, knows that without Divine grace
and, hence, without prayer and the frequent reception
of the sacraments, a morally good life for any con-
siderable length of time is impossible. From their
earliest years, therefore, the young must not only re-
ceive thorough instruction in all the Commandments,
but must be exercised and trained in the practical use
of the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and
atmosphere in which education develops and flourishes.
While, among non-Catholics ever since the Refor-
mation, and especially since Kant, there has been an
increasing tendency to divorce ethics from religion,
and to dissolve it into countless venturesome and
frequently contradictory systems. Catholics for the
most part have remained free from these errors, be-
cause, in the Church's infallible teaching authority,
the guardian of Christian Revelation, they have al-
ways found secure orientation. It is true that to-
wards the end of the eighteenth, and at the beginning
of the nineteenth centurj-, Illuminism and Rational-
ism penetrated here and there into Catholic circles
and attempted to replace moral theology by purely
philosophical ethics, and in turn to transform the
latter according to the Kantian autonomy. This
movement, however, was but a passing phase. With
a reawakening of the Church's activity, fresh impetus
was given to Catholic science, which was of benefit to
ethics also and produced in its domain some excellent
fruits. Recourse was again had to the illustrious past
of Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical
systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and
verification of principles of the moral order. Taparelli
d'Azeglio led the way with his great work " Saggio
teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto"
(1840-4.3). Then followed, in Italy, Audisio, Ros-
mini, Liberatore, Sanseverino, Roselli, Zigliara, Sig-
V.— 36
noriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo, and others. In
Spain this revival of ethics was due to, among others,
J. Balmes, Donoso Cortes, Zefirio Cionzalez, Slendive,
R. de Cepeda; in France and Belgium, to de Lehen
(Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair,
Ath, Vallet, Charles Perin, Piat, de Pascal, Moulart,
Castelein ; in England and .America, to Joseph Rickaby,
Jouin, Russo, HoUaind, J.J. Ming. In German-speak-
ing countries the reawakening of Scholasticism in
general begins with ICleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit,
1853; Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and of ethics
in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsatze der
Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris
naturalis seu philosophise moralis universae, ISSo-
1900). After them came A. Stockl, Ferd. Walter, Moy
de Sons,C.Gutberlet,Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Ros-
setti, A. M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen, Willems, V.
Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over
numerous Catholic writers, who have made a specialty
of sociology and political economy.
IV. Outlines of Ethics. — It is clear that the fol- lowing statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the most important prob- lems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment. Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical ethics, and spe- cial, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds and verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral order; special ethics applies these general prin- ciples to the various relations of man, and determines his duties in particular.
Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation to the certain knowledge of the exist- ence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this fundamental truth the structure of ethics must be based. God created man, as He created all things else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper motive of the will's activity. If God were not the ultimate object and end of His own activ- ity. He would depend upon His creatures, and would not be infinitely perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that He can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to an infinitely perfect being, but for His glorj-. They are to manifest His goodness and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of themselves directly glorify f!od, for they are inca- pable of knowing Him They are intended as means to the end for which rationa.1 man was created. The end of man, however, is to know God, to love Him and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unending happiness. Every man h.as within him an irresistible, indestructible desire for perfect happiness; he seeks to be free from every evil and to possess everj' obtain- able good. This impulse to happiness is foimded on man's nature; it is implanted there by his Maker; and hence will be duly realized, if nothing is wanting on the part of man's own individual endeavour. But perfect happiness is unattainable in the present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an early end to all earthly happiness There is reserved for man a better life, if he freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject to God and keeps His Commandments. Only from the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and the moral order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does man, considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence of su|)eniatural revelation, come to know what God retjuiros of him here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in order to arrive at eternal happiness? — By means of the natural law.
From etcrnitv there existed in the min<l of God the idea of the world, which He freely determined to cre- ate, as well as the plan of government according to
