OONZALO
63G
GOOD
comp. de J^sus; CoNCiNA, Apparatus ad theologiam christianam
(Rome, 1751), II; VindicuB societalis Jesu ejusque doctrina:
purgatio (Venice, 1769); Dollinger and Reusch, Gesch. der
Morahtreiiigkeiten in der roem, kuth. Kirche (Nordlingen, 18S9),
I, 120-273; II, 49-219; Huhtek, Nomenclator; Matignon,
Etudes religieuses (Paris, 1866); Patdzzi, Leitereteotogico-moTali,
VI (Trent, 1756); Redsch, Index der verbotenen Biicher (Bonn,
1885), pp. 506-10; Preussische Jahrbiicher (Berlin, 1888), FAne,
Krisis im Jesuitejiorden; Streber in Kirchenlex; Bihlmeyer in
Kirchl. Handlex. For controversies about the decree of Inno-
cent XI on probabilism see chiefiy Brucker, (Etudes religieuses,
1901-02), who quotes the official communication of the only
authentic text given by the Holy Office in 1902. Ter Haar,
Innocentii X I de Prohabilismo decreti historia ef l'i7idici(s (Tournay
and Paris, 1904); Lehmkdiil, Probabilismus vindieatus (Frei-
burg, 1906); see also, Arndt in Anatecla Ecch, 1902; Cathrein
in Theol. prakt. Quartalschrift, 1905; Franz in Zeitschr f.kath.
Theol.. 1905; Maxdonnet in Revue Thomiste. 1901-2.
J. S.\LSM.\NS.
Gonzalo de Berceo, Spanish poet, active between 1220 and 1242. Born in the clcsing years of the twelfth century, he appears to be the earliest Castilian author known to us by name. He became a priest and passed the whole of his life in or near the monas- tery of San Milldn de la Cogolla. His compositions extend to more than 13,000 verses (Alexandrines), arranged in monorhymed quatrains {cundcrna via), and, at least in so far as the truly authentic are con- cerned, are religious and hagiographical in their na- ture. They are made up of lives of Spanish saints: "La vida de Santo Domingo de Silos", "La vida de San Milldn", " La vida de Santa Oria"; of poems cele- brating the Blessed Virgin : " Los Milagros de Nuestra Seiiora ", " Los Loores de Nuestra Sefiora ' ', " El duelo de la Virgen"; and of other pious and didactic works: " El sacrificio de la Misa", " Los signos del juicio", and perhaps some hymns. In all these compositions he manifests but little originality, abiding, wherever pos- sible, by Latin sources that were doubtless in the mo- nastic library. His manner and style, however, are decidedly interesting, because they evince his desire to appeal to all the lay reading public of Castile in his time. He writes, as he tells us, in the vernacular, so that he may be read by the common man ; and he in- tentionally adopts the methods of the popular minstrel in order to reach more ciuickly the popular heart. In spite of his diffuseness, he can interest us to-day, and his quaint humour, heavy though it may be at times, has no little charm. If we are to believe the ascription contauied in one of the two manuscripts of the old Spanish poem on Alexander the Great (" Libro de Alexandre") we must credit him with that secular work also ; but scholars are not too prone to regard the ascription as correct.
Editions of his verse in S.\nchez, Coleccion de pnesias casle- llanas anteriores al sie(o XF (Madrid, 1779-90), II; in the Bf6- lioteca de autores espanoles, LVII; and, for the Santo Domingo in the Bibliothl'que de VEcole des Hautes Eludes, fasc. 149, ed. FitzGerald. See also Lanchetas, Gramdtiea y voeabulario de G. de Bereeo (Madrid, 1903); Fitzmaurice-Kelly, History of Spanish Literature,
J. D. M. Ford.
Good is one of those primary ideas which cannot be strictly defined. In order to fix its philosophical significance we may begin by observing that the word is employed firstly as an adjective, and secondly as a substantive. This distinction which is clearly marked in French by the two different tenns, bon and le lne?i, may be preserved in English by prefixing an article to the term when it is employed substantively. We call a tool or instrument good, if it serves the purpose for which it is intended. That is to say, it is good be- cause it is an efficient means to obtain a desired result. The result, in turn, may be desired for itself, or it may be .sought as a means to some ulterior end. If it is Kouglit for itself, it is or it is estimated liy us to bo a good, and tlierofore dpsiral)l<' on its own account. When we take some step to obtain it, it is the end of our action. The series of means and ends either stretches out indefinitely, or it must terminate in some desired object or objects which are ends in
themselves. Again we sometimes call a thing good
because it possesses completely, or in a high degree,
the perfections proper to its nature, as a good paint-
ing, good respiration. Sometimes too, things are
termed good because they are of a nature to produce
something desirable; that is, they are good causally.
Finally, we speak of good conduct, a good man, a good
intention, and here the adjective has for us a sense dif-
ferent from any of the foregoing, unless, indeed, we
are utilitarian philosophers, to whom morally good is
but another term for useful.
Now in all these locutions the word conveys directly or indirectly the idea of desirability. The merely use- ful is desired for the end towards which it is employed ; the end is desired on its own account. The latter is conceived as possessing some character, quality, power, which renders it an object of desire. Two questions now arise : (1) What is it which, in the nature or being of any object, constitutes it desirable? Or, in more technical phrase, what, metaphysically speak- ing, constitutes the good or goodness in a thing, abso- lutely considered? (2) What is the relationship existing between the good thus absolutely constituted and thesubject to which it is desirable? Or,whatisim- plied by good, relatively considered? These two ques- tions may be combined in one : " What is the good in the ontological order?" In exposing the reply to this question we shall come across the moral good, and the ethical aspect of the problem, which shall be treated in the second place.
I. Ontological. — In Greek philosophy no topic receives more attention than the nature of the good. The speculations of Plato and Aristotle, especially, have had a notable influence on Christian thought; they were adopted, in eclectic fashion, by the early Fat;hers, who combined many of the ancient philo- sophic ideas with revealed truth, by correctingsome and amplifying others. The synthesis was carried on by the earlier Scholastics, and took definitive form from the hand of St. Thomas. Some of his predecessors, as well as some of his followers, disagree with him on a few minor points, most of which, however, are of a character too subtle to call for attention in this article. We shall, therefore, present the doctrine of St. Thomas in outline as the approved teaching of our schools.
Plato. — According to Plato, in the objective order corresponding to our thought, there are two different worlds: the world of things, and the incomparably higher, nobler world of ideas, which transcends the world of things. The objects corresponding directly to our universal concepts are not things, but ideas. The objective idea is not indwelling in tiie essences of those things which fall within the scope of our corres- ponding universal concept, but the thing borrows or derives something from the idea. While the being or existence proper to the world of things is imperfect, unstable, essentially transitory, and therefore not truly deserving of the name of being, which implies permanence, ideas on the contrary are incorruptible, unchangeable, and truly existence. Now, among ideas the noblest and highest is the idea good: it is the supreme and sovereign idea. Whatever things pos- sess goodness have it only because they participate in, or draw from, the Sovereign Good. Their goodness, then, is something distinct from, and added to, their proper essences or being. What, in Plato's mind, is the nature of this participation we need not explain further than that he makes it consist in this, that the thing is a copy or imitation of the idea. This sover- eign idea, the Good, is identical with God. It is not a synthesis of all other ideas but is unique, transcend- ent, .and inchvidual. Whelhi-r I'l:ilo held that other ideas exist in God as in (heir proper dwelling-place is not quite cle:ir. Aristotle .so interpreted Phitii; and it is very likely that Aristotle was better cjualifii'd In understand Plato's meaning than were subsequent
