GOOD
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GOOD
philosophers who have disputed his interpretation.
The Supreme Good imparts to the intellect the power
to perceive, and gives intelligibility to the intelligible.
It is, therefore, the source of truth. Ciod, the essen-
tial and supreme Good, can impart nothing that is not
good. This view leads to the inference that the origin
of e\Tl lies beyond the control of God. The theory
leans, therefore, to dualism, and its influence may be
traced through the early Gnostic and Manichiean here-
sies, and, in a minor degree, in the doctrines of the
Priscillianists and Albigenses.
Aristotle. — Starting from the Platonic definition, good is that which all desire, .\ristotle, rejecting the Platonic doctrine of a transcentlent world of iileas, holds that the good and being are identical; good is not something atlded to being, it is being. Everything that is, is good because it is; the quantitj', if one may use the word loosely, of being or existence which a thing possesses, is at the same time its stock of good- ness. A diminution or an increase of its being is a diminution or increase of its goodness. Being and the good are, then, objectively the same; everj^ being is good, every good is being. Our concepts, being and good, differ formally: the first simply denotes exist- ence; the second, existence as a perfection, or the power of contributing to the perfection of a being. It follows from this that evil is not being at all; it is, on the contrary, the privation of being. Again, while be- ing, viewed as the object of tendency, appetite, or will, gives rise to the concept good, so, when considered as the proper object of the intellect, it is represented under the concept true or truth, and it is the beauti- ful, inasmuch as the knowledge of it is attended by that particular pleasurable emotion which we call esthetic. As God is the fullness of being, so, therefore, the supreme, infinite Being is also the Supreme Good from which all creatures derive their being and good- ness.
Neo-Platonism. — The neo-Platonists perpetuated the Platonic theory, mixed with Aristotelean, Judaic, and other Oriental ideas. Plotinus introduced the doctrine of a triple hypostasis, i. e. the one, the intelli- gence, and the universal soul, above the world of changing being. The good is identical with the one, and is above being, which is multiple. The intelli- gence is ordained to good; but, incapable of grasping it in its entirety, it breaks it up into parts, which con- stitute the essences. These essences by becoming united with a material principle constitute things. The Pseudo-Dionysius propagated the Platonic influ- ence in his work "De Nominibus Divinis", the doc- trine of which is based on the Scriptures. God is supereminently being — "I am who am" — but in Him the good is anterior to being, and the ineffable name of God is above all His other names. The good is more universal than being, for it emiiraces the material prin- ciple which tloes not possess any being of its own. The bond which unites beings among themselves and to the Supreme Being is love, which has for its object the good. The trend of the Pseudo-Dionysius is away from the dualism which admits a principle of evil, but on the other hand, it inclines towards pantheism.
The Fathers. — The Fathers, in general, treated the question of good from the standpoint of hermeneutics rather than from the philosophic. Their chief concern is to affirm that God is the Supreme Good, that He is the creator of all that exists, that creatures derive their goodness from Him, while they are distinct from Him; and that there is no supreme independent prin- ciple of evil. St. Augustine, however (De Natura Boni, P. L., XLIII), examines the topic fully and in great detail. Some of his expressions seem tinged with the Platonic notion that good is antecedent to being; but elsewhere he makes the good and being in (Jod fundamentally identical. Boethius distinguishes a double goodness in things created: first, that which in them is one with their being; second, an accitlental
goodness added to their nature by God. In God these
two elements of good, the essential and the accidental,
are but one, since there are no accidents in God.
Scholastic Doctrine. — St. Thomas starts from the Aristotelean principle that being and the good are objectively one. Being conceived as desirable is the good. The good differs from the true in this, that, while both are objectively nothing else than being, the good is being considered as the object of appetite, de- sire, and will, the true is being as the object of the intellect. God, the Supreme Being and the source of all other being, is consequently the Supreme Good, and the goodness of creatures results from the diffu- sion of His goodness. In a creature, considered as a subject having existence, we distinguish several ele- ments of the goodness which it posses.ses: (a) Its exist- ence or being, which is the ground of all the other elements, (b) Its powers, activities, and capacities. These are the complement of the first, and they ser\'e it to pursue and appropriate whatever is requisite for and contributory to sustaining its existence, and devel- oping that existence into the fullness of perfection proper to it. (c) Each perfection that is acquired is a further measure of existence for it, hence a good. (d) The totality of these various elements, forming its total good subjectively, that is, its entire being m a state of normal perfection according to its kind, is its good complete. This is the sense of the axiom: otnne ens est bonum sibi (every being is a good unto itself). The privation of any of its powers or due perfections is an evil for it, as, for instance, blindness, the loss of the power of sight, is an evil for an animal. Hence evil is not something positive and does not exist in itself; as the axiom expresses it, malum in bono jundatur (evil has its base in good).
Let us pass now to good in the relative sense. Every being has a natural tendency to continue and to develop itself. This tendency brings its activities into play; each power has its proper object, and a conalus pushing it to action. The end to which action is di- rected is something that is of a nature to contribute, when obtained, to the well-being or perfection of the subject. For this reason it is needed, pursued, desired, and, because of its desirability, is designated good. For example, the plant for its existence and develop- ment requires light, air, heat, moisture, nutriment. It has various organs adapted to appropriate these things, which are good for it, and, when by the exer- cise of these functions it acquires and appropriates them, it reaches its perfection and runs its course in nature. Now if we look into the cosmos, we perceive that the innumerable varieties of being in it are bound together in an indescribably complex system of mu- tual action and interaction, as they obey the laws of their nature. One class contributes to the other in that orderly relationship which constitutes the har- mony of the universe. True — to change the meta- phor — with our limited powers of observation we are unable to follow the innumerable tlu-eads of this mighty network, but we trace thera in sufficiently large and varieil sweeps to warrant the induction that everj'thing is good for some other thing, that every- thing has its proper end in the great whole. Omne ens est botium alteri. Since this orderly correlation of things is necessary to them in order that they may obtain from one another the help which they need, it too is good for them. This order is also a good in itself, because it is a created reflection of the unity and harmony of the Divine being and goodness. When we consider the Supreme Being as the efficient cause, con- server, and director of this majestic order, we reach the conception of Divine Providence. And then arises the question, what is the end towards which this Prov- idence directs the umverse? The end again is the good, i. e. God Himself. Not indeed that, as in the case of creatures. He may derive any advantage or perfection from the world, but that it, by participating in His
