GOOD
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GOOD
goodness, may manifest it. This manifestation is
what we untlerstand by the expression, " giving glory
to God". God is tlie Alpha and the Omega of the
good; the source from which it flows, the end to which
it returns. " I am the Beginning anfl I am the End. "
It must be remembered that, throughout the treat-
ment of this subject, the term good, like all other terms
which we predicate of God and of creatures, is used not
univocally but analogically when referred to God.
(See Analogy.)
The defined doctrine on the good, ontologically con- sidered, is formulated by the Coimcil of the Vatican (Sess. Ill, Const, de Fide Catholica, Cap. i): "This one, only, true God, of His own goodness and almighty power, not for the increase of His own happiness, not to acquire but to manifest His perfection by the bless- ings which Pie bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom of counsel created from the beginning of time both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelic and the mundane; and afterwards the human creature." In Canon iv we read: "If anyone shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spirit- ual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance; or that the Divine essence, by the manifestation and evolution of itself, becomes all things; or lastly, that God is imiversal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the uni- versality of things distinct according to genera, species, and individuals, let liim be anathema."
II. Ethical. — The moral good is not a kind dis- tinct from tlie good viewed ontologically; it is one form of perfection proper to human life, but, because of its excellence and supreme practical importance, it de- mands special treatment with reference to its own distinctive character which differentiates it from all other goods and perfections of man. It is again, in Greek philosophy, that we find the principles which have supplied the school with a basis for rational spec- ulations, controlled and supplemented by revelation.
Plato. — The supreme good of man is, as we have seen, the idea good, identical with God. By imion with God man attains his highest subjective good, which is happiness. This assimilation is effected by knowledge and love; the means to achieve it is to preserve in the soul a due harmony throughout its various parts in subordination to the intellect which is the highest faculty. The establishment of this har- mony brings man to a participation in the Divine unity; and through this union man attains to happi- ness, which remains even though he suffers pain and the privation of perishable goods. To regulate our actions harmoniously we stand in need of true knowledge, i. e. wisdom. The highest duty of man, therefore, is to obtain wisdom, which leads to God.
Aristotle. — The end of man, his highest subjective good, is happiness or well-being. Happiness is not pleasure; for pleasure is a feeling consequent upon action, while happiness is a state of activity. Happi- ness consists in perfect action, i. e. the actual exercise by man of his faculties — especially of his highest fac- ulty, the speculative intellect — in perfect correspond- ence with the norm which his nature itself prescribes. Action may deviate from this norm either by excess or defect. The golden mean is to be preserved, and in this consists virtue. The various faculties, higher and lower, are regulated by their resj^ective virtues to carry on their activities in due order. Pleasure fol- lows action duly performed, even the highest form of activity, i. e. speculative contemplation of truth; but, as ha-s been noted, happiness consists in the very operation itself. .\ life of contemplation, however, cannot be enjoyed unless a man possesses enough goods of the lower orders to relieve him from the toils and the cares of life. Hence happiness is beyond the re.ach of many. It is to be observed therefore that, while both Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Schola.s- tics, hold that happiness is the end of man, their con-
ception of happiness is quite different from the
hedonistic idea of happiness as presented in EngUsh
utilitarianism. For the utilitarian happiness is the
sum total of pleasurable feelings, from whatever
source they may be derived. On the other hand, in
our sense, happiness — eiSaiixovla, beatitudo — is a
distinct state or condition of consciousness accom-
panying and dependent on the realization in conduct
of one definite good or perfection, the nature of which
is objectively fixed and not deiiendent on our individ-
ual preferences. (See Utilitarianissl)
Hedonists. — The supreme good of man according to Aristippus is pleasure or the enjoj'ment of the mo- ment, and pleasure is essentially gentle motion. Pleasure can never be bad, and the primary form of it is bodily pleasure. But, in order to secure the maxi- mum of pleasure, prudent self-control is necessary; and this is virtue. Epicurus held that plexsure is the chief good; but pleasure is rest, not motion; and the highest form of pleasure is freedom from pain and the absence of all desires or needs that we cannot satisfy. Hence an important means towards happiness is the control of our desires, and the extinction of those that we cannot gratify, which is brought about by virtue. (See CYREN.UC School of Philosophy; Hedonism; Happines.s.)
The Stoics. — Everj'thing in the universe is regu- lated b_y law. Man's highest good, or happiness, is to conform his conduct to universal law, which is Divine in its origin. To pursue this end is virtue. Virtue is to be cultivated in scorn of consequences, whether pleasurable or painful. The Stoic principle, "duty for duty's sake alone", reappears in Kant, with the modification that the norm of right action is not to be regarded as imposed by a Divine will; its original source is the human miml, or the free spirit itself.
St. Thomas. — The radical difference which distin- guishes the nobler forms of ancient ethics from Chris- tian ethics is that, whereas the former identifies virtuous life with happiness, that is, with the posses- sion and enjoyment of the highest good, the Christian conception is that a virtuous life, while it is, indeed, the proximate end and good of man, is not, in itself, his ultimate end and supreme good. A life of virtue, the moral good, leads him to the acquisition of an ulterior and ultimate end. Furthermore the happi- ness, which in an imperfect measure attends the virtu- ous life, may be accompanied with pain, sorrow, and the privation of terrestrial goods; complete happiness (beatitudo) is not to be found in earthly existence, but in the life to come, and will consist in union with God, the Supreme Good.
(.\)The Proximate End and Good (Bonum Morale). •^Like all creatures involved in the cosmic system, man requires and seeks for the conservation and perfection of his being a variety of things and conditions, all of which are, therefore, good for him. A composite being, partly corporeal and partly spiritual, he pos- sesses two sets of tendencies and appetites. Rational, he employs contrivance in order to obtain goods not immediately within his reach. That he may attain the perfection of this highly complex nature, he must observe an order in the pursuit of different kinds of goods, lest the enjoyment of a good of lower value may cause him to lose or forfeit a higher one, in which case the former would be no true benefit to him at all. Besides, with a hierarchy of activities, capacities, and needs, he is a unity, an individual, a person; hence there exists for him a good in which all his other goods focus in harmonious correlation; and they are to be viewed and valued through the medium of this para- mount good, not merely in isolated relation to their resjiective corresponding appetites.
There are, then, several divisions of good: (a) corpo- real good is whatever cont ributes t o t he perfection of the purely animal nature; (b) spiritual good is that which perfects the spiritual faculty — knowledge, truth; (c)
