GOOD
641
GOOD
In thus defining human happiness, Aristotle does
not aim at determining which good is absolutely
supreme, but only tluit which relatively is the highest
for man in his present condition — the highest attain-
able in this life {t6 navTav aKpSrarov tCiv irpaKTu>v a-yaBQiv,
Ibid., I, iv, 16). Though Aristotle tlius makes happi-
ness and the highest good to consist in virtuous action,
yet he does not exclude pleasure, but holds that
pleasure in its keenest form springs from virtue.
Pleasure completes an action, is added to it, as "to
youth its bloom" (ofov tois aKixaioi^ t] &pa. Ibid., X,
iv, 8). Since, therefore, Aristotle places man's high-
est good in his perfection, which is identical ■with his
happiness and carries with it pleasure, he is rightly
accounted a Eudseraonist, though of a nobler sort.
(d) Kpicurus (circa 340-270 B. c), whilst accepting in substance the Hedonism of the C'yrenaics, does not admit with them that the highest gooil lies in the pleasure of motion {tiSovti Iv kik^ctci), but rather in the pleasure of rest {i]5oi/Ti KaracrK-ii/iaTtKi^); not in the voluptas in motu but in the stubililas rohiptatis, says Cicero (De Finibus, II, v, 3) — that state of deep peace and perfect contentment in which we feel secure against all the storms of life {arapaila). To attain this is the paramount problem of Epicurus's philoso- phy, to which his empirical logic (canonics) and his theory of nature (the materialism of Democritus) are merely preliminaries. Thus the whole of his philoso- phy is constructed with a view to his Ethics, for which it prepares the way and which completes it.
In holding that the pleasures of the mind are prefer- able to voluptuousness, inasnnich as they endure, while those of the senses pass with the moment that gives them birth, he is not consistent, seeing that his materialism reduces all the operations of the mind'to mere sensations. Finally, as virtue is according to him the tact which impels the wise man to do what- ever contributes to his welfare, and makes him avoid the contrary, it cannot be the highest good, but only a means of realizing it. By his materialLsm Epicurus paved the way for modern Utilitarianism, which has assumed two fortns, viz.:
(e) Individual Utilitarianism, which places man's highest good in his greatest personal welfare and pleasure. This is identical with the Greek Hedonism, and was revived in the eighteenth century by the Encyclopedists, De la Mettrie (1709-1751), Helvetius (1715-1771), Diderot (1713-1784), and De Volney (1757-1820). It was also advocated by the Sensists, Hartley (1704-1757), Priestley (1733-1804) and Hume (1711-177(1); iiud in the nineteenth century by the Cerman Materialists, \'c)gt 11S17-1S95), Mole- scholt llS22-l.S9:i), and Hiicliner i IS24-1,S99);
(f) Social Utilitariunisni, which is mainly of English origin. In its earliest stage, with Hicliard Cumber- land (1632-1718), and Antlumy Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (1C71-1718), it still retained a somewhat subjective character, and placed the highest good in the practice of social benevolence. With Jeremy Benthain (1748-1832) and .John Stuart Mill (1806- 1873), it becomes wholly objective. The highest good, so they say, cannot be the happiness of the in- dividual, but the happiness of the many, " the greatest happiness of the greatest number". Stated m these terms, the proposition is merely a truism. That in general, the happiness of a community is superior to the happiness of one of its members, is obvious ; but, when it comes to be a personal affair, the individual is no longer a jiart of tlie whole, but one party pitted against otiiers. and it is by no means evident, from the positivistic jioint of view, that hLs personal happiness IS not for him the highest good.
(g) This passage from self to non-self, from the indi- vidual to the commimity, Herbert Spencer (1820- 1903) attempted to derive from the evolutionary principle of "the survival of the fittest". Those in- dividuals have evidently a better chance to survive
VI.— 41
who oppose their enemies as a body, and therefore
who live in societies (flocks, herds, human associa-
tions) ; and therefore, again, the social instincts are
destined to survive and grow stronger, while the in-
dividualistic ones cannot but disappear. The highest
good here Ls not the happiness of the individual, not
even the happiness of the present generation, but the
sum total of the conditions which make possible the
survival and the constant progress of mankind at
large. Hence in a system of elaborate synthetic
philosophy Spencer discusses at great length the laws
of life and those conditions of psychologic and social
existence from which, as from a prearranged premise,
he gathers "The Data of Ethics", or Ethics emanci-
pated from the notion of divine legislation.
II. Deontologism. — Under this head may be classed systems which place the highest human good in the conformity of conduct with reason. It assumes an exaggerated or tempered form, according as it excludes or admits regard for human perfection and happiness as one of the elements of morality.
(a) Plato, in common with Socrates and the minor Socratic schools, holds that happiness is the supreme and ultimate object of human endeavour, and that this happiness is identical with the highest good. But when he comes to determine in what this good or hap- piness consists, he does so in accordance with the presuppositions of his philosophical system. The soul in its true essence is declared to be an incorporeal spirit destined for the intuition of the Idea ; hence its ultimate end and supreme good is to be attained by withdrawing from the life of sense and retiring into pure contemplation of the Idea, which is identical with God. Man must, therefore, rise to God and find his chief good in Him. This may be considered the high- est good in the objective order, and Ls found inculcated in those passages of this philosopher's writings in which the solution of the supreme problem of life is sought in flight from sensuality (cf. Theaet., 176, A; Pha-do, 64, E; Republic, VII, 519, C sqg., apud Zeller, pp. 435-444). But inasmuch as this is practi- cally unattainable in this life, man is told that the highest good here is to be found in making himself like God, and that this is to be brought about by the knowledge and the enthusiastic love of God, as the .Supreme Good. In the knowledge, therefore, and love of God as the Supreme Good consists man's high- est good in the subjective order. This is brought out in those passages in which even sensuous beauty is described as worthy of love, and external activity, sensible pleasure, is included among the component elements of the highest good (cf. Republic, X, 603, E sqq.; Phil., 28, A sqq.; Tim., 59, (!).
(b) The Stoic school was founded by Zenoof Cittium (.350-258 B. c). According t.i its followers, the high- est purpose (good) of hunuui life is not to be found in contemplation (Seapta), as Plato would have it, but in action. To live according to nature (6^oXo7oK/i^>'i<js t^ ipiiret f^i/) was their supreme rule of conduct. By this they did not mean that individual luiture of man, but the eternal and divine law which manifests itself in nature as the measure to which all things in the universe should conform their action. For man to live according to nature, therefore, means to conform his will to the divine will, and in this consists virtue. Virtue alone is good in the highest sense of the word, and virtue alone is sufficient for happiness. As this law imposes itself through reason, the system is rightly called rational Deontologism.
(c) Kant agrees with the Stoics in placing the essence of the highest good in virtue, and not in happiness. Yet he thinks our conception of it is incomplete unless it is made to include happiness as well. The highest good may mean either the Supreme (supremum) or the Complete {consummatum) . The Supreme is a condition which is itself unconditioned, or is not subordinate to anything else {originarium) . The
