GOOD
642
GOOD
Complete, again, is a whole which is not itself a part
of a larger whole of the same kind (perfectissimum).
Virtue, or that disposition to act in conformity with
the moral law, is not dependent on happiness, but it-
self makes man worthy of happiness. It is, therefore,
the highest good, the supreme condition of whatever
can be regarded as desirable. But it is not the whole,
nor the supreme good, which finite rational beings
crave; the complete good includes happiness. Hence
the highest conceivable good must consist in the union
of virtue and happiness proportioned to morality.
This is what Kant means by the whole or complete good. Of its two elements, virtue, having no higher condition and being itself the condition of happiness, is the supreme good. Happiness, however, while it is agreeable to the person who possesses it, is not good in itself and in all respects ; it is good only under the con- dition that a man's conduct is in conformity with the moral law. This is why Kant was wont to say that "nothing can be called good without qualification, but good will " ; and since the best it can do in this life is to strive after holiness, the struggle between the desire to obey and the impulse to transgress must con- tinue for ever, making the highest good in this life un- attainable.
III. Rational Eud^monism or Tempered Deon- TOLOGISM. — Christian Philosophers, in dealing with the problem of the highest good, have necessarily kept in view the teachings of Faith; still they base their solution of it on motives of reason. Their system is neither strictly deontologico-rational, nor yet alto- gether eudemonistic, but a consistent blending of both. The ultimate end of man is to be placed in perfect rational activity, in ultimate perfection, and in happi- ness, not as in three different things, but as in one and the self-same, since the three conceptions are resolva- ble into one another, and each of them denotes a goal of human tendency, a limit beyond which no desire remains to be satisfied. Though they differ some- what in their several ways of formulating it, at bottom they all agree: (1) that in the blissful possession of God is to be found the rightful object of reason (man's deontologico-rational end), and of free will (his eu- dcemonistic end) ; (2) that this euda^monistic end — the perfect satisfaction of the will in the possession of God — is not merely an accidental result of the former, but is the positive determination of God, the author of our nature; (3) that this eudsemonLstic end may not be intended by the will for its own sake, to the exclusion of the deontologico-rational end, which, by its nature, it presupposes, and to which it is subordinated.
It is St. Thomas Aquinas who best harmonized this system with revelation. His teaching may be sum- marized thus: (a) man's highest happiness does not consist in pleasure, but in action, since, in the nature of things, action is not for pleasure, but pleasure for action. This activity, on which man's happiness rests, must, on the one hand, be the noblest and high- est of which his nature is capable, and, on the other, it must be directed toward the noblest and the highest object.
(b) This noblest and highest object of human activity is not that of the will, which merely follows upon and is conditioned by knowledge; it must rather be knowledge itself. Consequently , the highest happi- ness of man consists in the knowledge of the highest truth, which is God, With the knowledge of God must, of course, be joined the love of God; but this love is not the essential element of perfect happiness ; it is merely a necessary complement of it (Summa Theol., I-II, Q. iii, a. 2, c; Con. Gen., Ill, xxv, xxvi).
(c) Since the knowledge of God can be acquired in three ways — by demonstration, by faith, and by in- tuition — ^the further question arises: which of these three kinds of knowledge is the foundation of man's highest hapijiness? Not knowledge by tlemonstra- tion, for happiness must be something universal and
attainable by all men, whereas only a few can arrive
at this knowledge by demonstration; neither can
knowledge by faith be a basis for perfect happiness,
seeing that this consists chiefly in the activity of the
intellect, whilst in faith the will claims for itself the
principal part, inasmuch as the will must here deter-
mine the intellect to give its assent. Consequently
happiness can consist only in the intuitive knowledge
of God; and since this is attainable only in the next
life, it follows that the ultimate destiny of man — and
hence his highest good — reaches beyond time into
eternity. It must be everlasting, otherwise it would
not be perfect (Con. Gent., Ill, xxxviii, sqq.).
(d) This end is not merely a subjective one which the reason imposes upon itself. Just because it is an activity, it involves relation to some external object. The intellect essentially represents a truth distinct from itself, as the act of the will is an inclination to- wards some good not identical with itself. The truth to be represented, therefore, and the good to be at- tained or possessed, are objects to which happiness refers as to further ends, just as the image has refer- ence to a model and motion to a goal. Truth, there- fore, and good are objective ends to which formal happiness corresponds as a subjective end. The absolutely ultimate end, therefore, is in the objective order, beyond which nothing remains to be known and desired, and which, when it is known and possessed, gives rest to the rational faculties. This can be nothing else than the infinite truth and the infinite good, which is God. Hence the system is not a purely deontologico-rational one, constituting the reason a law to itself, the observance of which law would be the highest good.
(t) Still less is it purely eudsemonistic, since the ulti- mate end and highest good does not coincide with subjective happiness as Hedonism teaches, but with the object of the highest acts of contemplation and love. This object is God, not merely as beatifying us, but as the Absolute Truth and Goodness, infinitely perfect in itself.
Ueberweg, History of Philosophy (New York, 1872); Turn- er, History of Philosophy (Boston, 1903); Stoeckl-Finlat, History of Philosophy (Dublin, 1903); Kant, Critique of Practi- cal Reason, ed. Abbott (London, 1898); Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, II (London, 1897); Idem, Plato and the Older Academy (London, 1888); Janet and Seailles, //i«/oryo/ the Problems of Philosophy, II (London, 1902); Bywater, Ariilotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, 1894); Ming, Dnla of Modern Ethics Examined (New York, 1894); Meyer, In^tilu- tioncs Juris Natnralis, I (Freiburg im Br., 1885); S. Thomce Aqiiinatis Summa Theologica; Summa contra Gentiles; Suarez, De Ultimo Fine Hominis.
M. F. DiNNEEN.
Good Faith, a phrase employed to designate the mental and moral state of honest, even if objectively unfounded, conviction as to the truth or falsehood of a proposition or body of opinion, or as to the rectitude or depravity of a line of conduct. One who is in this condition, so far as the violation of positive law, or even, in certain junctures, of the natural law, is con- cerned, is said to labour under an invincible error, and hence to be guiltless. This consideration is often in- voked in behalf of those who are outside of the visible aflSliation of the Catholic Church. It is not unfre- quently applied to determine the degree of right or obligation prevailing in the various forms of human engagements, such as contracts, etc. In the matter of prescription it is held to be an indispensable require- ment whether there be question of acquiring dominion or freeing oneself from a burden. Likewise, in decid- ing the duty incumbent upon one who finds himself in possession of another's property, cognizance is taken of the good faith with which perchance the holding has been begun and accompanied. Finally, if a person, although actually in the state of mortal sin, were in good faith to come to Holy Communion, such a one, according to the judgment of many theologians, would receive sanctifying grace. The reason alleged by
