GRACE
G98
GRACE
nor is it to be confounded with ordinary graces, nor
finally to be looked upon as a result of the mere power
of perseverance (posse perseivrare). Hence, as a new
and special grace, it ultimately is but a continuous
series of efficacious (not merely sufficient) graces com-
bined with a particular external protection of God
against fall into sin and with the final experience of a
happy death. The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can.
xvi) is therefore justified in speaking of it as a great
gift — " magnum donum ". The Bible extols final per-
severance, now as a special grace not included in the
bare notion of justification (Phil., i, G; I Pet., i, 5), now
as the precious fruit of special prayer (Matt., xxvi, 41 ;
John, xvii, 11; Col., iv, 12). Augustine (De dono
persev., c. iii) used the necessity of such prayer as a
basis of argumentation, but added, for the consolation
of the faithful, that, while this great grace could not
be merited by good works, it could by persevering,
genuine prayer be obtained with infalhble certainty.
Hence the practice of pious Christians to pray daily
for a good death can never be too earnestly com-
mended.
(b) Gratuity. — Beside the necessity of actual grace, its absolute gratuity stands out as the second funda- mental question in the Christian doctrine on this sub- ject. The very name of grace excludes the notion of merit. But the gratuity of specifically Christian grace is so great and of such a superior character that even mere natural petition for grace or positive natural dispositions cannot determine God to the be- stowal of his supernatural assistance. A mere nega- tive preparation or mere negative dispositions, on the contrary, which consist only in the natural removal of obstacles, are in all probabilit}^ not essentially opposed to gratuity. Owing to its gratuitous character, grace cannot be earned by strictly natural merit either in strict justice {meritum de condigno) or as a matter of fitness {meritum de congruo). But is not this asser- tion in conflict with the dogma that the just man can, through suiMrnatiU'al works, merit de condigno an in- creai>e in the state of grace and eternal glory, just as the sinner can, through salutary acts, earn de congruo justification and all graces leading up to it? That it is not, will be clearly evident if it be remembered that the merits springing from supernatural grace are no longer natural, but supernatural (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. xvi). The absolute gratuity of grace is, therefore, safeguarded if it is referred to the initial grace (prima gratia means), with which the work of salvation begins, and which is preceded by pure and mere nature. For it then follows that the whole sub- sequent series of graces, up to justification, is not and cannot be merited any more than the initial grace. We shall now briefly examine the gratuity of grace in its several degrees as indicated above.
(a) The gratuitous character of grace categorically excludes real and strict natural merit with a rightful claim to just compensation as well as merit improperly so called implying a claim to reward as a matter of fit- ness. The meritorious character of our actions in the former sense was defended by the Pelagians, while the Semipelagians advocated it in the latter meaning. To this twofold error the infallible teaching authority of the Church opposed the dogmatic declaration that the initial grace preparatory to justification is in no wise due to natural merit as a determining factor (Cf. Second Synod of Orange, epilogue; Council of Trent, Sess. VI, cap. v). The categorical synodal expres- sion, nullis prceeedentibus mentis, wards ofi' from grace, as a poisonous breath, not only the Pelagian condign merit, but also the Semipelagian congruous merit. The presupposition that grace can be merited by nat- ural deeds involves a latent contradiction. For it would be attributing to nature the power to bridge over with its own strength the chasm lying between the nat- ural and the supernatural order. In powerfully elo- quent words docs Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans,
declare that the vocation to the Faith was not granted
to the Jews in consequence of the works of the Mosaic
Law, nor to the pagans because of the observance of
the natural moral law, but that the concession was en-
tirely gratuitous. He inserts the harsh statement:
"Therefore he hath mercyonwhom he will; and whom
he will, hehardeneth" (Rom., ix, 18). The Doctor of
Grace, Augustine (De peccato orig., xxiv, 28), like a
second Paul, advocates the absolute gratuity of grace,
when he writes: "Non enim gratia Dei erit ullo modo,
nisi gratuita f uerit onini modo ' ' (For it will not be the
grace of God in any way unless it has been gratuitous in
every way) . He lays stress on the fundamental prin-
ciple: " Grace does not find the merits in existence, but
causes them", and substantiates it decisively thus:
" Non gratia ex merito, sed meritum ex gratia. Nam
si gratia ex merito, emisti, non gratis accepisti" (Not
grace by merit, but merit by grace. For if grace by
merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis. — Serm.,
169, c. II). Not even Chrysostom could be suspected
of Semipelagianism, as he thought in this matter pre-
cisely like Paul and Augustine.
(/3) While natural merit suppresses the idea of gratu- ity in grace, the same cannot be affirmed of natural prayer (preces naturw, oratio mituraUs), as long as we do not ascribe to it any intrinsic right to be heard and to God a duty to answer it — a right and duty which are undoubtedly implied in supernatural petitions (cf. John, xvi, 23 sq.). Prayer does not, like merit, ap- peal to the justice or equity of God, but to his liberal- ity and mercy. The sphere of influence of prayer is consequently much more extensive than the power of merit. The gratuity of Christian grace is, neverthe- less, to be understood so strictly that pure nature can- not obtain even the smallest grace by the most fervent prayer. Such is the doctrine asserted by the Second Synod of Orange (can. iii) against the Semipelagians. It is based on a positive Divine decree and can no longer be deduced from the intrinsic impossibility of the contrary. It is therefore permissible, without prejudice to the Faith, to adopt Ripalda's opinion (De ente supernat., disp. xix, sect. 3), which holds that, in an economy of salvation different from the present, natural prayer for grace would be entitled to be heard. How little this is the case in the present dispensation is best learned from the language of the Bible. We are told that in our infirmity "we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings" (Rom. viii, 26; cf. I Cor., xii, 3). The supernatural union with Christ is, moreover, represented as tiie indispensable condition of every successful petition (John, xv, 7). Every wholesome prayer being in itself a salutary act, it must, according to antecedent statements, spring from prevenient grace. Augustine (De dono persev., xxiii, 64) in vivid descriptions brings home to the Semipelagians their delusion in thinking that true prayer comes from us and not from God who inspires it. . On an almost identical level with natural prayer stand the positive preparation and dispositions to grace (capacitas, sive prceparatio positiva). It often occurs in human life that the positive disposition to a natural good includes in itself a certain claim to satis- faction, as, e. g. thirst of itself calls for quenching. This is still more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive preparation for the good in question. Thus the student has acquired by his preparation for the examination a certain claim to be sooner or later admitted to it. But how about grace? Does there exist in man a positive disposition and a claim to grace in the sense that the witl holding of this expected blessing would sensibly injuie and bit- terly disappoint the soul? Or can man, unai led, posi- tively dispose himself for the reception of grace, con- fident that God will reward his natural efforts vith the bestowal of supernatural grace? Both supp'isitions are untenable. For, according to the express teach-
