GRACE
699
GRACE
ing of the Apostle Paul and of the Fathers of the
Church, the gratuity of grace is rooted solely in the
supreme freedom of the Divine will, and the nature of
man possesses not even the slightest claim to grace.
As a consequence, the relapse into Semipelagianism is
unavoidable as soon as we seek in the positive disposi-
tion or preparation a cause for the bestowal of grace.
It should be remembered, moreover, that nature is
never found in its pure form, but that, from the be-
ginning, mankind is defiled by original sin. This
consideration still more forcibly puts before us the
necessity of denying to sinful nature the power to
draw down upon itself, like an arid region, the effusion
of Divine grace, either by its natural constitution or
its own endeavours.
(7) Negative disposition or preparation (capadtas sive prcEparalio negativa) designates, in general, the absence or removal of obstacles which are an impedi- ment to the introduction of a new form, as green wood is dried up to become fit for burning. The question arises, whether the requirement of such merely negative natural preparation is reconcilable with the absolute gratuity of grace. Some of the earlier Schoolmen cited in answer the celebrated much-debated axiom: Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegal graliam (To the one who does what in him lies, God does not deny grace). If among the proposed interpretations of this proposition we adopt the one asserting that, in consequence of the commendable en- deavours of the natural will, God does not withhold from anyone the first grace of vocation, we necessarily fall into the Semipelagian heresy refuted above. In order systematically to exclude this contingency, many Schoolmen thus interpreted the axiom with St. Thomas (Summa, I-II, Q. cix, a. 6): "To the one who accom- plishes what he can with the help of supernatural grace God grants further and more powerful graces up to justification." But, interpreted in this manner, the axiom offers nothing new and has nothing to do with the above-proposed question. There remains, therefore, a third interpretation: God, out of mere liberality, does not withhold His grace from the one who accomplishes what he can with his natural moral strength, i. e. from the one who, by deliberate absten- tion from offences, seeks to dispose God favourably towards him and thus prepares himself negatively for grace. Some theologians (e. g. Vasquez, Glossner) declared even this most mitigated and mildest inter- pretation to be Semipelagian. Most modern theo- logical authorities, however, with Molina, Suarez, and Lessius, see in it nothing else but the expression of the truth: To the one who prepares himself negatively and places no obstacle to the ever-ready influence of grace, God in general is more inclined to offer his grace than to another who wallows in the mire of sin and thus neglects to accomplish what lies in his power. In this manner the cause of the distribution of grace is located not in the dignity of nature, but, conformably to orthodoxy, in the universal will of God to save man- kind.
(c) Universality. — The universality of grace does not conflict with its gratuity, if God, in virtue of his will to save all men, distributes with sovereign liberty his graces to all adults without exception. But if the universality of grace is only a result of the Divine will to save all mankind, we must first turn our attention to the latter as the basis of the former.
(a) By the "will to save" (voluntas Dei salvifica) theologians understand the earnest and sincere will of God to free all men from sin and lead them to super- natural happiness. As this will refers to human na- ture as such, it is a merciful will, also called "first" or "antecedent will" {voluntas prijna sive aniecedens). It is not absolute, but conditional, inasmuch as no one is saved if he does not will it or does not comply with the conditions laid down by God for salvation. The "second" or "consequent will" {voluntas secunda sive
consequens), on the contrary, can only be absolute, i. e.
a will of justice, as God must simply reward or punish
according as one has deserved by his works heaven or
hell. — We consider here solely the "antecedent will"
to save; regarding the will of justice see Predestina-
tion.
Against the error of the Calvinists and Jansenists the ecclesiastical teaching authority (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, can. xvLi; Prop, v Jansenii damn., in Denzinger, n. 827, 1096) proclaimed in the first place the doctrine that God seriously wills the salvation not of the predestined only, but also of other men. As the Church obliged all her faithful to the recital of the passage of the creed, " Qui propter nos homines et propter nostrani salutem descendit de coelis", it is also established with certainty of faith that at least all the faithful are included in the universality of salva- tion willed by God. Not to mention the touching scene in which Jesus weeps over the impenitent Jeru- salem (cf. Matt., xxiii, 37), the following is the declara- tion of the Saviour himself respecting believers: "For God so loved the world, as to give his only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting" (John, iii, 16). Far from limiting the will to save to these two classes of men, the predestined and believers, theologians ad- here to the theological conclusion that God, without regard to original sin, wills the eternal salvation of all the posterity of Adam. The range of this will cer- tainly extends further than the circle of believers, the eternal reprobation of many of whom is a notorious fact. For Pope Alexander VIII (1690) condemned the proposition that Christ died " for all the faithful and only for them " {pro omnibus et solis fidelibus. — See Denzinger, n. 1294). The foreknowledge of original sin is no reason for God to e.xcept some men from his will of redemption, as the Calvinist sect called Infra- lapsarians or Postlapsarians (from infra, or post, lap- sum) asserted in Holland against the strictly Calvinist opinion of those called Supralapsarians or Antelapsar- ians (from supra, or ante, lapsum. — See Arminianism). In proof of the Catholic contention, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. ii) rested on the Biblical text which exhibits the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ as offered not only for ovir sins, " but also for those of the whole world" (I John, ii, 2). We possess, besides, two classical Scriptural passages which exclude all doubt. The Book of Wisdom (xi, 24 sqq.) eulogizes in stirring language the all-exceeding mercy of God and bases its universality on the omnipotence of God {quia omnia pates), on his universal domination {quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia, quw jecisti), and on his love for souls {qui amas animas). Wherever, therefore. Di- vine omnipotence and domination extend, wherever immortal souls are to be fouml, thither also the will to grant salvation extends, so that it cannot be exclusive of any human being. After St. Paul (I Tim., ii, 1 sqq.) has ordained prayers for all men and proclaimed them " acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved " {omnes homines vult salvos fieri), he adds a threefold motivation: "For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a redemption for all " (1. c). Hence it is just as true that the will to grant salvation extends to all men as it is that God is the God of all men, and that Christ as mediator as- sumed the nature of all men and redeemed them on the Cross. In regard to tradition, Passaglia, as early as 1851, brilliantly demonstrated the universality of this Divine intention from two hundred Fathers of the Church and ecclesiastical writers. Augustine alone presents some difficulty. It may, however, be con- sidered as certain to-day that the great Bishop of Hippo interpreted in the year 412 the Pauline text with all the other Fathers of the Church in the sense of a universal will to save all men without exception and that subsequently he never explicitly retracted this
