GRACE
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GRACE
view (De spir. et lit., xxiii, 58). But it is equally cer-
tain that from 421 onwards (cf. Enchir., xxvii, 103;
Contr. Julian., IV, viii, 42; De corr. et grat., xv, 47) he
attempted such tortuous and violent interpretations
of the clear, unmistakable text that the Divine will re-
garding human salvation was no longer universal, but
particular. The mystery can only be solved by the
admission that Augustine still believed in a plurality
of literal senses in the Bible (cf. Confess., XII, xvii
sqq.). To avoid the necessity of imputing to the
Holy Ghost the inspiration of contradictions in the
same text, he conceived in his three divergent inter-
pretations the Divine will concerning salvation as the
" second " or " consequent will ", which, as absolute
will destining men to eternal happiness, must natu-
rally be particular, no less than the consequent will
affecting the reprobate (cf. J. B. Faure, " Notse in En-
chir. s. Augustini", c. 103, p. 195 sqq., Naples, 1847).
The most difficult problem concerning this Divine will
to save all men, a real crux theologorum, lies in the
mysterious attitude of God towards children dying
without baptism. Did God sincerely and earnestly
will the salvation also of the little ones who, without
fault of their own, fail to receive the baptism of water
or blood and are thus forever deprived of the beatific
vision? Only a few theologians (e. g. Bellarmine,
Vasquez) are bold enough to answer this question in
the negative. Either invincible ignorance, as among
the pagans, or the physical order of nature, as in still-
births, precludes the possibility of the administration
of baptism without the least culpability on the part of
the children. The difficulty lies, therefore, in the fact
that God, the author of the natural order, eventually
declines to remove the existing obstacles by means of
a miracle. The well-meant opinion of some theolo-
gians (.\rrubal, Kilber, Mannens) that the whole and
full guilt falls in all instances not on God, but on men
(for example, on the imprudence of the mothers), is
evidently too airy an hypothesis to be entitled to con-
sideration. Tlie subterfuge of Klee, the writer on
dogma, that self-consciousness is awakened for a short
time in dying chililren, to render baptism of desire
possible to tlieni, is just as unsatisfactory and objec-
tionable as Cardinal Cajetan's admission, disapproved
of by Pius X, that the prayer of Christian parents, act-
ing like a baptism of desire, saves their children for
heaven. We are thus confronted with an unsolved
mystery. Our ignorance of the manner does not de-
stroy, however, the theological certainty of the fact.
For the above-cited Biblical texts are of such unques-
tionable universality that it is impossible to exclude a
priori millions of children from the Divine will to save
humankind. — Cf. Bolgeni, "Stato dei bambini morti
senza battesimo" (Rome, 1787); Didiot, "Ungetauft
verstorbene Kinder, Dogmatische Trostbriefe"
(Kempen, 1898); A. Seitz, "Die Heilsnotwendigkeit
der Kirche" (Freiburg, 1903), pp. 301 sqq.
(|3) The universality of grace is a necessary conse- quence of the will to save all men. For adults this will transforms itself into the concrete Divine will to distribute " sufficient " graces; it evidently involves no obligation on God to bestow only " efficacious" graces. If it can be established, therefore, that God grants to the three classes of the just, sinners, and infidels truly sufficient graces for their eternal salvation, the proof of the universality of grace w'll have been furnished. Without prejudice to this universality, God may either await the moment of its actual necessity before bestowing grace, or He may, even in time of need (e. g. in vehement temptation), grant immediately only the grace of prayer (gratia orationis sive remote sufficiens) . But in the latter case he must be ever ready to confer immediate grace for action (gr. operationis s. proxime sufjicii'iis), if the adult has made a faithful use of the grace oi prayer.
So far a.s the category of the just is concerned, the heretical proposition of Jansen, that "the observance
of some commandments of God is impossible to the
just for want of grace" (see Denzinger, n. 1092), had
already been exploded by the anathema of the Council
of Trent (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, can. xviii). In
fact Holy Writ teaches concerning the just, that the
yoke of Jesus is sweet, and His burden light (Matt., xi,
30), that the commandments of God are not heavy (I
John, V, 3), that " God is faithful, who will not suffer you
to be tempted above that which you are able : but will
make also with temptation issue, that you may be able
to bear it" (I Cor., x, 13). These statements warrant
not only the full possibility of the observance of the
Divine commandments and the triumph over vehe-
ment temptations ; they virtually express simultane-
ously the concession of the necessary grace without
which all these salutary acts are known to be abso-
lutely impossible. It is true that in the polemical
writings of some Fathers of the Church a,gainst the
Pelagians and Semipelagians we read the proposition:
"The grace of God is not granted to all." But a
closer examination of the passages immediately re-
veals the fact that they speak of efficacious, not of
sufficient, grace. This distinction is expressly stated
by the anonymous writer of the fifth century whom
Pope Gelasius commends as an "experienced ecclesi-
astical teacher" (probatus ecdesia; ?nagisier). In his
excellent work "De vocatione gentium", he differen-
tiates the "general" (betngnitas Dei generalis) and the
"particular" economy of grace (specialis misericor-
dia), referring the former to the distribution of suffi-
cient, the latter to that of efficacious, graces. We
come to the second class, that of Christian sinners,
among whom we reckon apostates and formal heretics,
a.s the.se can hardlj' be placed on aparwith the heathen.
In their valuation of the distribution of grace, theolo-
gians distinguish somewhat sharply between ordinary
sinners (among whom they include habitual and re-
lapsing sinners) and those sinners whose intellect is
blinded, and whose heart is hardened, the so-called
obdurate sinners {ohccecati et indurati, impcmitentes).
The bestowal of grace on the former group is, they say,
of a higher degree of certainty than its concession to the
latter, although for both the universality of sufficient
grace is beyond any doubt. Not only is it said of
sinners in general: "I desire not the death of the
wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and
live" (Ezech.,xx.\iii, ll),andagain: "TheLord ....
dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any
should perish, but that all should return to penance "
(II Peter, iii, 9), but even the obdurate and impenitent
sinners are energetically summoned by the Bible to
dutiful penance or at least are most vehemently rep-
rimanded because of their wickedness (Is., Ixv, 2;
Rom., ii, 4; Acts, vii, 51). Now where a duty of
conversion exists, the necessary grace must be at hand
without which no conversion is possible. For, as
Augustine (De nat. et grat., xliii, n. 50) affirms:
"Deus impo,ssibilia non jubet" (God does not give
impossible orders). Obduracy, however, forms such a
powerful obstacle to conversion that some ancient
theologians embraced the untenable opinion that God
finally completely withdraws from these sinners, a
withdrawal due to His mercj', which desires to save
thein from a more severe punishment in hell. But
St. Thomas Aquinas (De verit., Q. xxiv, a. 11)
stated that "complete obduracy" (obstinutio pcr-
fecta), or absolute impossibility of conversion, begins
only in hell itself; "incomplete obduracy", on the
contrary, ever presents on earth in the enfeeliled moral
affections of the heart a point of contact through
which the appeal of grace may obtain entrance.
Were the rigorist opinion of God's complete aban-
donment of tlie obdurate correct, despair of God's
mercy would be jierfectly justified in such souls. The
Catholic catechism, however, presents this as a new
grievous sin.
The third and last question arises: Is the grace of
