This, however, is an Opinion which cannot be suppos'd consistent with found Theism. For whatever be decided as to a future Life, or the Rewards and Punishments of hereafter; he who, as a found Theist believes a reigning Mind, sovereign in Nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as of Wisdom and Power, must necessarily believe Virtue to be naturally good and advantageous. For what cou'd more strongly imply an unjust Ordinance, a Blot and Imperfection in the general Constitution of Things, than to suppose Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice the natural Good of any Creature?
And now last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further Advantage to Virtue, in the Theistical Belief above the Atheistical. The Proposition may at first sight appear over-refin'd, and of a sort which is esteem'd too nicely philosophical. But after what has been already examin'd, the Subject perhaps may be more easily explain'd.
There is no Creature, according to what has been already prov'd, who must not of necessity be ill in some degree, by having any Affection or Aversion in a stronger degree than is sutable to his own private Good, or that of the System to which he is join'd. For in either
