EXI
[ 3*5 j
EXO
Cnfy to thofe in ABli. Note, however, that this docs not obtain in God j about whofe Nature and Effence the Mind cannot think, without conceiving his Exigence.
We have divers Ways of arriving at the Knowledge of the Exijlence of Things. — Our own Exijlence we know by Intuition; the Exijlence of a God, by Demonstration : And that t)f other Things by Senfation.
As for our own Exijlence; we perceive it fo plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any Proof. I think, I reafon, I feel Pleafure and Pain : Can any of thefe be more evident to me than my own Exijlence ? If I doubt of all other Things, that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Exijlence^ and will not iuffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, 1 have as certain a Perception of the Thing doubting, as of that Thought which 1 call Doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Exijlence, and an internal, inkdlible Perception that we are. In every Act of Senfation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are confeious to our felves of our own Being, and in this Matter come not ihort of the higheit Degree of Certainty. See Cartesianism.
As to our Knowledge of the Exijlence of a God 5 tho' he has given u- no innate Ideas of himfelf, yet having furnifh'd us with Faculties of Senfe, Perception and Rea- fon^ we can never want a clear Proof thereof. See God.
The Knowledge of the Exigence of other Things, i. e. of external Objects, Bodies, a World, gfc. we only have by Senfation - 7 for there being no neceflary Connexion of real Exijlence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory j nor of any other Exijtence but that of God, with the Exijlence of any particular Man 5 no particular Man can know the Exiftence of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes it felt be perceived by him. The having the Idea ot any Thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exijlence of that Thing, than- the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World ; or the Virions of a Dream make a true Hittory. It is there- fore the actual receiving of Ideas from without, that gives us notice ot the Exijlence of other Things, and makes us know that fomethfng doth exijl at that Time without us, which caufes that Idea in us, tho' we neither know, nor coniider how it doth it.
This Notice which we have by our Senfes of the exijling of Things without us, tho' it be not altogether fo certain as Intuition and Demonitrationj yet deferves the Name ot Knowledge, if we perfuade our felves, that our Faculties act and intorm us right, concerning the Exijtence of thofe Ob- jects that affect them. See Knowledge.
Now befides the AfTurance ot our Senfes emfelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Exijlence of Things without us, we have other concurrent Reafons .- As 1°. It is plain thofe Perceptions are produced in us, by exterior Caufes affecting our Senfes, becaufe thofe that want the Organs oi any Senfe, never have the Ideas be- longing to that Senfe produced in their Minds. 2 . Be- cauie we find we cannot avoid the having thofe Ideas produced in our Minds : When our Eyes are fhut, we can at Pleafure recal to our Mind the Ideas of Light, or the Sun, which former Senfations had lodged in our Me- mories ; but if we turn our Eyes towards the Sun, we cannot avoid the Ideas, which the Light or the Sun then produces in us j which fhews a manifeft Difference be- tween thofe Ideas laid up in the Memory, and fuch as force themfelves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. Beiidts, there is no Body who doth not perceive the Dif- ference 'in himfelf between actually looking upon the Sun, and contemplating the Idea he has of it in his Memory 5 and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory or Fancy. Thirdly, Add to this, that many Ideas are produced in us with Pain, which we afterwards remember without the leaft Offence : Thus, the Pain of Heat or Cold, when the Idea of it is rec iv'd in our Minds, gives us no Disturbance ; which when felt, was very troublefome 5 and we remember the Pain of Hunger, Tnirft, Head-ach, &c. without any Pain at all, which would either never difturb us, or elfe conltantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Exigence of Things affect- ing us from abroad. 4 . Our Senfes, in many Cafes, bear Witnefs to the Truth of each others Report, concerning the Exijlence of fenfiblc Things without us : He that doubts, when he fees a Fire, whether it be real, may feel it too, if he pleafes, and by the exquisite Pain may be convinced, that it is not a bare Idea or Phantom.
Such is Mr. Lock's Demonflration of the Exijlence oi External Bodies. _
, The ingenious Mr. Berkeley has a quite different Syltem. External Bodies, he contends, have no Exijlence but in a Mind perceiving them j that is, they only exijl, quatenus they are percdv'd j there Exijlere is percipi. They have
no Exijlence, nor Shadow of Exijlence oui of our Minds, And of this he has given us what he and fome others account a Demonffration. See Body, External World, Set.
As to the Exijlence of Spirits^ Mr. Lock allows, that our having Ideas of them, does not make us know, that any fuch Things do exijl without us j or that there are any finite Spirits, or any other fpiritual Beings, but God. We have ground from Revelation, and feveral other Rea- fons, to believe with AfTurance, that there are fuch Crea- tures ; but our Senfes being not able to difcover them, we want the Means of' knowing their particular Exijlence : For we can no more know that there are finite Spirits really Exijling by the Idea we have of fuch Beings, than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come to know that Things anfwering to thofe Ideas do really exijl.
EXIT, properly exprgffes the Departure of a Player from off the Stage, when he hath acted his Part. — The Word is alfo uftd in a figurative Senfe to exprefs any- Kind of Departure.
EXITUS, in Law, TJfues 5 or, the yearly Rents, or Profits of Lands or Tenements. See Issue.
fLX-?nero motu, are formal Words ufed in the King's Charters, and Letters patent 3 fignifying that he does what is contain'd therein Of his own WHl and Motion.— The Effect of thefe Words is to bar all Exceptions that might be taken to the Inllrument, by alledging that the Prince, in paffing fuch Charter, was abufed by falfe Suggestion.
EXOCATACOELUS, in Antiquity, a general Deno- mination, under which were included feveral grand Officers of the Church at Conjlantinople ; as the Grand Oicono- mus, Grand Sacellarius, Grand Majler of the Chapped Grand Scevophylac, or Keeper of the Veffel, Grand Carto- phylax, the Majler of the little Chappelj and the Tro- tecdicus, or firft Defender of the Church.
The Exocatacceli, were of great Authority : In public Afemblies they had the Precedence of Bifhops; and in the Patriarchate of Conjlantinople, did the Office of Deacons 5 as the Cardinals originally did in the church at Rome. Accordingly, in the Letter of John IX. to the E nperor Sajil Leo, they are call'd Cardinales. See Cardinal.
At flrff they were Priefts 5 but fome Patriarch of Con- fiantinople, whom Codin does not mention, would have them for the future to be no more than Deacons. The Reafon was, that being Priefts, each of them had their feveral Churches, wherein they were to officiate on all the grand Feftival Days $ fo that it unhappily tell out, the Patriarch on the moil folemn Days was denoted by all his chief Minifters. See Deacon.
The Criticks are not at all agreed about the Origin of their Name Exacatacceli : Junius, in 'his Edition of Codin, breaks the Word into two, and reads s£ K«t7tfw>u&^ q. d. Six Catacttli -j but this Reading, tho' authorized by feveral MSS. is faulty j the Generality of Copies only making one Word : Beiide that they are call'd Evaeata- cozli, even when there were only five of them. The fame Junius derives Cataccelus hence, that thefe Officers dwelt in the Valleys, k&tv- tws KWAet/«c
'Pet. Gregor. f'olofan, takes the Word to have been form'd from jtshthxh^w, pcnmilceo, jlia-vitate Animum de- linio : But Gretfer rejects this Etymology, as without any Foundation. In Lieu thereof, he proposes another Conjecture- tho' with a good deal of Timidity : He reads h£ay&}a- Kihuij inffead of t|»igffeKofAiK, as if they were thus called by Reafon they lodged, or lived out of the Patriarchal Palace.
Fa. Goar rejects this Opinion, and had rather they fhould read 6^ffl^t7««sAA.w, as intimating they were thus call'd in Oppofition to the Syncellus, who lay in the Pa- triarch's Apartment, which the reft did not ; but he is far from being of the Opinion that Officers of fo much Eminence, fhould take their Denomination from a Thing which tefbifies a Want of a Privilege. He chufes, therefore, to imagine that all the inferior Priefts were call*d K^tts- koiKoi, Catacoili, q. d. People of a low Condition ; and that their Superiors were call'd Exocatacceli, q. d. People out of the Number of Katacceli, or above them.
Upon the whole, however, he adheres to the Sentiment of G. Corefius, who fays, that the Patriarchal Palace and the Apartments of the Syncelhts, and the Monks in the Patriarch's Service, were in a very low Part of the City, which with Regard to the reft fecnVd a Valley or Pit ; and that the Offices above mentioned had their fe- veral Houfes, or Palaces, !§», out of the Valley : Whence the Name Exocatac&li.
The Opinion of M. du Cange is the Iaff we fhall name : He
derives the Appellation from their being above the Level, or
Rank of the other Clerks $ and feated at Church, &c. in more
J? f f * honour-
