Friday, June 8, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment—11 states. Mr. PINCKNEY moved, "that the national legislature shall have the power of negativing all laws to be passed by the state legislatures which they may judge improper," in the room of the clause as it stood reported.
He grounds his motion on the necessity of one supreme controlling power, and he considers this as the corner-stone of the present system; and hence the necessity of retrenching the state authorities, in order to preserve the good government of the national council.
Mr. WILLIAMSON against the motion. The national legislature ought to possess the power of negativing such laws only as will encroach on the national government.
Mr. MADISON wished that the line of jurisprudence could be drawn—he would be for it—but, upon reflection, he finds it impossible, and therefore he is for the amendment. If the clause remains without the amendment, it is inefficient. The judges of the state must give the state laws their operation, although the law abridges the rights of the national government. How is it to be repealed? By the power who made it. How shall you compel them? By force! To prevent this disagreeable expedient, the power of negativing is absolutely necessary. This is the only attractive principle which will retain its centrifugal force, and without this the planets will fly from their orbits.
Mr. GERRY supposes that this power ought to extend to all laws already made ; but the preferable mode would be to designate the powers of the national legislature, to which the negative ought to apply. He has no objection to restrain the laws which may be made for issuing paper money. Upon the whole, he does not choose, on this important trust, to take a leap in the dark.
Mr. PINCKNEY supposes that the proposed amendment had no retrospect to the state laws already made. The adoption of the new government must operate as a complete repeal of all the constitutions and state laws, as far as they are inconsistent with the new government.
Mr. WILSON supposes the surrender of the rights of a federal government to be a surrender of sovereignty. True, we may define some of the rights, but when we come near the line, it cannot be found. One general excepting clause must therefore apply to the whole. In the beginning of our
