troubles, Congress themselves were as one state. Dissensions or state interests were not known. They gradually crept in after the formation of the Constitution, and each took to himself a slice. The original draft of Confederation was drawn on the first ideas; and the draft concluded on, how different!
Mr. BEDFORD was against the motion, and states the proportion of the intended representation of the number 90: Delaware 1—Pennsylvania and Virginia one third. On this computation, where is the weight of the small states, when the interest of the one is in competition with the other on trade, manufactures, and agriculture? When he sees this mode of government so strongly advocated by the members of the great states, he must suppose it a question of interest.
Mr. MADISON confesses it is not without its difficulties on many accounts; some may be removed, others modified, and some are unavoidable. May not this power be vested in the senatorial branch? They will probably be always sitting. Take the question on the other ground—who is to determine the line when drawn in doubtful cases? The state legislatures cannot, for they will be partial in support of their own powers; no tribunal can be found. It is impossible that the Articles of Confederation can be amended. They are too tottering to be invigorated. Nothing but the present system, or something like it, can restore the peace and harmony of the country.
The question put on Mr. Pinckney's motion—7 states against it; Delaware divided; Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, for it. Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
Saturday, June 9, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment. Motion by Mr. GERRY to reconsider the appointment of the national executive: "that the national executive be appointed by the state executives."
He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great number of bad men of various descriptions. These will make a wrong appointment; besides, an executive thus
appointed will have his partiality in favor of those who appointed him—that this will not be the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this means be independent of the national legislature; but the appointment by
vol. i.51
