purposes. If we give this power to the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from office: his will and pleasure will be the slight tenure by which an office is to be held; and of consequence, you render the officer the mere state dependant, the abject slave, of a person who may be disposed to abuse the confidence his fellow-citizens have placed in him.
Another danger may result. If you desire an officer to be a man of capacity and integrity, you may be disappointed. A gentleman possessed of these qualities, knowing he may be removed at the pleasure of the President, will be loath to risk his reputation on such insecure ground. As the matter stands in the Constitution, he knows, if he is suspected of doing any thing wrong, he shall have a fair trial, and the whole of his transactions developed by an impartial tribunal: he will have confidence in himself when he knows he can only be removed for improper behavior. But if he is subjected to the whim of any man, it may deter him from entering into the service of his country; because, if he is not subservient to that person's pleasure, he may be turned out, and the public may be led to suppose for improper behavior. This impression cannot be removed, as a public inquiry cannot be obtained. Beside this, it ought to be considered, that the person who is appointed will probably quit some other office or business in which he is occupied. Ought he, after making this sacrifice in order to serve the public, to be turned out of place without even a reason being assigned for such behavior? Perhaps the President does not do this with an ill intention: he may have been misinformed, for it is presumable that a President may have round him men envious of the honors or emoluments of persons in office, who will insinuate suspicions into his honest breast, that may produce a removal; be this as it may, the event is still the same to the removed officer. The public suppose him guilty of malpractices—hence his reputation is blasted, his property sacrificed. I say his property is sacrificed, because I consider his office as his property: he is stripped of this, and left exposed to the malevolence of the world, contrary to the principles of the Constitution, and contrary to the principles of all free governments, which are, that no man shall be despoiled of his property but by a fair and impartial trial.
I have stated that, if the power is given by the Constitution, the declaration in the law is nugatory; and I will add, if it is not given, it will be nugatory also to attempt to vest the power. If the Senate participate, on any principle whatever, in the removal, they will never consent to transfer their power to another branch of the government; therefore they will not pass a law with such a declaration in it.
Upon this consideration alone, if there was no other, the words should be struck out, and the question of right, if it is one, left; to the decision of the judiciary. It will be time enough to determine the question when the President shall remove an officer in this way, I conceive it can properly be brought before that tribunal; the officer will have a right to a mandamus to be restored to his office; and the judges would determine whether the President exercised a constitutional authority or not.
Some gentlemen think the Constitution takes no notice of this officer, as the head of a department. They suppose him an inferior officer in aid of the executive. This, I think, is going too far; because the Constitution, in the words authorizing the President to call on the heads of departments for their opinions in writing, contemplates several departments. It says, "the principal officer in each of the executive departments."
