I have seriously reflected on this subject, and am convinced that the President h:is not this power by the Constitution, and that, if we had the right to invest him with it, it would be dangerous to do so.
Mr. HUNTINGDON. I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well observed, that the Constitution was silent respecting the removal, otherwise than by impeachment. I would likewise add, that it mentions no other cause of removal than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of infirmity or incapacity. Indeed, it appears hard to me that, after an officer has become old in an honorable service, he should be impeached for this infirmity. The Constitution, I think, must be the only rule to guide us on this occasion. As it is silent with respect to the removal, Congress ought to say nothing about it, because it implies that we have a right to bestow it, and I believe this power is not to be found among the enumerated powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress.
It was said, if the President had this authority, it would make him more responsible for the conduct of the officer. But if we have a vicious President, who inclines to abuse this power, which God forbid! his responsibility will stand us in little stead: therefore that idea does not satisfy me that it is proper the President should have this power.
Mr. SEDGWICK. I wish the words to be struck out, because I conceive them to be unnecessary in this place. I do conceive, Mr. Speaker, that this officer will be the mere creature of the law, and that very little need be said to prove to you that of necessity this ought to be the case. I apprehend, likewise, that it requires but a small share of abilities to point out certain causes for which a person ought to be removed from office, without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance; and the nature of things demands that it should be so. Suppose, sir, a man becomes insane by the visitation of God, and is likely to ruin our affairs; are the hands of government to be confined from warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment; is the error not to be corrected? Suppose he acquires vicious habits, an incurable indolence, or total neglect of the duties of his office, which forebode mischief to the public welfare; is there no way to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures which he pursues,—and this he may do without committing any positive offence against the law,—must he preserve his office in despite of the public will? Suppose him grasping at his own aggrandizement, and the elevation of his connections, by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution,—hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquility, plundering you of the means of defence, by alienating the affections of your allies, and promoting the spirit of discord,—is there no way suddenly to seize the worthless wretch, and hurl him from the pinnacle of power? Must the tardy, tedious, desultory road, by way of impeachment, be traveled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off" the vital principle of the government? Sir, the nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of this Constitution, require that this thing should be otherwise. Well, sir, this is admitted by gentlemen; but they say the Senate is to be united With the President in the exercise of this power. I hope, sir, this is not the case, because it would involve us in the most serious difficulty. Suppose a discovery of any of those events which I have just enumerated were to
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