take place when the Senate is not in session; how is the remedy to be applied? This is a serious consideration, and the evil could be avoided no other way than by the Senate's sitting always. Surely no gentleman of this house contemplates the necessity of incurring such an expense. I am sure it will be very objectionable to our constituents; and yet this must be done, or the public interest be endangered by keeping an unworthy officer in place until that body shall be assembled from the extremes of the Union.
It has been said that there is danger of this power being abused if exercised by one man. Certainly, the danger is as great with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the continent, with different impressions and opinions. It appears to me that such a body is more likely to misuse this power than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the presidential chair. As the nature of the government requires the power of removal, I think it is to be exercised in this way by a hand capable of exerting itself with effect; and the power must be conferred on the President by the Constitution, as the executive officer of the government.
I believe some difficulty will result from determining this question by a mandamus. A mandamus is issued to replace an officer who has been removed contrary to law. Now, this officer being the creature of the law, we may declare that he shall be removed for incapacity; and if so declared, the removal will be according to law.
Mr. MADISON. If the construction of the Constitution is to be left to its natural course, with respect to the executive powers of this government, I own that the insertion of this sentiment in law may not be of material importance, though, if it is nothing more than a mere declaration of a clear grant made by the Constitution, it can do no harm; but if it relates to a doubtful part of the Constitution, I suppose an exposition of the Constitution may come with as much propriety from the legislature as any other department of government. If the power naturally belongs to the government, and the Constitution is undecided as to the body which is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the legislatures, and the question will depend upon its own merits.
I am clearly of opinion with the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that we ought, in this and every other case, to adhere to the Constitution, so far as it will serve as a guide to us; and that we ought not to be swayed in our decisions by the splendor of the character of our present chief magistrate, but consider it with respect to the merit of men who, in the ordinary course of things, may be supposed to fill the chair. I believe the power here declared is a high one, and in some respects a dangerous one; but, in order to come to a right decision on this point, we must consider both sides of the question—the possible abuses which may spring from the single will of the first magistrate, and the abuse which may spring from the combined will of the executive and the senatorial qualification.
When we consider that the first magistrate is to be appointed at present by the suffrages of three millions of people, and, in all human probability, in a few years' time, by double that number, it is not to be presumed that a vicious or bad character will be selected. If the government of any country on the face of the earth was ever effectually guarded against the election of ambitious or designing characters to the first office of the state, I think it may with truth be said to be the case under the Constitution of the United Stales. With all the infirmities incident to a popular election
