It will, then, become a considerable question, as it has been in my mind, that as, in the nature of things, the power which appoints removes also and as the power of appointment, by the Constitution, is placed in the President and Senate, whether the removal does not follow as incidental to that power. But I am averse to that construction, as the terms of the Constitution are sufficient to invest the legislature with complete power for performing its duties; and since it has given the power of making treaties, and judging of them, to the Senate and President, I should be inclined to believe that, as they have an immediate concern in, and control over this business, therefore they ought to have the power of removal. It may be said, with respect to some other officers, that, agreeably to this principle, the President alone ought to have the sole power of removal, because he is interested in it, and has the control over the business they manage; for example, the minister at war. The President is the commander-in-chief of the army and militia of the United States; but the ground is narrowed by the Senate being combined with him in making treaties; though even here the ground is reduced, because of the power combined in the whole legislature to declare war and grant supplies. If it is considered that Congress have a right to appoint these officers, or dictate the mode by which they shall be appointed,—and I calculate in my own opinion the manner of dismission from the mode of appointment,—I should have no doubt but we might make such regulations as we may judge proper. If the Constitution had given no rule by which officers were to be appointed, I should search for one in my own mind. But as the Constitution has laid down the rule, I consider the mode of removal as clearly defined as by implication it can be: it ought to be the same with that of the appointment. What quality of the human mind is necessary for the one that is not necessary for the other? Information, impartiality, and judgment in the business to be conducted, are necessary to make a good appointment. Are not the same properties requisite for a dismission? It appears so to me.
I cannot subscribe to the opinion, delivered by some gentlemen, that the executive in its nature implies the power to appoint the officers of government. Why does it imply it? The appointment of officers depends upon the qualities that are necessary for forming a judgment on the merits of men; and the displacing of them, instead of including the idea of what is necessary for an executive officer, includes the idea necessary for a judicial one; therefore it cannot exist, in the nature of things, that an executive power is either to appoint or displace the officers of government. Is it a political dogma? Is it founded in experience? If it is, I confess it has been very long wrapped up in mysterious darkness. As a political rule, it is not common in the world, excepting monarchies, where this principle is established, that the interest of the state is included in the interest of the prince; that whatever injures the state is an injury to the sovereign because he has a property in the state and the government, and is to take care that nothing of that kind is to be injured or destroyed, he being so intimately connected with the well-being of the nation, it appears a point of justice only to suffer him to manage his own concerns. Our principles of government are different; and the President, instead of being master of the people of America, is only their great servant. But, if it arises from a political dogma, it must be subject to exceptions, which hold good as they are applied to governments which give greater or lesser proportions of power to their executive. I shall only remark that the Constitution,
vol. iv.43
