in no one part of it, so far as I can see, supposes that the President is the sole judge of the merits of an appointment; it is very forcible to my mind, that the Constitution has confined his sole appointment to the case of inferior officers. It also strikes me, from the clause that gives the President the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment, that the Constitution reposes a confidence in the Senate which it has not done in this officer; and therefore, there is no good reason for destroying that participation of power which the system of government has given to them.
Whether it would be expedient to give the power of removal to the President alone, depends on this consideration:—they are both bodies chosen with equal care and propriety; the people show as much confidence in the one as in the other; the best President and the best Senate, it is to be presumed, will always be chosen that they can get. All the difficulties and embarrassments that have been mentioned can be removed by giving to the President the power of suspension during the recess of the Senate; and I think that an attention to the Constitution will lead us to decide that this is the only proper power to be vested in the President of the United States.
Mr. MADISON. I feel the importance of the question, and know that our decision will involve the decision of all similar cases. The decision that is at this time made will become the permanent exposition of the Constitution; and on a permanent exposition of the Constitution will depend the genius and character of the whole government. It will depend, perhaps, on this decision, whether the government shall retain that equilibrium which the Constitution intended, or take a direction towards aristocracy, or anarchy, among the members of the government. Hence, how careful ought we to be to give a true direction to a power so critically circumstanced! It is incumbent on us to weigh, with particular attention, the arguments which have been advanced in support of the various opinions with cautious deliberation. I own to you, Mr. Chairman, that I feel great anxiety upon this question. I feel an anxiety, because I am called upon to give a decision in a case that may affect the fundamental principles of the government under which we act, and liberty itself But all that I can do, on such an occasion, is to weigh well every thing advanced on both sides, with the purest desire to find out the true meaning of the Constitution, and to be guided by that, and an attachment to the true spirit of liberty, whose influence I believe strongly predominates here.
Several constructions have been put upon the Constitution relative to the point in question. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) has advanced a doctrine which was not touched upon before. He seems to think (if I understood him right) that the power of displacing from office is subject to legislative discretion, because, it having a right to create, it may limit or modify, as is thought proper. I shall not say but at first view this doctrine may seem to have some plausibility. But when I consider that the Constitution clearly intended to maintain a marked distinction between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government; and when I consider that, if the legislature has a power such as contended for, they may subject, and transfer, at discretion, powers from one department of government to another; they may, on that principle, exclude the President altogether from exercising any authority in the removal of officers; they may give it to the Senate alone, or the President and Senate combined; they may vest it in the whole Congress, or they may
