they would reject it. To him it was plain that, if the house pursued the object of the resolution, it led them on forbidden ground. In the first place, it took from the citizens a right which, by their Constitution, they had secured themselves,—to wit, the right of free elections. Do what the resolution contemplates, and no man can hold a seat here who ever fought a duel, or gave or carried a challenge, although he may be the choice of the people. No such thing is said in the Constitution. The people, in that instrument, have already defined the disqualifications to office; that charter of their rights declares that no person who has been impeached and found guilty shall hold an office; and I contend that Congress cannot impeach a person for any offence done by him as an individual. Two things are requisite to ground an impeachment. First, the person must be an officer of the United States: secondly, he must have been guilty of some malfeasance in the discharge of the duties imposed on him by that office. If an individual who does not hold an office under the United States commits murder, I deny the right of Congress to impeach him. He is made amenable to the state laws. While we were busy in impeaching him, he might be executed by the statute laws of the states. My observations disclaim the right we have to act on it.
The resolution was negatived.
On the Amendment to the Constitution.
House of Representatives, December 9, 1804.
Mr. JACKSON. The fate of the other little republics warranted the idea that the smaller members would be swallowed up by the larger ones, who would, in turn, attack each other; and thus the liberty achieved by the blood of some of the bravest men that ever lived would pass away without leaving a trace behind it. They, therefore, yielded every thing to the little states, knowing they were not numerous, and naturally jealous of the large ones. If we examine the Constitution, we shall find the whole of the great powers of the government centred in the Senate.
On the Impeachment of Judge Chase.
House of Representatives, February 21, 1805.
Mr. HOPKINSON. What part of the Constitution declares any of the acts charged and proved upon Judge Chase, even in the worst aspect, to be impeachable? He has not been guilty of bribery or corruption; he is not charged with them. Has he, then, been guilty of "other high crimes and misdemeanors"? In an instrument so sacred as the Constitution, I presume every word must have its full and fair meaning. It is not, then, only for crimes and misdemeanors that a judge is impeachable, but it must be for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although this qualifying adjective "high" immediately precedes, and is directly attached to the word "crimes," yet, from the evident intention of the Constitution, and upon a just grammatical construction, it must also be applied to "misdemeanors." If my construction of this part of the Constitution be not admitted, and the adjective "high" be given exclusively to "crimes," and denied to "misdemeanors," this strange absurdity must ensue—that when an officer of the government is impeached for a crime, he cannot be convicted, unless it proves to be a high crime; but he may, nevertheless, be convicted of a misdemeanor of the most petty grade. Observe, sir, the
