third were taken from Zeno, from Diogenes, and from Chrysippus περὶ τελῶν; the refutation of the Stoics in book fourth probably proceeds from Carneades. The Peripatetical doctrines in book fifth are from Aristotle and Theophrastus, as explained and enlarged by Antiochus of Ascalon; while the Stoical objections are in all probability due to Diodotus [see above p. 709, a.], who, we are told elsewhere, was strongly opposed to Antiochus. (Acad. ii. 36.)
In determining the precise date at which the work before us was completed and published, we cannot agree with Goerenz, that the expression "duo magna suntagmata absolvi" (ad Att. xii. 45, 11th June, в. с. 45) can with certainty be made to comprehend both the De Finibus and the Academica. No distinct notice of the former occurs until the 27th of June, when, in a letter to Atticus, (xiii. 32,) we find "Torquatus Romae est. Misi ut tibi daretur," where Torquatus denotes the first book. On the 24th of July (ad Att. xiii. 12), the treatise is spoken of as finished. " Nunc illam περὶ τελῶν σύνταξιν, sane mihi probatam, Bruto, ut tibi placuit, despondimus." Again, on the 30th of the same month, " Ita confeci quinque libros περὶ τελῶν, ut Epicurea L. Torquato, Stoica M. Catoni, περιπατητικά M. Pisoni darem. Ὰζηλοτύπητον id fore putaram, quod oranes illi decesserant" (ad Att. xiii. 19); and we learn from an epistle, despatched only two days afterwards (ad Att. xiii. 21, comp. 22), that it had been for some time in the hands of Atticus, through whom Balbus had obtained a copy of the fifth book, while the widow Caerellia, in her philosophic zeal, had contrived by some means to get possession of the whole. Cicero complains of this for two reasons ; first, because it was but fitting that since the work was dedicated to Brutus it should be presented to him before it became trite and stale, and in the second place, because he had made some changes in the last book; which he was desirous to insert before finally dismissing it from his hands. It is not unlikely that the formal presentation to Brutus took place about the middle of August, when he paid a visit to Cicero at his Tusculanum (ad Att. xiii. 44), and that two editions of the fifth book, differing in some respects from each other, may have gone abroad, which will account for some singular variations and interpolations which have long exercised the ingenuity of editors. (See Goerenz. praef. p. xiv.)
The Editio Princeps in 4to. is without date, name of place or printer, but is believed to have appeared at Cologne, from the press of Ulric Zell, about 1467, and was followed by the edition of Joannes ex Colonia, 4to., Venice, 1471. The edition of Davis, 8vo., Cambridge, 1728, was long held in high estimation, and frequently reprinted, but is now superseded by those of Rath, Hal. Sax. 8vo., 1804; of Goerenz, Leipz. 1813, 8vo., forming the third volume of the collected philosophical works; of Otto, Leipz. 8vo., 1831; and, last and best of all, of Madvig, Copenhagen, 1839, 8vo.
3. Tusculanarum Disputationem Libri V.
This work, addressed to M. Brutus, is a series of discussions on various important points of practical philosophy supposed to have been held in the Tusculanum of Cicero, who, on a certain occasion, soon after the departure of Brutus for the government of Gaul (B. C. 46), requested one of the numerous circle of friends and visitors by whom he was surrounded, to propose some subject for debate which he then proceeded to examine as he sat or walked about. These exercises were continued for five days, a new topic being started and exhausted at each successive conference. There is an utter want of dramatic effect in this collection of dialogues, for the antagonist is throughout anonymous, and is not invested with any life or individuality, but is a sort of a man of straw who brings forward a succession of propositions which are bowled down by Cicero as fast as they are set up. This personage is usually designated in MSS. by the letter A, and editors have amused themselves by quarrelling about the import of the symbol which they have variously interpreted to mean Atticus, Adolescens, Auditor, and so forth. There is little room for doubt as to the period when this work was actually composed, since it abounds in allusions to historical events and to former treatises which enable us, when taken in connexion with other circumstances, to determine the question within very narrow limits. Thus, in the eleventh chapter of the fifth book, we have a reference to the De Finibus which was not published until the month of August, в. с. 45, while the dissertations before us were familiarly known before the middle of May in the following year (ad Att. xv. 24), and must consequently have been given to the world early in в. с. 44, since the task appears to have been undertaken just at the time when the Academica were completed (ad Att. xiii. 32). Schütz (Proleg.) has satisfactorily proved that Tusculanae Disputationes is the true title, and not Tusculanae Quaestiones as a few MSS. have it.
The first book treats of the wisdom of despising death which, it is maintained, cannot be considered as an evil either to the living or to the dead, whether the soul be mortal or immortal. This leads to an investigation of the real nature of death, and a review of the opinions entertained by different philosophers with regard to the soul. The arguments for its immortality are derived chiefly from the writings of the Stoics and of Plato, especially from the Phaedon.
The second book is on the endurance of pain, in which it is demonstrated, after Zeno, Aristo, and Pyrrho, that pain is not an evil, in opposition to Aristippus and Epicurus, who held it to be the greatest evil, to Hieronymus of Rhodes, who placed the chief good in the absence of pain, and to the numerous band of philosophers, belonging to different schools, who agreed that pain was an evil, although not the greatest of evils. Here everything is taken from the Stoics.
In the third book it is proved that a wise man is insensible to sorrow; and the doctrines of the Peripatetics, of Epicurus, of the Cyrenaics, and of Crantor, being examined in turn, and weighed against the tenets of Zeno, are found wanting. The authorities chiefly consulted appear to have been Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Cleitomachus, Antiochus of Ascalon, Carneades, and Epicurus περὶ τέλους.
The thesis supported in the fourth book, which forms a continuation to the preceding, is, that the wise man is absolutely free from all mental disquietude (animi perturbatione). We have first a curious classification of perturbations in which the terms sorrow, joy, fear, pity, and a host of others, are carefully analysed and defined according to the discipline of the Porch; and, after a few remarks upon the main proposition, we find a long essay on
