Page:E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism Accessible.pdf/25

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

44. The degree to which the rhetoric of non-violent Far-Right activists may overlap with, and act as a spur to motivate, more extreme and violent actors—and the difficulty this poses for law enforcement action—is also a factor in the development of the ERWT threat, as noted by the Commission for Countering Extremism:

Hateful extremists may share and propagate similar ideological worldviews as terrorists, but will not engage directly in violence or terrorism, and therefore fall short of counter-terrorism legislation. However, hateful extremists can still create a climate conducive to terrorism by radicalising, recruiting and propagating the same ideologies as terrorists, inciting hatred, and/or equivocating or legitimising violence against an 'out-group,'. . .[1]

45. In January 2020, JTAC provided an assessment of how it saw the ERWT threat evolving:

  • It is likely that RW terrorists globally will aspire to carry out high-impact attacks that will have a similar resonance in the RW community to Brenton Tarrant's Christchurch attack.
  • Propaganda will continue to be distributed online, as well as propaganda that relates to mainstream issues. For a small minority of UK-based individuals ingesting such propaganda, real-world ERWT activity will be attractive.
  • As more high-profile RW terrorists enter the Prisons Estate, there will likely be an increased threat from RW terrorists within prisons and following prison release in the medium to long-term future.[2]

46. More recently, in June 2021 Homeland Security Group provided a strategic overview of the factors that could act as a driver of the ERWT threat:

Our understanding of the future trajectory of the ERWT threat is aligned with views of operational partners and our international partners; the threat is likely to increase over the next five years, with economic decline caused by COVID-19 being a likely driver of increased threat.

Other common issues identified were the rise of identity politics and increasing support for minority groups (opposed by Right Wing Extremists) alongside a reduction in trust in the state and the mainstream institutions/news [outlets] by Right Wing Extremists, and the increasing prevalence and reach of conspiracy theories held by Right Wing Extremists.

Given that the current threat is predominantly from Self-Initiated Terrorists, not groups, individual 'micro' motivations (e.g. an individual's employment status) are as likely to influence the threat as 'macro' ones (e.g. increasing levels of immigration into Europe).[3]


  1. Written evidence - Commission for Countering Extremism, 17 December 2020.
  2. JTAC paper, 19 November 2020.
  3. Written evidence - Home Office, 8 June 2021.

18