Native Rulers and Foreign Interference, 2 vols. (London, 1883);
O. Borelli, Choses politiques d’Égypte, 1883–1895 (Paris, 1895); H.
Resener, Ägypten unter englischer Okkupation (Berlin, 1896). Morley’s
Life of Gladstone and Fitzmaurice’s Life of Granville throw considerable
light on the inner history of the period 1880–1893. See further
the historical works cited in Sudan: Anglo-Egyptian, and those
given at the end of the first section of this article.
For military operations 1882–1899 see C. Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns 1882 to 1899, revised ed. (London, 1900); H. Brackenbury, Narrative of the Advance of the River Column of the Nile Expeditionary Force (Edinburgh, 1885); Sir W. F. Butler, Campaign of the Cataracts (London, 1887); Count A. E. W. Gleichen, With the Camel Corps up the Nile (London, 1888); Gordon’s Last Journal (London, 1885); Sir C. W. Wilson, From Korti to Khartum (Edinburgh, 1886); J. Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, 6 vols. (London, 1885 et seq.); “An Officer,” Sudan Campaigns 1896–1899 (London, 1899); G. W. Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum (Edinburgh, 1898); W. S. Churchill, The River War, new edition (London, 1902).
Bibliographical notes for each section of this article are given in their several places. The following bibliographies may be consulted: Ibrahim Hilmi, Literature of Egypt and the Soudan, 2 vols. (London, 1886–1888); H. Jolowicz, Bibliotheca aegyptiaca (Leipzig, 1858; supplement, 1861); M. Hartmann, The Arabic Press of Egypt (London, 1899). (F. R. C.)
Military Operations of 1882–1885
In February 1879 a slight outbreak of discharged officers and soldiers occurred at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships to Alexandria. On the 26th of June of that year Ismail Pasha was removed from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the khediviate, becoming practically the protégé of the two western powers. On the 1st of February 1881 a more serious disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the khedive. Again British and French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It soon became clear that the khedive was powerless, and that the military party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The “dual note,” communicated to the khedive on the 6th of January 1881, contained an intimation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta’s ministry produced a reaction, and both governments proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The khedive was practically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was minister of war and Mahmud Sami premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on the 25th of May 1882 the consuls-general of the two powers made a strong representation to Mahmud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, and a demand, to which the khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were “absolutely defenceless.” This warning was amply justified by the massacres of the 11th of June, during which more than one hundred persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets of Bombardment of Alexandria. Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and on the 15th the channel squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (afterwards Lord Alcester) on the 3rd of July was as follows:—
“Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform military commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping and foreign men-of-war.”
On the 9th the admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh “parbuckling two smoothbore guns—apparently 32-pounders—towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour.” Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the military commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sunrise on the following morning unless “the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria” were previously surrendered “for the purpose of disarming.” The fleet prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the president of the council, and offering to dismount three guns in the batteries named, only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 a.m. on the 11th of July the “Alexandra” opened fire and the action became general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups: (1) the “Alexandra,” “Sultan” and “Superb,” outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earthworks under weigh; (2) the “Monarch,” “Invincible” and “Penelope,” inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the “Inflexible” and “Temeraire,” to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats “Beacon,” “Bittern,” “Condor,” “Cygnet” and “Decoy” were to keep out of fire at first and seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12.45 p.m., and a party from the “Invincible” landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under weigh was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 a.m., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 p.m., and Fort Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 p.m. The “Inflexible” weighed soon after 8 a.m. and engaged Ras-el-Tin, afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The “Condor,” followed by the “Beacon,” “Bittern” and “Decoy,” engaged Fort Marabout soon after 8 a.m. till 11 a.m., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 p.m.; but a few rounds were fired by the “Inflexible” and “Temeraire” on the morning of the 12th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-in. to 10-in.), 3 R.B.L. guns (40 prs.), and 120 S.B. guns (6.5-in. and 10-in.), with a few mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once practised with rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired 1741 heavy projectiles (7-in. to 16-in.) and 1457 light (7-prs. to 64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns, which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience that the fire of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and well-handled guns on shore.
In the afternoon of the 12th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 p.m.
Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit for £2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on the 27th of July. Five days later the French government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An
