the Court of Chancery, quotes a case in the reign of Charles II., in which chief justice Vaughan said:
“I wonder to hear of citing of precedents in matter of equity, for if there be equity in a case, that equity is an universal truth, and there can be no precedent in it; so that in any precedent that can be produced, if it be the same with this case, the reason and equity is the same in itself; and if the precedent be not the same case with this it is not to be cited.”
But the lord keeper Bridgeman answered:
“Certainly precedents are very necessary and useful to us, for in them we may find the reasons of the equity to guide us, and besides the authority of those who made them is much to be regarded. We shall suppose they did it upon great consideration and weighing of the matter, and it would be very strange and very ill if we should disturb and set aside what has been the course for a long series of times and ages.”
Selden’s description is well known: “Equity is a roguish thing. ’Tis all one as if they should make the standard for measure the chancellor’s foot.” Lord Nottingham in 1676 reconciled the ancient theory and the established practice by saying that the conscience which guided the court was not the natural conscience of the man, but the civil and political conscience of the judge. The same tendency of equity to settle into a system of law is seen in the recognition of its limits—in the fact that it did not attempt in all cases to give a remedy when the rule of the common law was contrary to justice. Cases of hardship, which the early chancellors would certainly have relieved, were passed over by later judges, simply because no precedent could be found for their interference. The point at which the introduction of new principles of equity finally stopped is fixed by Sir Henry Maine in the chancellorship of Lord Eldon, who held that the doctrines of the court ought to be as well settled and made as uniform almost as those of the common law. From that time certainly equity, like common law, has professed to take its principles wholly from recorded decisions and statute law. The view (traceable no doubt to the Aristotelian definition) that equity mitigates the hardships of the law where the law errs through being framed in universals, is to be found in some of the earlier writings. Thus in the Doctor and Student it is said:
“Law makers take heed to such things as may often come, and not to every particular case, for they could not though they would; therefore, in some cases it is necessary to leave the words of the law and follow that reason and justice requireth, and to that intent equity is ordained, that is to say, to temper and mitigate the rigour of the law.”
And Lord Ellesmere said:
“The cause why there is a chancery is for that men’s actions are so divers and infinite that it is impossible to make any general law which shall aptly meet with every particular act and not fail in some circumstances.”
Modern equity, it need hardly be said, does not profess to soften the rigour of the law, or to correct the errors into which it falls by reason of its generality.
To give any account, even in outline, of the subject matter of equity within the necessary limits of this article would be impossible. It will be sufficient to say here that the classification generally adopted by text-writers is based upon the relations of equity to the common law, of which some explanation is given above. Thus equitable jurisdiction is said to be exclusive, concurrent or auxiliary. Equity has exclusive jurisdiction where it recognizes rights which are unknown to the common law. The most important example is trusts. Equity has concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the law recognized the right but did not give adequate relief, or did not give relief without circuity of action or some similar inconvenience. And equity has auxiliary jurisdiction when the machinery of the courts of law was unable to procure the necessary evidence.
“The evils of this double system of judicature,” says the report of the judicature commission (1863–1867), “and the confusion and conflict of jurisdiction to which it has led, have been long known and acknowledged.” A partial attempt to meet the difficulty was made by several acts of parliament (passed after the reports of commissions appointed in 1850 and 1851), which enabled courts of law and equity both to exercise certain powers formerly peculiar to one or other of them. A more complete remedy was introduced by the Judicature Act 1873, which consolidated the courts of law and equity, and ordered that law and equity should be administered concurrently according to the rules contained in the 26th section of the act. At the same time many matters of equitable jurisdiction are still left to the chancery division of the High Court in the first instance. (See Chancery.)
Authorities.—The principles of equity as set out by the following writers may be consulted: J. Story, J. W. Smith, H. A. Smith and W. Ashburner; and for the history see G. Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (2 vols., 1846–1849); D. M. Kerly, Historical Sketch of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (1890).
EQUIVALENT, in chemistry, the proportion of an element
which will combine with or replace unit weight of hydrogen.
When multiplied by the valency it gives the atomic weight.
The determination of equivalent weights is treated in the article
Stoichiometry. (See also Chemistry.) In a more general sense
the term “equivalent” is used to denote quantities of substances
which neutralize one another, as for example NaOH,
HCl, 12H2SO4, 12Ba(OH)2.
ÉRARD, SÉBASTIEN (1752–1831), French manufacturer of
musical instruments, distinguished especially for the improvements
he made upon the harp and the pianoforte, was born at
Strassburg on the 5th of April 1752. While a boy he showed
great aptitude for practical geometry and architectural drawing,
and in the workshop of his father, who was an upholsterer, he
found opportunity for the early exercise of his mechanical
ingenuity. When he was sixteen his father died, and he removed
to Paris where he obtained employment with a harpsichord
maker. Here his remarkable constructive skill, though it
speedily excited the jealousy of his master and procured his
dismissal, almost equally soon attracted the notice of musicians
and musical instrument makers of eminence. Before he was
twenty-five he set up in business for himself, his first workshop
being a room in the hotel of the duchesse de Villeroi, who gave
him warm encouragement. Here he constructed in 1780 his
first pianoforte, which was also one of the first manufactured
in France. It quickly secured for its maker such a reputation
that he was soon overwhelmed with commissions, and finding
assistance necessary, he sent for his brother, Jean Baptiste, in
conjunction with whom he established in the rue de Bourbon,
in the Faubourg St Germain, a piano manufactory, which in a
few years became one of the most celebrated in Europe. On
the outbreak of the Revolution he went to London where he
established a factory. Returning to Paris in 1796, he soon
afterwards introduced grand pianofortes, made in the English
fashion, with improvements of his own. In 1808 he again
visited London, where, two years later, he produced his first
double-movement harp. He had previously made various
improvements in the manufacture of harps, but the new instrument
was an immense advance upon anything he had before
produced, and obtained such a reputation that for some time
he devoted himself exclusively to its manufacture. It has been
said that in the year following his invention he made harps to
the value of £25,000. In 1812 he returned to Paris, and continued
to devote himself to the further perfecting of the two
instruments with which his name is associated. In 1823 he
crowned his work by producing his model grand pianoforte
with the double escapement. Érard died at Passy, on the 5th
of August 1831. (See also Harp and Pianoforte.)
ERASMUS, DESIDERIUS (1466–1536), Dutch scholar and
theologian, was born on the night of the 27/28th of October,
probably in 1466; but his statements about his age are conflicting,
and in view of his own uncertainty (Ep. x. 29: 466) and the
weakness of his memory for dates, the year of his birth cannot
be definitely fixed. His father’s name seems to have been
Rogerius Gerardus. He himself was christened Herasmus;
but in 1503, when becoming familiar with Greek, he assimilated
the name to a fancied Greek original, which he had a few years
before Latinized into Desyderius. A contemporary authority
states that he was born at Gouda, his father’s native town;
