in north Germany, is not infrequently harvested in a more or less damp condition. In the United Kingdom, Messrs Spencer & Co., of Melksham, have erected several granaries on the floor-bin principle, and have adopted an ingenious system of “telescopic” spouting, by means of which grain may be discharged from one bin to another or at any desired point. This spouting can be applied to bins either with level floors or with hoppered bottoms, if they are arranged one above the other on the different floors, and is so constructed that an opening can be effected at certain points by simply sliding upwards a section of the spout.
National Granaries.—Wheat forms the staple food of a large proportion of the population of the British Isles, and of the total amount consumed about four-fifths is sea-borne. The stocks normally held in the country being limited, serious consequences might result from any interruption of the supply, such as might occur were Great Britain involved in war with a power or powers commanding a strong fleet. To meet this contingency it has been suggested that the State should establish granaries containing a national reserve of wheat for use in emergency, or should adopt measures calculated to induce merchants, millers, &c., to hold larger stocks than at present and to stimulate the production of home-grown wheat.
Stocks of wheat (and of flour expressed in its equivalent weight
of wheat) are held by merchants, millers and farmers. Merchants’
stocks are kept in granaries at ports of importation
and are known as first-hand stocks. Stocks of wheat
and flour in the hands of millers and of flour held byAmount
of stocks.
bakers are termed second-hand stocks, while farmers’ stocks only
consist of native wheat. Periodical returns are generally made
of first-hand or port stocks, nor should a wide margin of error be
possible in the case of farmers’ stocks, but second-hand stocks are
more difficult to gauge. Since the last decade of the 19th century
the storage capacity of British mills has considerably increased.
As the number of small mills has diminished the capacity of the
bigger ones has increased, and proportionately their warehousing
accommodation has been enlarged. At the present time first-hand
stocks tend to diminish because a larger proportion of millers’
holdings are in mill granaries and silo houses. The immense
preponderance of steamers over sailing vessels in the grain trade
has also had the effect of greatly diminishing stocks. With his
cargo or parcel on a steamer a corn merchant can tell almost to a
day when it will be due. In fact foreign wheat owned by British
merchants is to a great extent stored in foreign granaries in
preference to British warehouses. The merchant’s risk is thereby
lessened to a certain extent. When his wheat has been brought
into a British port, to send it farther afield means extra expense.
But wheat in an American or Argentine elevator may be ordered
wherever the best price can be obtained for it. Options or
“futures,” too, have helped to restrict the size of wheat stocks
in the United Kingdom. A merchant buys a cargo of wheat on
passage for arrival at a definite time, and, lest the market value
of grain should have depreciated by the time it arrives, he sells
an option against it. In this way he hedges his deal, the option
serving as insurance against loss. This is why the British corn
trade finds it less risky to limit purchases to bare needs, protecting
itself by option deals, than to store large quantities which may
depreciate and involve their owners in loss.
Varying estimates have been made of the number of weeks’ supply of breadstuffs (wheat and flour) held by millers at various seasons of the year. A table compiled by the secretary of the National Association of British and Irish Millers from returns for 1902 made by 170 milling firms showed 4.7, 4.9, 4.9 and 5 weeks’ supply at the end of March, June, September and December respectively. These 170 mills were said to represent 46% of the milling capacity of the United Kingdom, and claimed to have ground 12,000,000 qrs. out of 25,349,000 qrs. milled in 1902. These were obviously large mills; it is probable that the other mills would not have shown anything like such a proportion of stock of either raw or finished material. A fair estimate of the stocks normally held by millers and bakers throughout the United Kingdom would be about four weeks’ supply. First-hand stocks vary considerably, but the limits are definite, ranging from 1,000,000 to 3,500,000 qrs., the latter being a high figure. The tendency is for first-hand stocks to decline, but two weeks’ supply must be a minimum. Farmers’ stocks necessarily vary with the size of the crop and the period of the year; they will range from 9 or 10 weeks on the 1st of September to a half week on the 1st of August. Taking all the stocks together, it is very exceptional for the stock of breadstuffs to fall below 7 weeks’ supply. Between the cereal years 1893–1894 and 1903–1904, a period of 570 weeks, the stocks of all kinds fell below 7 weeks’ supply in only 9 weeks; of these 9 weeks 7 were between the beginning of June and the end of August 1898. This was immediately after the Leiter collapse. In seven of these eleven years there is no instance of stocks falling below 8 weeks’ supply. In 21 out of these 570 weeks and in 39 weeks during the same period stocks dropped below 712 and 8 weeks’ supply respectively. Roughly speaking the stock of wheat available for bread-making varies from a two to four months’ supply and is at times well above the latter figure.
The formation of a national reserve of wheat, to be held at the disposal of the state in case of urgent need during war, is beset by many practical difficulties. The father of the scheme was probably The Miller, a well-known trade journal. In March and April 1886 two articlesNational reserve. appeared in that paper under the heading “Years of Plenty and State Granaries,” in which it was urged that to meet the risk of hostile cruisers interrupting the supplies it would be desirable to lay up in granaries on British soil and under government control a stock of wheat sufficient for 12 or alternatively 6 months’ consumption. This was to be national property, not to be touched except when the fortune of war sent up the price of wheat to a famine level or caused severe distress. The State holding this large stock—a year’s supply of foreign grain would have meant at least 15,000,000 qrs., and have cost about £25,000,000 exclusive of warehousing—was in peace time to sell no wheat except when it became necessary to part with stock as a precautionary measure. In that case the wheat sold was to be replaced by the same amount of new grain. The idea was to provide the country with a supply of wheat until sufficient wheat-growing soil could be broken up to make it practically self-sufficing in respect of wheat. The original suggestion fell quite flat. Two years later Captain Warren, R.N., read a paper on “Great Britain’s Corn Supplies in War,” before the London Chamber of Commerce, and accepted national granaries as the only practicable safeguard against what appeared to him a great peril. The representatives of the shipping interest opposed the scheme, probably because it appeared to them likely to divert the public from insisting on an all-powerful navy. The corn trade opposed the project on account of its great practical difficulties. But constant contraction of the British wheat acreage kept the question alive, and during the earlier half of the ’nineties it was a favourite theme with agriculturists. Some influential members of parliament pressed the matter on the government, who, acting, no doubt, on the advice of their military and naval experts, refused either a royal commission or a departmental committee. While the then technical advisers of the government were divided on the advisability of establishing national granaries as a defensive measure, the balance of expert opinion was adverse to the scheme. Lord Wolseley, then commander-in-chief, publicly stigmatized the theory that Great Britain might in war be starved into submission as “unmitigated humbug.”
In spite of official discouragement the agitation continued, and early in 1897 the council of the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture, at the suggestion to a great extent of Mr R. A. Yerburgh, M.P., nominated a committee to examine the question of nationalYerburgh committee. wheat stores. This committee held thirteen sittings and examined fifty-four witnesses. Its report, which was published (L. G. Newman & Co., 12 Finsbury Square, London, E.C.) with minutes of the evidence taken, practically recommended that a national reserve of wheat on the lines already sketched should be formed and administered by the State, and that the government should be strongly urged to obtain the
