appointment of a royal commission, comprising representatives of agriculture, the corn trade, shipping, and the army and navy, to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into the whole subject of the national food-supply in case of war. This recommendation was ultimately carried into effect, but not till nearly five years had elapsed. Of two schemes for national granaries put before the Yerburgh committee, one was formulated by Mr Seth Taylor, a London miller and corn merchant, who reckoned that a store of 10,000,000 qrs. of wheat might be accumulated at an average cost of 40s. per qr.—this was in the Leiter year of high prices—and distributed in six specially constructed granaries to be erected at London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, Glasgow and Dublin. The cost of the granaries was put at £7,500,000. Mr Taylor’s scheme, all charges included, such as 212% interest on capital, cost of storage (at 6d. per qr.), and 2s. per qr. for cost of replacing wheat, involved an annual expenditure of £1,250,000. The Yerburgh committee also considered a proposal to stimulate the home supply of wheat by offering a bounty to farmers for every quarter of wheat grown. This proposal has taken different shapes; some have suggested that a bounty should be given on every acre of land covered with wheat, while others would only allow the bounty on wheat raised and kept in good condition up to a certain date, say the beginning of the following harvest. It is obvious that a bounty on the area of land covered by wheat, irrespective of yield, would be a premium on poor farming, and might divert to wheat-growing land unsuitable for that purpose. The suggestion to pay a bounty of say 3s. to 5s. per qr. for all wheat grown and stacked for a certain time stands on a different basis; it is conceivable that a bounty of 5s. might expand the British production of wheat from say 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 qrs., which would mean that a bounty of £2,250,000 per annum, plus costs of administration, had secured an extra home production of 2,000,000 qrs. Whether such a price would be worth paying is another matter; the Yerburgh committee’s conclusion was decidedly in the negative. It has also been suggested that the State might subsidize millers to the extent of 2s. 6d. per sack of 280 ℔. per annum on condition that each maintained a minimum supply of two months’ flour. This may be taken to mean that for keeping a special stock of flour over and above his usual output a miller would be entitled to an annual subsidy of 2s. 6d. per sack. An extra stock of 10,000,000 sacks might be thus kept up at an annual cost of £1,250,000, plus the expenditure of administration, which would probably be heavy. With regard to this suggestion, it is very probable that a few large mills which have plenty of warehouse accommodation and depots all over the country would be ready to keep up a permanent extra stock of 100,000 sacks. Thus a mill of 10,000 sacks’ capacity per week, which habitually maintains a total stock of 50,000 sacks, might bring up its stock to 150,000 sacks. Such a mill, being a good customer to railways, could get from them the storage it required for little or nothing. But the bulk of the mills have no such advantages. They have little or no spare warehousing room, and are not accustomed to keep any stock, sending their flour out almost as fast as it is milled. It is doubtful therefore if a bounty of 2s. 6d. per sack would have the desired effect of keeping up a stock of 10,000,000 sacks, sufficient for two to three months’ bread consumption.
The controversy reached a climax in the royal commission appointed in 1903, to which was also referred the importation of raw material in war time. Its report appeared in 1905. To the question whether the unquestioned dependence of the United Kingdom on an uninterruptedRoyal commission, 1903-1905. supply of sea-borne breadstuffs renders it advisable or not to maintain at all times a six months’ stock of wheat and flour, it returned no decided answer, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the commission was hopelessly divided. The main report was distinctly optimistic so far as the liability of the country to harass and distress at the hands of a hostile naval power or combination of powers was concerned. But there were several dissentients, and there was hardly any portion of the report in chief which did not provoke some reservation or another. That a maritime war would cause freights and insurance to rise in a high degree was freely admitted, and it was also admitted that the price of bread must also rise very appreciably. But, provided the navy did not break down, the risk of starvation was dismissed. Therefore all the proposals for providing national granaries or inducing merchants and millers to carry bigger stocks were put aside as unpractical and unnecessary. The commission was, however, inclined to consider more favourably a suggestion for providing free storage for wheat at the expense of the State. The idea was that if the State would subsidize any large granary company to the extent of 6d. or 5d. per qr., grain now warehoused in foreign lands would be attracted to the British Isles. But on the whole the commission held that the main effect of the scheme would be to saddle the government with the rent of all grain stored in public warehouses in the United Kingdom without materially increasing stocks. The proposal to offer bounties to farmers to hold stocks for a longer period and to grow more wheat met with equally little favour.
To sum up the advantages of national granaries, assuming any sort of disaster to the navy, the possession of a reserve of even six months’ wheat-supply in addition to ordinary stocks would prevent panic prices. On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of forming and administering such a reserve are very great. The world grows no great surplus of wheat, and to form a six months’, much more a twelve months’, stock would be the work of years. The government in buying up the wheat would have to go carefully if they would avoid sending up prices with a rush. They would have to buy dearly, and when they let go a certain amount of stock they would be bound to sell cheaply. A stock once formed might be held by the State with little or no disturbance of the corn market, although the existence of such an emergency stock would hardly encourage British farmers to grow more wheat. The cost of erecting, equipping and keeping in good order the necessary warehouses would be, probably, much heavier than the most liberal estimate hitherto made by advocates of national granaries. (G. F. Z.)
GRANBY, JOHN MANNERS, Marquess of (1721–1770),
British soldier, was the eldest son of the third duke of Rutland.
He was born in 1721 and educated at Eton and Trinity College,
Cambridge, and was returned as member of parliament for
Grantham in 1741. Four years later he received a commission
as colonel of a regiment raised by the Rutland interest in and
about Leicester to assist in quelling the Highland revolt of 1745.
This corps never got beyond Newcastle, but young Granby
went to the front as a volunteer on the duke of Cumberland’s
staff, and saw active service in the last stages of the insurrection.
Very soon his regiment was disbanded. He continued in parliament,
combining with it military duties, making the campaign
of Flanders (1747). Promoted major-general in 1755, three
years later he was appointed colonel of the Royal Horse Guards
(Blues). Meanwhile he had married the daughter of the duke
of Somerset, and in 1754 had begun his parliamentary connexion
with Cambridgeshire, for which county he sat until his death.
The same year that saw Granby made colonel of the Blues,
saw also the despatch of a considerable British contingent to
Germany. Minden was Granby’s first great battle. At the head
of the Blues he was one of the cavalry leaders halted at the
critical moment by Sackville, and when in consequence that
officer was sent home in disgrace, Lieut.-General Lord
Granby succeeded to the command of the British contingent
in Ferdinand’s army, having 32,000 men under his orders at
the beginning of 1760. In the remaining campaigns of the Seven
Years’ War the English contingent was more conspicuous by its
conduct than the Prussians themselves. On the 31st of July
1760 Granby brilliantly stormed Warburg at the head of the
British cavalry, capturing 1500 men and ten pieces of artillery.
A year later (15th of July 1761) the British defended the heights
of Vellinghausen with what Ferdinand himself styled “indescribable
bravery.” In the last campaign, at Gravenstein und
Wilhelmsthal, Homburg and Cassel, Granby’s men bore the brunt
of the fighting and earned the greatest share of the glory.
Returning to England in 1763 the marquess found himself
