of Cissey’s division, still out of their sight but moving due south. Hardly had they stepped off when Cissey’s first line, catching sight of them, opened a devastating fire upon their left flank, and to meet this fresh danger the Prussians endeavoured to change front half-left whilst still on the move. Without pausing to fire, the men raced onward, but the French striking their outer wing rolled up the whole line in succession, the actual collision occurring in and near the Bruville ravine, a deep-cut natural trench which, starting from the Tronville copses, here intersects the plateau from west to east. Against the weight of French numbers, nearly three to one, the Prussians were unable to stand, and presently they broke and drifted backwards, completely routed. Then the 1st Guard Dragoons (since known as Queen Victoria’s regiment), after a brilliant manœuvre under heavy fire, to get into the best position for delivering a charge, rode down the whole French line of pursuers from left to right, and by their heroic self-sacrifice relieved the remnants of the infantry from further pursuit.
This was the scene which for the moment held the attention of Prince Frederick Charles when at length he reached the battlefield from Pont-à-Mousson. All along the rest of the line the Prussians were still holding their own, and on the extreme right fresh troops from the IX. Corps were streaming up through the woods against the French left wing. But on the left there was every sign of incipient disaster, and to avert this only the cavalry were at hand. Sending, therefore, hasty orders to the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions to concentrate to the west of Mars-la-Tour, the prince ordered them from there to sweep round on the right rear of the French army. The same idea had, however, occurred to Ladmirault, and he had called on the two nearest French cavalry divisions to put it into execution, and as the Prussians began to reach the plateau west of Mars-la-Tour and the Yron brook from the south, the French were deploying across it some two thousand yards to the north.
Then followed a duel—the one great cavalry duel of the war—between upwards of two thousand horsemen a side. But it was delivered by both sides in a series of regimental charges, and in result was singularly indecisive. For about half an hour great crowds of riders, hidden by dense clouds of dust, drifted aimlessly about the plain, till at length the charge of a single squadron of the Oldenburg Dragoons (who had joined in on their own initiative) delivered on the outer French flank, brought the whole mass into motion north-eastward, and, both sides sounding the rally, the engagement gradually ceased.
It was now about 7 p.m. and night was coming on. Seeing the dust-clouds drifting away northward, and noting the lethargy which seemed to have settled over the whole French line, Prince Frederick Charles decided to assert his own independent will to conquer by a final assault along his whole front. Guns, cavalry, infantry, everything that could still stand were to take part in it. Weary as they all were, his indomitable will put fresh life into the whole army. With drums beating and colours flying, every unit within call went forward for the final effort. It was almost dark when the Prussians approached the French position between Rezonville and the woods to the northward, and the troops soon lost direction in the smoke and became involved in the direst confusion; the firing again blazed out for a few moments, only to die away as utter exhaustion at length put an end to the Prussian advance. Then the wearied troops, for the most part, lay down and slept in the positions they had reached.
Thus closed the hardest fought battle of the Franco-German War. From 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. only 23,700 rifles, 8100 sabres and 126 guns had been brought into action by the Germans against 59,100 rifles, 6700 sabres, and 300 guns on the French side, and even at the close of the day the former had only deployed 47,100 rifles, 8300 sabres and 222 guns against 83,000 rifles, 8000 sabres and 432 guns including 24 mitrailleuses. The chief characteristic of the day’s fighting was the terrible effectiveness of the Prussian artillery, which was handled in masses and not, as on the French side, by batteries. The manœuvring power of the latter attracted the admiration of the Germans, but arriving singly on the field they were generally reduced to silence in a few minutes. Deprived of their support, not all the gallantry of the French infantry could avail anything. Again and again, particularly on their left wing, they chased the German infantry before them, but the moment the retreat of the latter downhill uncovered the pursuing French to the Prussian guns, a tornado of shells shattered their order and compelled them to retreat. Though the cavalry were freely engaged, the training of both was so far beneath the standard of the present day that the most that can be credited to them in respect of results is that they from time to time averted imminent disaster, but failed altogether to achieve such a decision as was well within their potential capacities.
3. Gravelotte—St Privat (August 18).—The position on to which the French army fell back from the field of Vionville is formed by a ridge some six miles long running from Rozerieulles almost due north to Roncourt, a little village overhanging the steep and wooded banks of the Orne, and connected with the general plateau between the Meuse and Moselle by a gentle saddle running from about Amanvillers nearly due west through the Bois de la Cusse towards Doncourt. North of this saddle the slopes show a slight concavity, but are passable by troops of all arms in close order. To the south the rivulet of the Mance soon forms a formidable obstacle as its bed cuts its way through the sandstone. Scrub and woods with dense undergrowth line both its banks, and, except by the great chaussée from Metz to Verdun, access to the French side becomes impossible to troops in ordered bodies.
It does not appear that the position had been systematically examined, or apportioned to the several corps in accordance with any predetermined plan. The army merely swung backwards, pivoting on its left wing, the corps preserving their relative order as it had been on the 16th, with the exception that the Imperial Guard was withdrawn to the spur on which Fort Plappeville stands, and the 6th Corps (Marshal Canrobert) crossed the line of march of the 3rd and 4th Corps in order to gain St Privat la Montagne. No lines of march were assigned to the several units, consequently the confusion became so great that though the distance to be traversed in no case exceeded six miles, only the right wing and centre reached their destinations as night was falling. Many of them had so little idea of the general situation that they actually placed outposts to the north and east, whilst the whole of the enemy’s army lay to the south and west. No attempt was made to entrench the position systematically, but on the left the 2nd and 3rd Corps made some disconnected shelter trenches and gun-pits, while the 4th Corps in the centre began to improve available cover about an hour before the battle began, and the 6th corps on the right, not yet having received any entrenching tools, could do no more than improvise a few loopholes in the walls of the villages of St Privat and Roncourt with such tools as the sappers could obtain from the inhabitants.
Fortunately for the French the Germans were too exhausted by the battle of the 16th to attempt to interfere with these movements. At daybreak on the morning of the 18th the royal headquarters (which now for the first time arrived at the front) still had no certain knowledge as to whether the French main army was in retreat—covered by the force which they could see on the high ground north of the Metz road—or whether they had taken up a position in order to fight.
Hence the orders issued overnight on the presumption that the main force of the French was retreating to the north and west were allowed to stand, and the whole II. Army (Prince Frederick Charles) moved off in échelon from left to right, the I. army under Steinmetz, consisting for the day of the I., II. and VII. Corps, being left in observation of the troops visible on their front and of the garrison of Metz itself. The I. Corps was kept back beyond the Moselle on the east side of Metz, the II. was not due to arrive at Rezonville before 4 p.m., hence the VII. only was immediately available if the enemy counter-attacked. But Steinmetz had not ordered, nor had von Zastrow, the corps commander, undertaken, any preparations to meet an emergency. About 10 a.m. the corps had reached the following positions:
