VIII. Corps, Rezonville; XI. near St Marcel; Guard approaching Doncourt; XII. towards Jarny; the III. and X., which had been so heavily engaged on the 16th, still in their bivouacs preparing to move. The cavalry of the Saxons had established the fact that the French had not retreated northward, but though scouts from the Guard had already seen the enemy on the heights of St Privat, this information had not yet reached headquarters, nor had it been transmitted to the IX. Corps, which it most closely concerned.
Shortly after 10 a.m. Moltke, still under the impression that the French right extended no farther than La Folie (2 m. north of the Metz road), determined to attack with the IX. and VIII. Corps whilst the Guard executed a turning movement Via Habonville against the French right. The IX. Corps was to engage, but not to push its attack home until the Guard could co-operate. The XII. Corps was left to its own devices, but fortunately the crown prince of Saxony, who commanded it, had ridden forward and, seeing the French in force towards Roncourt, had issued orders which in the event proved decisive.
In pursuance of his instructions von Manstein, commanding the IX. Corps, set his two divisions in motion towards La Folie and the Bois de la Cusse, and advanced to reconnoitre the French position. From the eastern edge of the above-named copses he suddenly descried the camp of a whole French Corps (the 4th), evidently ignorant of their danger, on the slopes trending westward from Amanvillers. Unmindful of the experience of the 16th, he decided to execute an artillery surprise on a grand scale, and sent orders to his corps artillery to come into action on the long spur overlooking the French camps from the westward. At noon, just as the French infantry were falling in for midday roll-call, sufficient guns were in position, and suddenly opened fire. But the effect was disappointing. The French infantry ran to their arms, piled along the front of their positions, and moved forward to attack, covering their advance by a hail of bullets. Simultaneously the French artillery also took up the challenge, and from the heights near St Privat the 6th Corps, whose presence had been unsuspected by the Prussians, joined in the fight.
In a few minutes the batteries on the extreme Prussian left were completely overwhelmed, and suddenly dense lines of French skirmishers emerged from a fold in the ground upon their flank and front, and the gunners were compelled to resort to case-shot, so imminent was their danger. But at this critical moment the leading companies of the Hessian infantry arrived, re-established the equilibrium (though not before four Prussian batteries had been temporarily overrun by the enemy), and a most obstinate fight ensued.
Prince Frederick Charles now rode forward to a point north-east of Vernéville, whence the southern boundary of St Privat could be seen. But the northern side of the village and the country towards Roncourt was hidden from his view by the high poplars bordering the Metz-Briey road. Seeing the Hessians hard pressed, he now brought forward the 2nd division of the Guard to their assistance, sending in the 3rd brigade immediately, and holding the 4th brigade in reserve. The 1st division, warned by their own scouts that French troops were in Ste Marie, deployed to attack this village, and were assisted in their endeavour by a brigade of Saxons detached by the crown prince of Saxony, who from his position could see behind the poplar screen that limited the view of the commander-in-chief. Hence he was already aware that the French position extended to Roncourt at least, and had despatched a whole division down the valley of the Orne to outflank them. No news of this movement, however, appears to have reached Prince Frederick Charles.
The French troops in Ste Marie were only an outpost of the 6th corps, and seeing themselves outnumbered, they withdrew about 2.30, the Prussians rushing the village immediately afterwards. Considerable confusion arose from the convergence of these three brigades upon one village, and more than an hour passed before the troops could be disentangled and massed for further operations. The leaders of the two Guard brigades, still ignorant of the extent of the French position, rallied their men on the main bodies of their commands (which had not been engaged) and then lay down facing exactly as they had done when brought forward to the attack. Thus the 1st brigade lay, facing about east-south-east, south of the chaussée and some five hundred yards west of the village. The 2nd brigade lay south-west of the village about three hundred yards away from it and facing nearly north-east.
The Saxons were on the left rear of the 1st brigade, but took longer to recover themselves than the Guards. With the Hessians and the IX. Corps the action still dragged; the 3rd brigade of the Guards had become involved in the fight, and notwithstanding the arrival of the corps artillery of the III. Corps in the centre the situation was still critical. From the south also came the thunder of guns and no encouraging news from that quarter had as yet reached the prince's headquarters.
About 4.30 p.m. the prince therefore had to consider how long it would take to obtain a decision. To postpone it till the morrow seemed undesirable: to achieve it before nightfall was only possible at the cost of immediate effort.
He therefore decided to assault St Privat with all the Guards available, and called up the III., X. and Saxons to assist them.
The 4th brigade of the Guards now received their orders to attack Jérusalem (a hamlet a little south of St Privat), and the 1st division was ordered to assault St Privat itself.
Von Pape, commanding the latter division, pointed out that no artillery force adequate to prepare the way for him was as yet on the ground, and that the Saxons were still a long way to the rear. But his orders were imperative, and the 4th brigade was already moving off and had to be supported at any cost. Actually all available batteries had already been sent for and were trotting forward from every quarter towards the objective. He accordingly transmitted his orders, and the 2nd brigade was the first to attempt their execution. It had to wheel half-right in mass to bring it in the required direction, and then to advance till its rear was clear of the obstruction formed by the gardens of St Marie. By the time (5.30) it had sufficiently cleared this village it became apparent that the 4th brigade in its extension for attack would overlap the front assigned to the 2nd, hence a further (half-left) wheel, still in mass, had to be undertaken before room for deployment could be obtained. Almost as the commands were given, the French suddenly opened an overwhelming long-range fire and their bullets swept like hail through the crowded mass of the German troops. Nevertheless the wheel was effected, the fresh direction taken, the troops extended for attack, and then the whole brigade dashed towards the houses assigned them as their objective. Meanwhile the 1st brigade had moved round the north of the village and carried out its extension without serious hindrance. But emerging from the hollow running north from St Marie, they came under a heavy fire not only from St Privat but also from Roncourt, which latter village they now saw for the first time. Instinctively a portion of their line worked to the left to face this new menace, and the front thus became dangerously extended. They were, however, now abreast of the 2nd brigade, and the whole line raced forward to reach the effective range of their very inferior weapons, which were about equal at 200 yds. to the French rifle at 600. But the losses of the 2nd brigade, particularly in officers, had been too heavy, and the rush died out whilst still 500 yds. from the two villages.
It was now about 6 p.m. and a long pause ensued, while the 220 guns, which by degrees had unlimbered behind them, brought St Privat and Roncourt under fire. About 7 p.m. the Saxon turning-movement took effect; their infantry from the Orne valley attacked Roncourt from the north, and about 7.15 the village was carried.
Neither Prince Frederick Charles nor the troops in the fighting-line could see what had taken place; but the former seeing other Saxons moving towards Montois and the masses of the III. and X. Corps approaching, whilst the rain of shells into St Privat exceeded anything hitherto seen on any battlefield, decided to call on the whole of his force to attack. He was in
