of the Irun-Bayonne road, along mountain spurs to the Great
Rhune, 2800 ft. high. The decisive movement was a passage in
Passage of the Bidassoa,
October 7, 1813.
strength near Fuenterrabia, to the astonishment of
the enemy, who in view of the width of the river
and the shifting sands, had thought the crossing
impossible at that point. The French right was
then rolled back, and Soult was unable to reinforce his
right in time to retrieve the day. His works fell in succession
after hard fighting, and he withdrew towards the river Nivelle.
The loss was about—Allies, 1600; French, 1400. The passage
of the Bidassoa “was a general’s not a soldiers’ battle”
(Napier).
On the 31st of October Pampeluna surrendered, and Wellington was now anxious to drive Suchet from Catalonia before further invading France. The British government, however, in the interests of the continental powers, urged an immediate advance, so on the night of the 9th of November 1813 he brought up his right from the Pyrenean passes to the northward of Maya and towards the Nivelle. Soult’s army (about 79,000), in three entrenched lines, stretched from the sea in front of St Jean de Luz along commanding ground to Amotz and thence, behind the river, to Mont Mondarin near the Nive. Each army had with it about 100 guns; and, during a heavy cannonade, Wellington on the 10th of November 1813 attacked this extended Passage of the Nivelle, Nov. 10, 1813. position of 16 m. in five columns, these being so directed that after carrying Soult’s advanced works a mass of about 50,000 men converged towards the French centre near Amotz, where, after hard fighting, it swept away the 18,000 of the second line there opposed to it, cutting Soult’s army in two. The French right then fell back to St Jean de Luz, the left towards points on the Nive. It was now late and the Allies, after moving a few miles down both banks of the Nivelle, bivouacked, while Soult, taking advantage of the respite, withdrew in the night to Bayonne. The allied loss was about 2700; that of the French 4000, 51 guns, and all their magazines. The next day Wellington closed in upon Bayonne from the sea to the left bank of the Nive.
After this there was a period of comparative inaction, though during it the French were driven from the bridges at Urdains and Cambo. The weather had become bad, and the Nive unfordable; but there were additional and serious causes of delay. The Portuguese and Spanish authorities were neglecting the payment and supply of their troops. Wellington had also difficulties of a similar kind with his own government, and also the Spanish soldiers, in revenge for many French outrages, had become guilty of grave excesses in France, so that Wellington took the extreme step of sending 25,000 of them back to Spain and resigning the command of their army, though his resignation was subsequently withdrawn. So great was the tension at this crisis that a rupture with Spain seemed possible. These matters, however, having been at length adjusted, Wellington, who in his cramped position between the sea and the Nive could not use his cavalry or artillery effectively, or interfere with the French supplies coming through St Jean Pied de Port, determined to occupy the right as well as the left bank of the Nive. He could not pass to that bank with his whole force while Soult held Bayonne, without exposing his own communications through Irun. Therefore, on the 9th of December 1813, after making a demonstration elsewhere, he effected the passage with Passage of the Nivelle, Nov. 10, 1813. a portion of his force only under Hill and Beresford, Ustaritz and Cambo, his loss being slight, and thence pushed down the river towards Villefranque, where Soult barred his way across the road to Bayonne. The allied army was now divided into two portions by the Nive; and Soult from Bayonne at once took advantage of his central position to attack it with all his available force, first on the left bank and then on the right. On the morning of the 10th of December he fell, with 60,000 men and 40 guns, upon Hope, who with 30,000 men and 24 guns held a position from the sea 3 m. south of Biarritz on a ridge behind two lakes (or tanks) through Arcangues towards the Nive. Desperate fighting now ensued, but fortunately, owing to the intersected ground, Soult was compelled to advance slowly, and in the end, Wellington coming up with Beresford from the right bank, the Battles before Bayonne, or Battles of the Nive, Dec. 10–13, 1813. French retired baffled. On the 11th and 12th of December there were engagements of a less severe character, and finally on the 13th of December Soult with 35,000 men made a vehement attack up the right bank of the Nive against Hill, who with about 14,000 men occupied some heights from Villefranque past St Pierre (Lostenia) to Vieux Moguerre. The conflict about St Pierre (Lostenia) was one of the most bloody of the war; but for hours Hill maintained his ground, and finally repulsed the French before Wellington, delayed by his pontoon bridge over the Nive having been swept away, arrived to his aid. The losses in the four days’ fighting in the battles before Bayonne (or battles of the Nive) were—Allies about 5000, French about 7000. Both the British and Portuguese artillery, as well as infantry, greatly distinguished themselves in these battles.
In eastern Spain Suchet (April 11, 1813) had defeated Elio’s Murcians at Yecla and Villena, but was subsequently routed by Sir John Murray[1] near Castalla (April 13), who then besieged Tarragona. The siege was abandoned after a time, but was later on renewed by Lord W. Bentinck. Suchet, after the battle of Vitoria, evacuated Tarragona (Aug. 17) but defeated Bentinck in the combat of Ordal (Sept. 13).
Campaign in the South of France, 1814.—When operations recommenced in February 1814 the French line extended from Bayonne up the north bank of the Adour to the Pau, thence bending south along the Bidouze to St Palais, with advanced posts on the Joyeuse and at St Jean Pied de Port. Wellington’s left, under Hope, watched Bayonne, while Beresford, with Hill, observed the Adour and the Joyeuse, the right trending back till it reached Urcuray on the St Jean Pied de Port road. Exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other places, the available field force of Soult numbered about 41,000, while that of the Allies, deducting Hope’s force observing Bayonne, was of much the same strength. It had now become Wellington’s object to draw Soult away from Bayonne, in order that the allied army might, with less loss, cross the Adour and lay siege to the place on both banks of the river.
At its mouth the Adour was about 500 yds. wide, and its entrance from the sea by small vessels, except in the finest weather, was a perilous undertaking, owing to the shifting sands and a dangerous bar. On the other hand, the deep sandy soil near its banks made the transport of bridging matériel by land laborious, and almost certain of discovery. Wellington, convinced that no effort to bridge below Bayonne would be expected, decided to attempt it there, and collected at St Jean Pied de Port and Passages a large number of country vessels (termed chasse-marées) Then, leaving Hope with 30,000 men to watch Bayonne, he began an enveloping movement round Soult’s left. Hill on the 14th and 15th of February, after a combat at Garris, drove the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; and Wellington then pressed these troops back over the Bidouze and Gave[2] de Mauleon to the Gave d’Oleron. Wellington’s object in this was at once attained, for Soult, leaving only 10,000 men in Bayonne, came out and concentrated at Orthes on the Pau. Then Wellington (Feb. 19) proceeded to St Jean de Luz to superintend the despatch of boats to the Adour. Unfavourable weather, however, compelled him to leave this to Sir John Hope and Admiral Penrose, so returning to the Gave d’Oleron he crossed it, and faced Soult on the Pau (Feb. 25). Hope in the meantime, after feints higher up the Adour, succeeded (Feb. 22 and 23) in passing 600 men across Passage of the Adour, Feb. 22 to 26, 1814. the river in boats. The nature of the ground, and there being no suspicion of an attempt at this point, led to the French coming out very tardily to oppose them; and when they did, some Congreve rockets (then a novelty) threw them into confusion, so that the right bank was held until, on the morning of the 24th, the flotilla of
