chasse-marées appeared from St Jean de Luz, preceded by men-of-war boats. Several men and vessels were lost in crossing the bar, but by noon on the 26th of February the bridge of 26 vessels had been thrown and secured, batteries and a boom placed to protect it, 8000 troops passed over, and the enemy’s gunboats driven up the river. Bayonne was then invested on both banks as a preliminary to the siege.
On the 27th of February Wellington, having with little loss
effected the passage of the Pau below Orthes, attacked Soult.
In this battle the Allies and French were of about equal strength
(37,000): the former having 48 guns, the latter 40. Soult held
a strong position behind Orthes on heights commanding
Battle of Orthes,
Feb. 27, 1814.
the roads to Dax and St Sever. Beresford was
directed to turn his right, if possible cutting him off
from Dax, and Hill his left towards the St Sever road.
Beresford’s attack, after hard fighting over difficult ground, was
repulsed, when Wellington, perceiving that the pursuing French
had left a central part of the heights unoccupied, thrust up the
Light Division into it, between Soult’s right and centre. At the
same time Hill, having found a ford above Orthes, was turning
the French left, when Soult retreated just in time to save being
cut off, withdrawing towards St Sever, which he reached on the
28th of February. The allied loss was about 2000; the French
4000 and 6 guns.
From St Sever Soult turned eastwards to Aire, where he covered the roads to Bordeaux and Toulouse. Beresford, with 12,000 men, was now sent to Bordeaux, which opened its gates as promised to the Allies. Driven by Hill from Aire on the 2nd of March 1814, Soult retired by Vic Bigorre, where there was a combat (March 19), and Tarbes, where there was a severe action (March 20), to Toulouse behind the Garonne. He endeavoured also to rouse the French peasantry against the Allies, but in vain, for Wellington’s justice and moderation afforded them no grievances. Wellington wished to pass the Garonne above Toulouse in order to attack the city from the south—its weakest side—and interpose between Soult and Suchet. But finding it impracticable to operate in that direction, he left Hill on the west side and crossed at Grenade below Toulouse (April 3). When Beresford, who had now rejoined Wellington, had passed over, the bridge was swept away, which left him isolated on the right bank. But Soult did not attack, the bridge (April 8) was restored, Wellington crossed the Garonne and the Ers, and attacked Soult on the 10th of April. In the battle of Toulouse the French numbered about 40,000 (exclusive of the local National Guards) with 80 guns; the Allies under 52,000 with 64 Battle of Toulouse, April 10, 1814. guns. Soult’s position to the north and east of the city was exceedingly strong, consisting of the canal of Languedoc, some fortified suburbs, and (to the extreme east) the commanding ridge of Mont Rave, crowned with redoubts and earthworks. Wellington’s columns, under Beresford, were now called upon to make a flank march of some two miles, under artillery, and occasionally musketry, fire, being threatened also by cavalry, and then, while the Spanish troops assaulted the north of the ridge, to wheel up, mount the eastern slope, and carry the works. The Spaniards were repulsed, but Beresford gallantly took Mont Rave and Soult fell back behind the canal. On the 12th of April Wellington advanced to invest Toulouse from the south, but Soult on the night of the 11th had retreated towards Villefranque, and Wellington then entered the city. The allied loss was about 5000, the French 3000. Thus, in the last great battle of the war, the courage and resolution of the soldiers of the Peninsular army were conspicuously illustrated.
On the 13th of April 1814 officers arrived with the announcement to both armies of the capture of Paris, the abdication of Napoleon, and the practical conclusion of peace; and on the 18th a convention, which included Suchet’s force, was entered into between Wellington and Soult. Unfortunately, after Toulouse had fallen the Allies and French, in a sortie from Bayonne on the 14th of April, each lost about 1000 men so that some 10,000 men fell after peace had virtually been made.
In the east, during this year (1814), Sir W. Clinton had, on the 16th of January, attacked Suchet at Molins de Rey and blockaded Barcelona (Feb. 7); the French posts of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon had also been yielded up, and Suchet, on the 2nd of March, had crossed the Pyrenees into France. Figueras surrendered to Cuesta before the end of May; and peace was formally signed at Paris on the 30th of May.
Thus terminated the long and sanguinary struggle of the Peninsular War. The British troops were partly sent to England, and partly embarked at Bordeaux for America, with which country war had broken out (see American War of 1812–15): the Portuguese and Spanish recrossed the Pyrenees: the French army was dispersed throughout France: Louis XVIII. was restored to the French throne: and Napoleon was permitted to reside in the island of Elba, the sovereignty of which had been conceded to him by the allied powers. For the operations of this campaign Wellington was created marquess of Douro and duke of Wellington, and peerages were conferred upon Beresford, Graham and Hill.
The events of the Peninsular War, especially as narrated in the Wellington Despatches, are replete with instruction not only for the soldier, but also for the civil administrator. Even in a brief summary of the war one salient fact is noticeable, that all Wellington’s reverses were in connexion with his sieges, for which his means were never adequate. In his many battles he was always victorious, his strategy eminently successful, his organizing and administrative power exceptionally great, his practical resource unlimited, his soldiers most courageous, but he never had an army fully complete in its departments and warlike equipment. He had no adequate corps of sappers and miners, or transport train. In 1812 tools and material of war for his sieges were often insufficient. In 1813, when he was before San Sebastian, the ammunition ran short; a battering train, long demanded, reached him not only some time after it was needed, but even then with only one day’s provision of shot and shell. For the siege of Burgos heavy guns were available in store on the coast, but he neither had, nor could procure, the transport to bring them up. By resource and dogged determination Wellington rose superior to almost every difficulty, but he could not overcome all; and the main teaching of the Peninsular War turns upon the value of an army that is completely organized in its various branches before hostilities break out. (C. W. R.)
Authorities.—The Wellington Despatches, ed. Gurwood (London, 1834–1839); Supplementary Wellington Despatches (London, 1858–1861 and 1867–1872); Sir W. Napier, History of War in the Peninsula and South of France (London, 1828–1840), C. W. C. Oman, History of the Peninsular War (London, 1902); Sir J. Jones, Journals and Sieges in Spain, 1811–12 (London, 1814); and Account of the War in Spain, Portugal and South of France, 1808–14 (London, 1821); Sir J. F. Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore (London, 1904); Commandant Balagny, Campaign de l’Empereur Napoléon en Espagne, 1808–1809 (Paris, 1902); Major-General C. W. Robinson, Wellington’s Campaigns (London, 1907); Sir A. Alison, History of Europe, 1789–1815 (London, 1835–1842); T. Choumara, Considérations militaires sur les mémoires du Maréchal Suchet et sur la bataille de Toulouse (Paris, 1838); Commandant Clerc, Campagne du Maréchal Soult dans les Pyrénées occidentales en 1813–14 (Paris, 1894); Mémoires du Baron Marbot (Paris, 1891; Eng. trans by A. J. Butler, London, 1902); H. R. Clinton, The War in the Peninsula, &c. (London, 1889); Marshal Suchet’s Mémoires (Paris, 1826; London, 1829); Captain L. Butler, Wellington’s Operations in the Peninsula, 1808–14 London, 1904); Batty, Campaign of the Left Wing of the Allied Army to the Western Pyrenees and South of France, 1813–14 (London, 1823); Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule, &c., sous Napoléon (Paris and London, 1827); Lord Londonderry, Narrative of the Peninsular War, 1808–13 (London, 1829); R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War (London, 1823–1832); Major A. Griffiths, Wellington and Waterloo (illustrated; London, 1898); Thiers, Histoire du consulat et de l’empire (Paris, 1845–1847; and translated by D. F. Campbell, London, 1845); Captain A. H. Marindin, The Salamanca Campaign (London, 1906); Marmont’s Mémoires (Paris, 1857); Colonel Sir A. S. Frazer, Letters during the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns (ed. by Major-General E. Sabine, London, 1859); Lieut.-Colonel W. Hill-James, Battles round Biarritz, Nivelle and the Nive (London, 1896); Battles round Biarritz, Garres and the Bridge of Boats (Edinburgh, 1897); H. B. Robinson, Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir T. Picton (London, 1835); G. C. Moore-Smith, Autobiography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith (London, 1901); Life of John Colborne (F.-M. Lord Seaton) (London, 1903), Rev. A. H. Craufurd,
