of Nicias and the loss of thousands of men and hundreds of ships, was a blow from which Athens never recovered (see under Syracuse and Sicily). Even before the final catastrophe the Spartans had reopened hostilities. On the advice of Alcibiades (q.v.), exiled from Athens in 415, they had fortified Decelea in Attica within fifteen miles of Athens. This place not only served as a permanent headquarters for predatory expeditions, but cut off the revenue from the Laurium mines, furnished a ready asylum for runaway slaves, and rendered the transference of supplies from Euboea considerably more difficult (i.e. by the sea round Cape Sunium). Athens thus entered upon the third stage of the conflict with exceedingly poor prospects.
3. The Ionian or Decelean War.—From the Athenian standpoint this war may be broken up into three periods: (1) period of revolt of allies (413–411), (2) the rally (410–408), (3) the relapse (407–404). As contrasted with the Archidamian War, this war was fought almost exclusively in the Aegean Sea, the enemy was primarily Sparta, and the deciding factor was Persian gold. Furthermore, apart from the gradual disintegration of the empire, Athens was disturbed by political strife.
In 412 many Ionian towns revolted, and appealed either to Agis at Decelea or to Sparta direct. Euboea, Lesbos, Chios, Erythrae led the way in negotiation and revolt, and simultaneously the court of Susa instructed the satraps Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes to renew the collection of tribute from the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The satraps likewise made overtures to Sparta. The revolt of the Ionian allies was due in part to Alcibiades also, whose prompt action in co-operation with his friend the ephor Endius finally confirmed the Chian oligarchs in their purpose. In 411 a treaty was signed by Sparta and Tissaphernes against Athens: the treaty formally surrendered to the Persian king all territory which he or his predecessors had held. It was subsequently renewed in a form somewhat less disgraceful to Greek patriotism by the Spartans Astyochus and Theramenes. On the other hand, a democratic rising in Samos prevented the rebellion of that island, which for the remainder of the war was invaluable to Athens as a stronghold lying between the two great centres of the struggle.
After the news of the Sicilian disaster Athens was compelled at last to draw on the reserve of 1000 talents which had lain untouched in the treasury.[1] The revolt of the Ionian allies, and (in 411) the loss of the Hellespontine, Thracian and Island tributes (see Delian League), very seriously crippled her finances. On the other hand, Tissaphernes undertook to pay the Peloponnesian sailors a daily wage of one Attic drachma (afterwards reduced to 12 drachma). In Attica itself Athens lost Oenoe and Oropus, and by the end of 411 only one quarter of the empire remained. In the meanwhile Tissaphernes began to play a double game with the object of wasting the strength of the combatants. Moreover Alcibiades lost the confidence of the Spartans and passed over to Tissaphernes, at whose disposal he placed his great powers of diplomacy, at the same time scheming for his restoration to Athens. He opened negotiations with the Athenian leaders in Samos and urged them to upset the democracy and establish a philo-Persian oligarchy. After elaborate intrigues, in the course of which Alcibiades played false to the conspirators by forcing them to abandon the idea of friendship with Tissaphernes owing to the exorbitant terms proposed, the new government by the Four Hundred was set up in Athens (see Theramenes). This government (which received no support from the armament in Samos) had a brief life, and on the final revolt of Euboea was replaced by the old democratic system. Alcibiades (q.v.) was soon afterwards invited to return to Athens.
The war, which, probably because of financial trouble, the Spartans had neglected to pursue when Athens was thus in the throes of political convulsion, was now resumed. After much manœuvring and intrigues a naval battle was fought at Cynossema in the Hellespont in which victory on the whole rested with the Athenians (Aug. 411), though the net result was inconsiderable. About this time the duplicity of Tissaphernes—who having again and again promised a Phoenician fleet and having actually brought it to the Aegean finally dismissed it on the excuse of trouble in the Levant—and the vigorous honesty of Pharnabazus definitely transferred the Peloponnesian forces to the north-west coast of Asia Minor and the Hellespont. There they were regularly financed by Pharnabazus, while the Athenians were compelled to rely on forced levies. In spite of this handicap Alcibiades, who had been seized and imprisoned by Tissaphernes at Sardis but effected his escape, achieved a remarkable victory over the Spartan Mindarus at Cyzicus (about April 410). So complete was the destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet that, according to Diodorus, peace was offered by Sparta (see ad fin.)and would have been accepted but for the warlike speeches of the “demagogue” Cleophon representing the extreme democrats.[2] Another result was the return to allegiance (409) of a number of the north-east cities of the empire. Great attempts were made by the Athenians to hold the Hellespont and then to protect the corn-supply from the Black Sea. In Greece these gains were compensated by the loss of Pylos and Nisaea.
In 408 Alcibiades effectively invested Chalcedon, which surrendered by agreement with Pharnabazus, and subsequently Byzantium also fell into his hands with the aid of some of its inhabitants.
Pharnabazus, weary of bearing the whole cost of the war for the Peloponnesians, agreed to a period of truce so that envoys might visit Susa, but at this stage the whole position was changed by the appointment of Cyrus the Younger as satrap of Lydia, Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia. His arrival coincided with the appointment of Lysander (c. Dec. 408) as Spartan admiral—the third of the three great commanders (Brasidas and Gylippus being the others) whom Sparta produced during the war. Cyrus promptly agreed on the special request of Lysander (q.v.) to pay slightly increased wages to the sailors, while Lysander established a system of anti-Athenian clubs and oligarchic governments in various cities. Meanwhile Alcibiades (May 407), having exacted levies in Caria, returned at length to Athens and was elected strategus with full powers (see Strategus). He raised a large force of men and ships and endeavoured to draw Lysander (then at Ephesus) into an engagement. But Cyrus and Lysander were resolved not to fight till they had a clear advantage, and Alcibiades took a small squadron to Phocaea. In spite of his express orders his captain Antiochus in his absence provoked a battle and was defeated and killed at Notium. This failure and the refusal of Lysander to fight again destroyed the confidence which Alcibiades had so recently regained. Ten strategi were appointed to supersede him and he retired to fortified ports in the Chersonese which he had prepared for such an emergency (c. Jan. 406). At the same time Lysander’s year of office expired and he was superseded by Callicratidas, to the disgust of all those whom he had so carefully organized in his service. Callicratidas, an honourable man of pan-Hellenic patriotism, was heavily handicapped in the fact that Cyrus declined to afford him the help which had made Lysander powerful, and had recourse to the Milesians and Chians, with whose aid he fitted out a fleet of 140 triremes (only 10 Spartan). With these he pursued Conon (chief of the ten new Athenian strategi), captured 30 of his 70 ships and besieged him in Mytilene. Faced with inevitable destruction, Conon succeeded in sending the news to Athens, where by extraordinary efforts a fleet of 110 ships was at once equipped. Callicratidas, hearing of this fleet’s approach, withdrew from Mytilene, leaving Eteonicus in charge of the blockade. Forty more ships were collected by the Athenians, who met and defeated Callicratidas at Arginusae with a loss of more than half his fleet. The immediate result was that Eteonicus left Mytilene and Conon found himself free. Unfortunately the victorious generals at Arginusae, through negligence or owing
