to a storm, failed to recover the bodies of those of their crews who were drowned or killed in the action. They were therefore recalled, tried and condemned to death, except two who had disobeyed the order to return to Athens.
At this point Lysander was again sent out, nominally as secretary to the official admiral Aracus Cyrus, recalled to Susa by the illness of Darius, left him in entire control of his satrapy. Thus strengthened he sailed to Lampsacus on the Hellespont and laid siege to it. Conon, now in charge of the Athenian fleet, sailed against him, but the fleet was entirely destroyed while at anchor at Aegospotami (Sept. 405), Conon escaping with only 12 out of 180 sail to Cyprus. In April 404 Lysander sailed into the Peiraeus, took possession of Athens, and destroyed the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiraeus. An oligarchical government was set up (see Critias), and Lysander having compelled the capitulation of Samos, the last Athenian stronghold, sailed in triumph to Sparta.
Two questions of considerable importance for the full understanding of the Peloponnesian War may be selected for special notice (1) how far was it a war between two antagonistic theories of government, oligarchic and democratic? and (2) how far was Athenian statesmanship at fault in declining the offers of peace which Sparta made?
1. A common theory is that Sparta fought throughout the war as an advocate of oligarchy, while Athens did not seek to interfere with the constitutional preferences of her allies. The view is based partly on Thuc. i. 19, according to which the Spartans took care that their allies should adhere to a policy convenient to themselves. This idea is disproved by Thucydides’ own narrative, which shows that down to 418 (the battle of Mantinea) Sparta tolerated democratic governments in Peloponnesus itself—e.g. Elis, Mantinea, Sicyon, Achaea. It was only after that date that democracy was suppressed in the Peloponnesian League, and even then Mantinea remained democratic. In point of fact, it was only when Lysander became the representative of Spartan foreign policy—i.e. in the last years of the war—that Sparta was identified with the oligarchic policy.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the Athenian Empire at a much earlier date was based upon a uniform democratic type of government (cf. Thuc. i. 19, viii. 64; Xen. Pol. i. 14, Hell. iii. 47, Arist. Pol. viii. 69). It is true that we find oligarchic government in Chios and Lesbos (up to 428) and in Samos (up to 440), but this is discounted by the fact that all three were “autonomous” allies. Moreover, in the case of Samos there was a democracy in 439, though in 412 the government was again oligarchic. The case of Selymbria (see Hicks and Hill, op. cit. 77) is of little account, because at that time (409) the Empire was in extremis. In general we find that Athenian orators take special credit on the ground that the Athenian had given to her allies the constitutional advantages which they themselves enjoyed.
2. In view of the disastrous issue of the war, it is important to notice that on three occasions—(a) after Pylos, (b) after Cyzicus, (c) after Arginusae—Athens refused formal peace proposals from Sparta. (a) Though Cleon was probably wise in opposing peace negotiations before the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria, it seems in the light of subsequent events that he was wrong to refuse the terms which were offered after the hoplites had been captured. No doubt, however, the temper in Athens was at that time predominantly warlike, and the surrender of the hoplites was a unique triumph. Possibly, too, Cleon foresaw that peace would have meant a triumph for the philo-Laconian party. (b) The peace proposals of 410 are given by Diodorus, who says that the ephor Endius proposed that a peace should be made on the basis of uti possidetis, except that Athens should evacuate Pylos and Cythera, and Sparta, Decelea. Cleophon, however, perhaps doubting whether the offer was sincere (cf. Philochorus in Schol. ap. Eurip. Orest. 371; Fragm. ed. Didot, 117, 118), demanded the status quo ante (413 or 431). (c) The proposals of 406, mentioned by Ath. Pol. 34, were on the same lines, except that Athens no longer had Pylos and Cythera, and had lost practically half her empire. At this time peace must therefore have been advantageous to Athens as showing the world that in spite of her losses she was still one of the great powers of Greece. Moreover, an alliance with Sparta would have meant a check to Persian interference. It is probable, again, that party interest was a leading motive in Cleophon’s mind, since a peace would have meant the return of the oligarchic exiles and the establishment of a moderate oligarchy.
Authorities.—G. Busolt, Griech. Gesch., Bd. iii., Teil ii. (1904), “Der Peloponnesische Krieg” is essential. All histories of Greece may be consulted (see Greece: History, Ancient, section “Authorities”). (J. M. M.)
PELOPONNESUS (“Island of Pelops”), the ancient and modern Greek official name for the part of Greece south of the Isthmus of Corinth. In medieval times it was called the Morea,
from its resemblance to a mulberry-leaf in shape, and this name
is still current in popular speech.
PELOPS, in Greek legend, the grandson of Zeus, son of Tantalus and Dione, and brother of Niobe. His father’s home was on Mt Sipylus in Asia Minor, whence Pelops is spoken of as a Lydian or a Phrygian. Tantalus one day served up to the gods his own son Pelops, boiled and cut in pieces. The gods detected the crime, and none of them would touch the food except Demeter (according to others, Thetis), who, distracted by the loss of her daughter Persephone, ate of the shoulder. The gods restored Pelops to life, and the shoulder consumed by Demeter was replaced by one of ivory. Wherefore the descendants of Pelops had a white mark on their shoulder ever after (Ovid, Metam. vi. 404; Virgil, Georgics, iii. 7). This tale is perhaps reminiscent of human sacrifice amongst the Greeks. Poseidon carried Pelops off to Olympus, where he dwelt with the gods, till, for his father’s sins, he was cast out from heaven. Then, taking much wealth with him, he crossed over from Asia to Greece. He went to Pisa in Elis as suitor of Hippodameia, daughter of king Oenomaus, who had already vanquished in the chariot-race and slain many suitors for his daughter’s hand. But by the help of Poseidon, who lent him winged steeds, or of Oenomaus’s charioteer Myrtilus, whom he or Hippodameia bribed, Pelops was victorious in the race, wedded Hippodameia, and became king of Pisa (Hyginus, Fab. 84) The race of Pelops for his wife may be a reminiscence of the early practice of marriage by capture. When Myrtilus claimed his promised reward, Pelops flung him into the sea near Geraestus in Euboea, and from his dying curse sprang those crimes and sorrows of the house of Pelops which supplied the Greek tragedians with such fruitful themes (Sophocles, Electra, 505, with Jebb’s note). Among the sons of Pelops by Hippodameia were Atreus, Thyestes and Chrysippus From Pisa Pelops extended his sway over the neighbouring Olympia, where he celebrated the Olympian games with a splendour unknown before. His power and fame were so great that henceforward the whole peninsula was known to the ancients as Peloponnesus, “island of Pelops” (νῆσος, island). In after times Pelops was honoured at Olympia above all other heroes; a temple was built for him by Heracles, his descendant in the fourth generation, in which the annual magistrates sacrificed to him a black ram.
From the reference to Asia in the tales of Tantalus, Niobe and Pelops it has been conjectured that Asia was the original seat of these legends, and that it was only after emigration to Greece that the people localized a part of the tale of Pelops in their new home. In the time of Pausanias the throne of Pelops was still shown on the top of Mt Sipylus. The story of Pelops is told in the first Olympian ode of Pindar and in prose by Nicolaus Damascenus.
PELOTA (Sp. “little ball,” from Lat. pila), a ball game which, originating centuries ago in the Basque provinces, has developed into several forms of the sport. Epigrams of Martial show that there were at least three kinds of pelota played in his time. Blaid, practically hand fives against the back wall of a court, is still played on both sides of the Pyrenees. It is so popular that the authorities had to forbid its being played against the walls of the cathedral at Barcelona. In uncovered courts of large size there are two varieties of pelota. One, the favourite pastime of the Basque, is played against a front wall (fronton), either bare-handed, with a leather or wooden long glove-like protector (cesta), or with a chistera strapped to the wrist, a sickle-shaped wicker-work implement three feet long, much like a hansom-wheel basket mud-guard, in the narrow groove of which the ball is caught and from which, thanks to the leverage afforded, it can be hurled with tremendous force. There are several players to a side, frequently an uneven number to allow a handicap. The score is announced by a cantara, whose melodious vocal efforts make him not the least appreciated participant in the game. In the other form of the game, played nearly exclusively by professionals (pelotaris), there are usually three players on each side, two forwards and a back, distinguished by a coloured sash or cap. The server (butteur) slips off his chistera to serve, bouncing the ball on the but, a kind of stool, about 30 ft. from the wall, and
