addition to the above, there were heavy artillery with 400 siege guns, engineers with pontoon trains, naval launches, and the necessary supply trains. The total Russian forces numbered 200,000 combatants of all arms, with 850 field and 400 siege guns.
For some months prior to the tsar's declaration, Turkey had realized that war was inevitable, but such preparations as were made were far from adequate. Abdul Kerim, who had commanded in Servia the previous year, was still acting as commander-in-chief, but the task set him was not an easy one. With the Russians in front, the Servians and Montenegrins, whose action was known to be uncertain, on the flank, and the Christian population of Bulgaria, in sympathy with the Russians, in the midst, it required a younger and more energetic man, with a greater knowledge of the art of war than he possessed, to plan and to carry out a successful defence of the Moslem dominions. The prospect of war had aroused the Turks, and the nation had taken steps to prepare for the conflict, but they lacked trained leaders. The Turkish officers were but ill-instructed. Works on the art of war did not exist in the Turkish language. General conscription existed in Turkey, but there was an entire absence of organization. Theoretically, each of the six districts into which the empire was divided should have produced an army of four corps, but it was only on paper. Practically the troops were not organized in corps. At the outbreak of war, Osman's force, some 30,000 strong, was at Vidin; a few battalions were spread along the Danube from Vidin to Silistria, with a brigade of infantry at Nikopol, another at Sistova, and the best part of two divisions at Rustchuk. Abdul Kerim's headquarters were at Shumla where there were two more infantry divisions. A cavalry division was in process of organization. Varna was the base of supply and was connected by rail with Shumla and Rustchuk. Suleiman Pasha with some 40,000 men was still in Montenegro. The total Turkish forces in Europe at that time were about 120,000 men with 450 guns, but they were disseminated instead of being concentrated, or grouped in view of a rapid concentration. Abdul Kerim's plan, or rather his idea, was, that the Russians would find some difficulty in the first place in forcing the passage of the Danube, and when they had succeeded in this, they would be bound to enter the zone of the Quadrilateral, where he hoped, operating with the fortresses as supports, to deal with them successfully. As regards the Turkish fleet, at the outset, in addition to a fleet of 8 ironclads below Braila, there were 7 monitors and 18 wooden ships of war on the Danube between Hirsova and Vidin.
In the matter of armament the Turks had the advantage. The artillery were armed with a Krupp breech-loading gun, which was better than the Russian bronze gun, while the Peabody-Martini rifles of the infantry were superior to the Russian Krenk. The firearm of the Turkish cavalry was the Winchester repeating Carbine, which was inferior to the short Berden with which the Russian cavalry was armed. But this advantage in armament was discounted by the fact that, from motives of economy, the Turkish soldier had done but little rifle practice.
Hostilities commenced on the 24th of April, when the Russian army advanced in three columns towards Bucharest, 1st Period.—The Russian advance and passage of the Danube. the eastern flank covered by the XI. Corps which marched to Galatz. By the end of May the bulk of the Russian forces were assembled at Bucharest practically opposite the intended point of passage, with the advanced guard under General Skobelev at Giurgevo, and cavalry observing the river line from Turnu Magureli to Kalarashi. It was now decided to await the arrival of the IV., XIII., and XIV. Corps and the necessary bridging material for the passage of the Danube.
On June 15th the troops were disposed as follows: 8th Cavalry Division at Turnu Magureli; 12th at Oltenitza; 2nd at Kalarashi; Advanced Guard at Giurgevo; XI. Army Corps at Oltenitza and Giurgevo; VIII., XII., XIII., ½IX., at Bucharest; ½IX. at Slatina; IV. at Slobodsia; XIV. at Galatz; VII. at Odessa; X. in the Crimea. Meanwhile steam launches were brought overland, and the Russians, by means of torpedoes, submarine mines and their shore batteries, had succeeded in clearing the Danube of Turkish vessels between Nikopolis and Rustchuk. Two of the smaller ironclads had been sunk, the remainder of the flotilla driven under the shelter of the fortresses, while barricades of mines effectually isolated them and prevented them from again entering the zone of operations. Of the large ironclads on the lower Danube, one was sunk near Sulina, and from that time the remainder stayed in Sulina harbour.
On June 22nd the XIV. Army Crops crossed into the Dobrudja at Galatz and advanced south, the Turkish detachment there retiring before them. Pontoons having been brought by rail, the necessary rafts and boats (which had been constructed at Slatina on the Aluta) were floated down to the neighbourhood of Zimnitza, and on June 24th siege batteries opened fire on Nikopol and Rustchuk, while the IX. Army Corps made a feint of crossing just below Nikopol. These measures were effective in confusing the Turkish commander as to the Russian intentions, and on the night of June 26/27th, 12 companies of rifles, with a squadron and 6 guns, were landed on the south bank opposite Zimnitza, and within twenty-four hours the whole of the VIII. Corps had. crossed the river. By July 2nd the Russians had completed a bridge over the river, which is 1000 yds. wide at this part. At Sistova was a Turkish brigade of infantry. The commander, in the early morning of the 27th, received information from his outposts of the crossing, but instead of moving with his whole force, sent two battalions to oppose it. The Russians drove them back, and when reinforced, advanced against the heights in rear of Sistova, which were occupied with a loss of 800 men, the Turkish troops retreating to Tirnova and Nikopol. The Turks had remained ignorant of the Russians' concentration in Rumania and no attempt had been made to discover their plans. Abdul Kerim remained inactive in the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and even when he heard of the crossing at Sistova, decided that it was but a demonstration. No measures were taken to observe the Russians. They were thus able to complete their crossing practically undisturbed, and this although it was never likely that the Russians would voluntarily select a point of passage leading into the Quadrilateral. Everything pointed to a crossing between Nikopol and Rustchuk. The best course for the Turks under existing circumstances would have been to leave garrisons in the fortresses, to observe the river line and to push reconnaissances to the north of the river, and to dispose the field army in a central position, whence it could concentrate on any point as soon as the enemy's intentions were revealed.
On June 30th Lieut.-General Gurko was put in command of a detachment composed of 10 battalions, 31 squadrons and 2nd Period.—Operations in Bulgaria to the fall of Plevna. 32 guns, with which he was ordered to advance rapidly to Tirnova to gain possession of a pass over the Balkans, to damage railways and telegraphs, and to endeavour to stir up a Bulgarian revolt. He crossed the Danube by the Russian bridge on July 3rd and occupied Tirnova on July 7th, the Turkish garrison retreating to Osman Bazar. At Tirnova he learned that the Shipka Pass was occupied by 3000 Turks, and that none of the remaining passes were held in any force. He then determined to cross by the Hainkioi Pass and to tum the Shipka. He started from Tirnova on the 12th July, on which day the head of the VIII. Corps reached the town. Hainkioi was occupied on the 14th, a detachment of 300 Turks being driven away. Gurko then sent two squadrons to cut the telegraph at Yeni Zagra, and leaving a garrison to hold the pass, set out for Kazanlik on July 16th. It had been arranged that a force from the VIII. Corps should attack the Shipka Pass (q.v.) from the north on the 17th, Gurko attacking simultaneously from the south; but his advance was delayed
