by small bodies of the enemy, and he failed to co-operate, with the result that the attack from the north was repulsed. The Turkish commander, however, evacuated the pass that night (July 18th/19th). It was occupied by the Russians on July 10th, and held till the end of the war. Gurko's detachment was followed across the Danube bridge by the XII. and XIII. Army Corps, which crossed between July 3rd and 8th and moved towards the Jantra river; the IX. Corps was across by July 10th and advanced on Nikopol, the XI. Corps crossed July 10th-15th; and finally the IV. Corps between July 20th and 30th. The VIII. Corps had meanwhile advanced on Tirnova, as we have seen.
On July 3rd Abdul Kerim received orders from Constantinople to advance against the Russians, and set out with the force from Shumla for Rustchuk, immediately preceded by the cavalry division. Still no attempt was made to gain contact with the Russians and discover their intentions. From Rustchuk, Abdul Kerim advanced towards the Jantra, and after a skirmish between the Turkish cavalry and a Russian cavalry brigade again retired. Realizing Abdul Kerim's incapacity, and rendered anxious by Gurko's successful advance, the authorities at Constantinople now decided to give the command to Mehemet Ali. He superseded Abdul Kerim on July 19th, and at once ordered the concentration of all available forces at Rasgrad. Meanwhile Osman Pasha, who had till now been condemned to inactivity at Vidin, received permission to march.
Vidin, with its modern fortifications and heavy armament, and with the Danube on one side and marshy ground towards the interior, was a place of considerable strength. But with the Russians south of the Danube there could no longer be any justification for keeping Osman's 30,000 men isolated. Leaving garrisons in Vidin and the other towns along the Danube from Nikopol to Rakovitza, and to bar the roads from Servia, Osman left Vidin with the remaining 19 battalions, 6 squadrons and 9 batteries on July 13th. His original plan was to join the 10 battalions under Hairi Pasha, then garrisoning Nikopol, and attack the Russian flank between Biela and Tirnova; but on July 15th he received news that the Russians were attacking Nikopol, and he then decided to march straight to Plevna, where there was a garrison of 3000 men under Atouf Pasha. First battle of Plevna. Osman reached Plevna (q.v.) on July 19th, and at once took up a position which had been previously reconnoitred by Atouf Pasha, on the hills to the north-east and east of the town. He had arrived just in time. On July 16th the Russian IX. Corps had taken Nikopol, and on the 18th orders were received to occupy Plevna with one division. At 5 a.m. on July 20th General Schilder-Schuldner, with the 5th Division IX. Corps and other forces, attacked Osman's position. No preliminary reconnaissance was made, and the Russians, after an artillery bombardment lasting about an hour, attacked at four points with separate columns. By midday the Russians were in retreat, having lost over 2800 men. There was no pursuit. On July 20th Osman was reinforced by fourteen battalions from Sofia, and the following day sent Rifaat Pasha with six battalions, a battery and some Circassian cavalry to occupy Lovcha in order to secure his communications with Sofia.
Osman's force at Plevna, within three days' march of the one Russian bridge over the Danube and flanking their line of operations, could not be neglected, and General Krüdener, commanding the IX. Corps, received orders to attack again as soon as possible. After the battle of the 20th he had been reinforced by brigades of the IV. and XII. Corps and a cavalry Second battle of Plevna. division. With this force, 30,000 in all, he attacked on July 30th. Krüdener advanced in two columns, cavalry covering both flanks. Skobelev, with the cavalry on the southern flank, was subsequently reinforced by infantry, so there were practically three columns of attack. A general reserve of one brigade was kept at Karagatsch (16 m. east of Plevna). After an artillery engagement which lasted from 8.30 a.m. till 2.30 p.m. the infantry advanced. The fighting lasted till sunset, when the Russians withdrew to Karagatsch, having lost 7300 officers and men. The Turkish casualties were 2000. General Krüdener, having reconnoitred the position, had hesitated to attack with the force available, and only acted in obedience to the orders received from headquarters, then 80 m. distant at Tirnova. His defeat was an unpleasant surprise for the Russians. Their plans were rudely upset, and their attention was now directed solely to the taking of Plevna. Headquarters were moved from Tirnova back to Bulgareni, Gurko was called back from south of the Balkans, the Rumanian army was called in to co-operate, orders were issued for the Guards and Grenadier Corps and the 24th and 26th infantry divisions to mobilize, 188,000 of the 1st Ban militia and three divisions of the reserve were called out, and the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions and the 3rd Rifle Brigade from Moscow district, where they had been mobilized, were at once ordered to the front.
At this time the position of the Russians was as follows: the XIV. and part of the VII. Corps were north of the Danube, covering the communications; the IV. and IX. Corps were opposed to Osman Pasha at Plevna and his garrisons of Lovcha and Orchanie (the advanced depot of the Plevna force); the XI., XII. and XIII. Corps were along the White Lom facing Mehemet Ali, who was on the line Rasgrad-Eski Djuma with a force of about 80,000 infantry with 60 guns and a few regiments of cavalry, in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses; a small garrison on the Shipka Pass. Gurko was south of the Balkans, where Suleiman Pasha had a force of some 30,000 men. The Russian casualties since the commencement had reached 15,000, and their numbers south of the Danube did not exceed 130,000. Suleiman Pasha could have joined Osman or Mehemet Ali, avoiding the Shipka, and a vigorous offensive against the Russian flank at that time held out every prospect of success. The Shipka Pass would of necessity have been evacuated, but all through we find the Turkish commanders with their eyes fixed on geographical, which were sometimes strategical, points, and losing sight of the fact that the Russian army was their first objective. It is true that the ministers at Constantinople were largely responsible for the faulty strategy, but the generals in the field were also to blame. It was the moment for vigorous action on the part of the Turks. The moral equilibrium of the enemy was upset and the whole army demoralized by this second defeat at Plevna, but not a move was made. Again Osman failed to pursue. He was weak in cavalry, but he had sufficient to keep in touch with the enemy, who were utterly demoralized, and could have followed on with his whole force. He was but 35 m. distant from Sistova, and the result of the demolition of the bridge would have been incalculable. He was subsequently forbidden by Constantinople to assume the offensive, but it was not necessary to consult ministers as to pursuit after a successful battle, and they cannot be held responsible for this. The other Turkish commanders received news of the results of the battles of Plevna with incredulity, and likewise failed to turn them to account.
South of the Balkans was Suleiman's army. He was ordered from Montenegro on July 1st, and, leaving garrisons along the Montenegrin frontier, embarked at Antivari on July 15th. Disembarking at Dedeagatch on the 21st, he moved thence by train to Adrianople. His command, increased by some 15 battalions under Reouf Pasha, raised in the Balkan zone, amounted to approximately 30,000 men, and he was ordered to retake the Shipka Pass and to join Osman Pasha. Suleiman arrived at Karabunar on July 20th and moved to Eski Sagra, where he was joined by Reouf Pasha. Gurko, who had been resting about the Shipka Pass, ignorant of the arrival of Suleiman, moved against Reouf Pasha on the 27th of July, and found himself confronted by their combined forces on the 31st. He was attacked by Suleiman that day and was forced to retire. His force consisted of 15,000 men, including six battalions of Bulgarian volunteers which had just been raised. The following day he retreated across the Balkans by Hainkioi, where he left two brigades to hold the Hainkioi and Elena Passes, the
