methods employed for his destruction by a force of all arms,
that is, of infantry (q.v.), artillery (q.v.) and cavalry (q.v.).
Each of these possesses a power peculiar to itself, the full
development of which depends to a greater or less degree upon
the aid and co-operation of the other two. Now it is quite
evident that the only force which can ensure this co-operation,
and can produce harmonious working between the various
components of that complex machine, a modern army, is the
will-power of the supreme commander. It is, then, the sphere
of the higher commander on the day of battle which is generally
expressed by the term “combined tactics,” and which will be
dealt with in this article. Yet it must not be understood that
because the term higher, or supreme, commander is used that
the theory of combined tactics may be safely neglected by those
soldiers whose ambitions or opportunities do not seem to lead
to that position. In the British Army more than
Necessity
of study.
in any other, as the South African war showed, a
comparatively junior officer may at any moment find
himself placed in command of a mixed force of all arms, without
any previous practical knowledge of how it should be handled.
It will not then be possible to make the best use of such
opportunities by the uneducated light of nature, and such
theoretical knowledge as may have been gleaned from books
and matured by thought will be of great value.
It is of the first importance that the commander of a mixed force should know exactly the powers and limitations of the units under his control. Should he not be a master of his profession, he will at times demand more from his subordinates than they can reasonably be expected to perform; at other times he will miss his chances by ignorance of their capabilities. An uneducated commander may indeed be likened to an indifferent mechanic, who sometimes places an undue strain upon the engine he is supposed to control, and sometimes allows its precious powers to run to waste.
There is, however, a still stronger reason why all officers should study the art of grand tactics. In every battle situations arise of which the issue is decided by the promptitude and efficiency of the co-operation between the three arms. At such moments, an officer in charge of a battery of artillery, or of a squadron of cavalry, may find an opportunity of rendering valuable aid to his own infantry; and a knowledge of the tactics and training of the other arms may then be essential, for it will probably be necessary to act without instructions from superior authority.
But although the importance of studying tactics may be
readily allowed, there would appear to be considerable diversity
of opinion as to the best method of conducting that study. It
is often confidently asserted that tactics cannot be learnt from
books; and in support of this theory it is customary to adduce
Napoleon's well-known statement that tactics change every
ten years. But if we examine the matter more' closely, it will
become evident that the changes which the great captain had
in his mind were those of formations, due principally to improved
weapons, rather than of the principles upon which
combined tactics are based. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise,
for military history furnishes many instances of great
battles which have been fought out on exactly the same lines,
although separated in point of time by many centuries. The
great similarity between Rossbach (q.v.), Austerlitz (q.v.) and
Salamanca (q.v.) has often been quoted since Napoleon first
drew attention to it, but a great deal more remarkable and
instructive is the similarity between the battle on the Metaurus,
which dealt the final blow to the hopes of Carthage in Italy, and
Marlborough’s masterpiece, the battle of Ramillies (q.v.). In
both cases the battle was lost through faulty dispositions before
Continuity
of military history.
it had been begun. In both cases the ultimate loser
took up a position behind a stream thereby losing his
mobility and voluntarily surrendering the initiative
to an enemy who was not slow to take advantage of
it. Precisely the same error was committed time after time
by the Austrian generals who fought against Frederick, notably
at Leuthen (see Seven Years’ War), a battle closely resembling
both Ramillies and the Metaurus. Coming to a later date, we
find the same error committed, with of course precisely the same
result, in Manchuria, where the Russian generals repeatedly
surrendered the initiative to their enterprising opponents, and
allowed them to dictate the course of battle. It must not,
however, be understood from this that no commander should
ever stand upon the defensive; rather it is meant that we
should learn from history the proper method of doing so. This
we cannot do better than by studying Wellington's battles in
the Peninsula, for never have tactics been brought to higher
perfection. Although frequently compelled to adopt the
defensive, he never surrendered the conduct of the battle to
his enemy. Even when surprised and taken at great disadvantage
by Soult at Maya (see Peninsular War), it can be
seen how, while lesser men would have been content to reinforce
the threatened points, Wellington’s one thought was to discover
where he could deal the most effective blow. Nearly a hundred
years later and in a theatre of war many thousands of miles
away, a very similar battle was fought out by Kuropatkin and
Oyama, though on a vastly greater scale.
But history teaches us more than the methods of the great captains; for from it we may learn those changes which have been introduced into both organization and tactics by the improved weapons which science has placed in our hands, and thence the tactician may deduce the changes of the future. Just as the “Old Dessauer” foresaw the advantage which the iron ramrod would give to the Prussian infantry, and as Wellington perceived that improved firearms would render possible the extended lines he adopted, so may the great generals of the future learn those lessons which are only brought home to others through the dire ordeal of battle. From the days of the long-bow to those of the Lee-Metford riHe, the changes in tactics have been brought about by the development of fire. It is therefore only natural that the introduction ofFire power. small-bore rifles, quick-firing artillery, and smokeless powder should have revolutionized many of our ideas. Before the invention of the breech-loader and the rifled cannon, the three arms of the service employed very different methods of combat. The infantry depended principally on the bayonet, the cavalry on the lance or sabre, the artillery on fire. Now there is practically but one method common to all arms whether in attack or defence. The bayonet and the sabre still have their part to play; but in almost every phase of the combat their importance is diminishing, and infantry and cavalry must depend more and more upon fire to compass the enemy’s overthrow. All the preliminary movement and manoeuvres have but one end in view, the development of fire in greater volume and more effectively directed than that of the opposing force; for it is “superiority of fire” that prepares the ground for the final decision.
Side by side with the improvement in firearms there has come another great change which, on the continent of Europe at all events, has had a marked effect on modern tactics. This is the improvement in communications, which has alone made it possible to use the vast numbers with which great battles have recently been fought. Without railways the power which universal service has placed in the hands of the generals of the 20th century could never have been fully developed, for the men could neither have been conveyed to the theatre of operations, nor could they have been fed even supposing Modern conditions. they had been got there. Now all this is and the first step towards the attainment of superiority of fire will be to bring as many men as possible on to the field of battle; the second step will be to place them in the position from which they can use their weapons to the very best advantage. From these premises it is not difficult to foresee the type of battle which will prevail, until some new discovery changes the military systems of the world. In the future, as in the past, it will be the duty of the strategist to mass superior numbers at the decisive point; but so soon as this has been effected there is only one method by which the tactician will be able to follow up the advantage. That is by bringing
