cavalry, I Schiitzen cavalry (Landwehr), and 2 Honved cavalry divisions.
The subdivision of infantry divisions into brigades of two regi- ments remained unaltered; the cavalry divisions, however, after the reconstitution retained as a rule only one brigade staff. There were thus finally 88 army, 20 Schutzen, 22 Honved, 10 Austrian Landsturm, I Hungarian Landsturm brigades, and II army cavalry, I Schutzen cavalry and I Honved cavalry brigades.
The number of field artillery brigades had grown to 66. The brigade organization of fortress (heavy) artillery had practically disappeared.
Armies. The foreseen organization of the forces was in six armies, for which six general officers were designated in peace and func- tioned as inspectors. In Oct. 1914 the Pflanzer-Baltin group was formed in the E. Carpathians; this became the VII. Army later. In Dec. 1914 the V. and VI. Armies in the Balkan theatre were dis- solved and reformed as a " Balkan Force."
In May 1915, when Italy came into the war, three new armies were created a new V., the army group Rohr, and the Tirol De- fence Force under the general command of a commander-in-chief S.W. front. About the same time the III. Army on the Russian front was dissolved, but a new III. Army was formed in the autumn for the operations under Mackensen in Serbia. This III. Army shortly moved to Tirol where, with a new XI. Army and the Tirol Defence Force it constituted a group of armies for the Asiago offen- sive. Shortly after that the III. Army moved again, this time to the Russian front to aid in meeting Brussilov's offensive; here, with a new XII. Army, it constituted the Archduke Karl's group of armies.
On the entry of Rumania into the war a new I. Army was created. The former I. Army on the Russian front had been dissolved in July 1916.
On the Italian front the Rohr group had meantime become the X. Army, and the Tirol Defence Force was dissolved.
In the winter of 1917, after the Caporetto offensive, a new VI. Army was created to replace the departing German XIV. Army. The V. Army had already become, in the summer of 1917, the Army of the Isonzo; for a time this army was subdivided into the I. and II. Isonzo Armies, forming the Boroevic group of armies, while the X. and XI. Armies constituted the Conrad group of armies.
In the E. nearly all armies were dissolved during 1918, first the I. then the III., IV., VII. The higher command on this side was then shared between the I., IV. and VII. " General Kommandos." The II. Army in Ukraine, however, retained its identity to the Armistice, under the name of K.u.K. Eastern Army.
In Albania, meantime, the Austro-Hungarian forces had been constituted as the Kovess army group. On the breakup of the Bulgarian front in the autumn of 1918 all available forces were constituted as one group of armies under the same general.
The End. In Nov. 1918 the old Habsburg Empire dissolved in ruin, and with it the famous old army which had maintained its integrity through four years of trial. Its remnants formed nuclei for the national armies of the successor states. Its record was closed, and it passed into the eternity of history. (A-K. ; E. J.)
X. THE TURKISH ARMY
At the time of the Balkan War mobilization in 1912, Turkey possessed an army in which the officer corps represented the traditions of the Sultan "Abdul Hamid. Everything that might make for modern efficiency in war had for 30 years been excluded from the Turkish military curriculum. Ninety-five per cent of the rank and file were illiterate; their main virtues were willing- ness and endurance. The officers also were in the main untrained; they were drawn either from the stupid and hidebound ranker elements (Alaili) or from the more up-to-date products of the military schools (Mektebli) ; but even these latter, mostly scions of better-class families, had little sense of accuracy and punc- tuality in the performance of their duty. There were even gen- eral staff officers who could neither read nor write. The Young Turkish movement had the effect of placing more energetic men at the head of the troops, but had also increased military ama- teurishness to such an extent as to become a positive danger to the army, and to make promotion henceforward dependent, not on efficiency and professional skill, but on political intrigue. The redeeming feature of the army was the quality of the private soldier, and particularly of the Anatolian peasant. No troops in Europe were more steadfast, self-sufficient and patient. The Arabian soldiers were bad, the Kurds useless in face of the enemy and as helpless as children, the Christian and Jewish subjects of Turkey of no military value.
The term of service in Turkey was three years for all arms. Mahmud Shevket Pasha has stated that 240,000 men per year be- came liable for service; of these some 110,000 to 120,000 were exempted, and of the rest only about 70,000 were actually enrolled.
Official returns showed that out of a total pop. of 24,000,000 (of whom at most 15,000,000 were liable for service) men from 20 to 25 years of age numbered 1,080,000, and from 20 to 40 years of age 4,000,000. The paper strength of this peace army showed 20,000 officers and 280,000 men. The total war strength of Turkey was reckoned on paper to amount to 24,000 officers, 1,300 officials, and 610,000 men. The forces actually raised in the Balkan War, how- ever, fell far below these figures. An estimate of 450,000 men for the war army would be excessive.
The term of service was made up as follows : three years with the colours (Nizam), up to 29 years of age with the reserve (Ikhtiat), thence up to 38 years of age with the Landwehr (Redif), 39th and 4Oth years of age with the Landsturm (Mustafiz). In war all classes, including the Mustafiz, were called up. The Ikhtiat brought up the ranks of the Nizam units to war strength; this process usually ab- sorbed them all, as the peace strength of the battalions was only some 200 to 250 men, and their arms in proportion. The Redifs formed separate and complete divisions, organized in their local recruiting areas. Any man liable to service could be released after three months on payment of 50 purchasing-out fine, and was there- after liable only to service in the older Redif classes. Thus it came about that only the poorer classes of the nation actually served in the army. There was no organization of the officers, N.C.O.'s and mili- tary officials not actually with the troops; so that in case of war the only reserve available consisted of the retired officers, of whom, however, as the pension was so small, very few were fit for service. The training of the men was very bad. The model units with their foreign instructors had in the short period of their existence been made to leaven the mass of the army. Constant internal unrest allowed of no continued instruction. The periods of reserve training laid down by law were one month for the Ikhtiat, and one month every two years for the Redif; but the absence of reserve organiza- tion and shortage of money prevented these provisions being car- ried out. The weakest parts of the Turkish army were the adminis- tration and the supply and transport services (provisions, clothing, material and munitions). Peculation was wide-spread, and prac- tically all the administrative personnel were hopelessly idle. The Young Turkish regime brought no improvement. The work of the few German reformers, who under 'Abdul Hamid were never, or practically never, allowed a free hand, proved entirely useless; more- over they were not always very suited to their task, which needed considerable tact if it were to be successfully accomplished.
When the Balkan War broke out Turkey was in the midst of her military reorganization. The greater part of the mass, who had been far too long with the colours, were being sent home; a number of Alaili, who so far had only been mechanically instructed in the rudiments of their duties, had replaced them, so that the whole army organization down to battalions and Redif depots had been sud- denly changed. The greatest confusion naturally resulted.
In place of the 7 armies hitherto existing there were formed 14 corps and 5 independent divisions (in Kozani, Yannina [Janina], Scutari, Hejaz and Tripoli). The infantry brigades were done away with, and four divisions were formed, consisting of three infantry regi- ments, each of three battalions, and a field artillery regiment of two or three detachments. To each corps was allotted a rifle regiment, a cavalry brigade of 10 to 15 squadrons, 6 to 9 heavy batteries, a pioneer battalion, a telegraph company, and a train battalion. Only a few corps, however, actually possessed all these units.
The distribution of the Turkish army in the various theatres of operations in the Balkan War was as follows: Commander-in-chief, Nazim Pasha; Eastern Army (around and east of Adrianople), 'Abdalla Pasha, I., II., III., and IV. Corps and some Redif divs. ; Western Army (Kumanovo area), Mahmud Shevket Pasha, V., VI. and VII. Corps and some Redif divs. ; Southern Army (Yannina area), 'Ali Riza Pasha, 22nd and 23rd Divs.; against Montenegro (Scutari area), Hasan Riza, later Essad Pasha, 24th Div. and Elba- san Redif Division. The total strength of these forces came to barely 250,000 men. The Anatolian corps and Redif divisions only came into action in Europe after the defeat of the main armies by Bulgaria and Serbia. Soon after their arrival cholera broke out. Though it was known that the VIII. Corps was infected with this disease, none the less it was dispatched to Europe, and the authorities, in order to set public opinion at rest, stated that the epidemic was well in hand. The Eastern Army during its occupation of the Chatalja lines lost in Nov. and Dec. more than 15,000 men, who fell victims to the plague. It may be estimated that of the 400,000 men mobilized by Turkey at least 100,000 were killed, died or were severely wounded (most of these last named may be counted as dead), i.e. 25% of the total strength.
The complete military breakdown in the Balkan War forced even the Turks to the conclusion that the time for undertaking serious reforms had come. For this purpose Turkey agreed with Germany that the latter should send her a large military mission under Gen. Liman von Sanders, which arrived in Constantinople in Dec. 1913. Great difficulties were met with in the task of remedy- ing the existing defects in the Turkish military organization and training. The military mission succeeded in effecting certain changes in the organization of the army, and in breathing into it a refreshing and living spirit; but the time which elapsed between its arrival and the outbreak of the World War was too short to carry out the
