necessary radical alterations in their entirety. In view of the loss of territory consequent on the Balkan War, it was necessary to re- model the whole peace organization of the army, and distribute it over the diminished area of the empire.
The total peace strength was now on paper 17,000 officers and 250,000 men, with 15,000 guns and 430 machine-guns; actually these numbers were never even approached. To each, division was allotted a definite recruiting area. Area commanders were estab- lished after the German model, but did not effectively get to work prior to the World War. The organization of Redif divisions was also taken in hand; the personnel not actually called up for peace service were to form these units, which were to be utilized in time of war to complete the first line units to full strength. Great impor- tance was rightly attached to the institution of new military schools, the inspection of which was undertaken by Liman von Sanders after he had handed over command of the I. Corps. A new Army Act became law on May 12 1914, but its provisions were never strictly enforced. Its principal clauses were: Every Turk, except for the suite of the Sultan's family, was liable to service from the age of 18. The period of service commenced on the March I next following the attainment of the age of 20, and extended over 25 years for infantry and train, for the other arms 20 years, and for the navy 17 years. The period of active service was in each of the above cases two, three and five years ; students were allowed an abridged term ; physically unfit men were liable to a special tax in lieu of service. Purchasing out was allowed after five months' service at the rate of 50 Turkish ; men thus liberated were transferred to the reserve and escaped all further liability for military duty in peace-time. Christian subjects of the empire were excluded from the ranks of the fighting troops. The War Office was reorganized from top to bot- tom. The great general staff was also entirely remodelled, Ger- man officers being placed at the head of the more important branches, such as those concerned with training, mobilization and intelligence.
Little or nothing could be done in the short space of time between the Balkan and European wars in the direction of rearming the army, so that the armament in the World War remained much as in the Balkan War. The infantry weapon was the 7-65-mm. Mauser re- peating rifle, but older models were still partly in use. The field artillery had the 7'5-cm. Krupp field gun with recoil buffer and shield, 1904, 1909 and 191 1 models; in addition there were a few old 8'7-cm. German field guns. The mountain guns in use were the 7'5-cm. Krupp 1905 model; the Schneider 7'5-cm., which was somewhat more modern, was also in use. The heavy artillery had a number of guns of various patterns, many of which were fairly antiquated; only a few modern 15-cm. Krupp howitzers and Schneider-Creusot how- itzers were available for use. Several howitzer batteries were still using smooth-bore guns, which were as good as useless on account of their short range. The fortress artillery was completely out of date, consisting as it did mainly of guns of 1880 and 1890. Moreover, lack of money prevented any steps being taken to bring the land fortresses up to date.
The Turkish forces were mobilized in the first days of Aug. 1914, but there was only a month of armed neutrality in which to prepare for war. This respite was used by Germany to equip Turkey with practically everything necessary for carrying on hostilities. Despite this German assistance the mobilization met with great difficulties. A Turkish War Office return in the summer of 1917 (which must however be accepted with caution) gave 1,478,176 as the number of recruits called up from Aug. 1914 to March 1915, 1,014,824 from March 1915 to March 1916, and 332,000 from March 1916 to March 1917. Figures as to enrolments from this latter date onwards are completely valueless. The grand total of all who served in the Turkish army from 1914 to 1918 amounted on this showing to 3,000,000 men. If we take into consideration the facts that many of these were counted twice or three times over it may be regarded as approximat- ing to accuracy to reduce this total to 2,000,000, of whom some 75r ooo deserted and 500,000 were killed or invalided out of the service in the course of the war. It is of interest to note that the officials in Turkey who were not affected by the military law, always reckoned all men called up that is, rounded up by the police ^as being of military age whether they were really so or not. Thus it happened that many young men were exempted as not coming within the age limit of 48, while unfortunates of 50 and boys of 15 were given as being 20 or 30 years old, and therefore of military age.
The establishment of officers in the Turkish army reached its maximum of 30.429 in the spring of 1917; the army, however, was at its greatest strength of 1,295,621 in the previous spring. Despite great efforts and reckless use of all possible man-power resources, this total could not be maintained in 1917 ; in the spring of that year only 1,200,344 men were present, and from that date on the total rapidly declined.
The organization of the supreme army command was also the work of the German military mission. This was in the hands of head- quarters in Constantinople. The Sultan of course held the titular post of commander-in-chief. Enver Pasha being vice-commander- m-chief. As the latter gradually assumed the political dictatorship of Turkey, divergence of views between the civil and military author- ities ceased to exist.
In the first days of mobilization in Aug. 1914 the following for-
mations and organizations were in being: 4 army inspections, 13 general commands, 38 divisional staffs, 305 battalions infantry, 64 machine-gun companies, 115 squadrons, 211 field batteries, 124 heavy and fortress batteries, 47 pioneer companies, 4 fortress pio- neer companies, 36 fortress construction companies, 42 searchlight troops (equipped with one searchlight each), 21 telegraph com- panies, I wireless telegraph company, 10 railway companies, 135 reserve squadrons, 17 service companies, 17 works troops and 51 train companies. The reserve squadrons were formed from the so- called Kurdish or Hamidie cavalry, and comprised 4 reserve cavalry divisions. They were quite untrained and of no military value. They had all the characteristics of independent nomads, and were imbued with the bitterest ill-feeling against the Armenians.
The war organization provided at first for three and in Sept. 1914 for four armies. The original armies were: I. Army, Gen. Liman von Sanders, I., II., III., IV. and VI. Corps, one cavalry brigade and one battery heavy howitzers; II. Army, Jemal Pasha, V. Corps and (from Sept. 6 1914) VI. Corps, cavalry as for the other armies, and all available heavy artillery; III. Army, Hasan "Izzet Pasha, X. and XI. Corps; IV. Army, Zeki Pasha (later Jemal), VIII. and XII. Corps. The other troops of the peace army remained for the time being unorganized in armies. But even with these few armies it was not possible to bring the troops up to full war strength with the re- serves available; some companies were barely 100 strong even in Jan. 1915. During the later stages of the war Enver's policy of limiting the formations to a few well-organized corps and armies was given up ; new formations were constantly being ordered, and old ones broken up or remodelled. For these the available man-power, armament and equipment were insufficient, so that the whole army became completely disorganized.
During the war the number of the armies was increased to nine. The army leaders were continually being given other troops, and having to give up divisions and corps, so that their armies were constantly growing smaller. Thus the I. Army, which in 1914 was over 200,000 strong, had sunk by 1917 to about 3,000 men, and the II. Army by 1918 to 5,000 men, and in 1918 there were in Palestine three Turkish armies, none of which were stronger than an English infantry division. All the armies, corps and divisions, however, still kept up their enormous staffs.
The number of officers in the German military mission increased in 1916 to 200, in 1917 to 800; a large number of other ranks, mostly of the technical services, must be added. Of complete German units the personnel of a few batteries at the Dardanelles and the crews of the " Goeben " and " Breslau " fought with the Turkish army. Enver shrank from employing larger units, and in principle stood out against it. Only the so-called " Yildekim " (known to the Germans as " F ") Group consisted entirely of German troops. (F. C. E.)
ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE (UNITED KINGDOM).—The British
Army Medical Service never had such a task imposed on it
as during the World War, from which it emerged with its or-
ganization tested by fire. Its duties cover the care of the sick
and wounded of the military forces, the preservation of their
health, the supply of medical and surgical material, the main-
tenance and administration of military hospitals and the com-
mand of patients in them, the medical examination of recruits
and invaliding of men unfit for further service, the education
and training of its own personnel, and the strategical and tactical
employment of a variety of medical units concerned with the
collection, evacuation and distribution of casualties in war.
Until 1873 the functions of an Army Medical Service had been carried out by a regimental system under which medical officers belonged to and wore the uniform of the regiments to which they were gazetted, and under which many of the sick and wound- ed were cared for in regimental hospitals. Soldiers enlisted in the combatant ranks were trained in hospital duties and formed a Medical Staff Corps, but they were not under the command of the medical officers. In 1861 " Medical Staff Corps " was changed to " Army Hospital Corps," but the pay and discipline of the men were directly under the department of the purveyor-in- chief, and medical officers had no military position until 1869, when the director-general for the first time was attached to the military department of the War Office on the recommendation of a committee presided over by Lord Northbrook. In 1878 the personnel of the Army Hospital Corps was recruited by direct enlistment. In 1883 a committee under Lord Morley, after the Egyptian War, recommended that the Army Hospital Corps and the officers of the Army Medical Department should be merged into a " Royal Medical Corps," but this recommenda- tion was not adopted at the time. A compromise was made by forming the officers into a body called the " Medical Staff " and the men into a corps called the " Medical Staff Corps," their
