" the battle of Asiago " was that which was fought in the Austrian offensive of 1916, resulting in the first enemy occupation of Italian territory.
An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff. In the words of Falkenhayn, who refused his cooperation to the proposal made by Conrad von Hotzendorff in Dec. 1915, " this project contemplated an operation which must, once at least during the war, have certainly attracted the attention of every general staff officer who took a look at the map of the Italian theatre of war. It was very inviting." Falkenhayn's refusal to join in the enterprise was based on various grounds; his belief in the prospects of success at Verdun; his anxiety regarding the Russian front, and, probably, the idea that a formal state of war between Germany and Italy might still be avoided. He felt, too, that even if the plan were as successful as Conrad claimed it would be, its effect on the general course of the war would not be sufficiently important to warrant the risk taken in detaching a strong German force for the enterprise itself, or for replacing Austro-Hungarian divisions in the east if the actual attack should be left to Germany's ally. Conrad believed that the effect of the attack would be decisive, and Krauss, then chief of the staff to the Archduke Eugene, agreed, but was of opinion that a double attack should be made, on both the Julian and Trentino fronts. Without German assistance it was obviously impossible to collect sufficient forces for this double attack. But Falkenhayn went further; he put the number of troops required for the Trentino attack alone at 25 divisions; he doubted the possibility of collecting such a force, and he questioned whether, if it were available, supply could be assured by the limited railway communications leading to the scene of action. Krauss was convinced that an offensive against Italy from the Trentino was practicable, and, if accompanied by a simultaneous attack on the Isonzo front, would lead to great results. He believed that the Trentino operation could be conducted in Jan. and Feb., when the winter snow was frozen hard, before the heavy spring snowfall. It is difficult for anyone who knows the Trentino in winter to admit his contention that this hard snow would resist the passage of troops in mass, not to speak of guns, even if one were to accept his idea of basing the operation on drives through the valleys, on the west of Lake Garda as well as on the east. Conrad does not seem to have considered the idea of attacking till later on in the season, and the plan which he put before German headquarters was radically different in idea from that which Krauss favoured.
Conrad's plan was to attack through the Asiago and Arsiero uplands, in the direction of Vicenza and Bassano rather than towards Verona. When he failed to convince Falkenhayn that the effort should be a joint one, he determined to attack inde- pendently, and, according to Krauss, he endeavoured to conceal his preparations from the Germans. Perhaps his independent action was a result of Falkenhayn's independent decision to attack at Verdun. Perhaps he wished to avoid further discussion of a project upon which his mind was set, the more so as he was embarking on the enterprise with a force greatly inferior to that which Falkenhayn had considered necessary. Conrad's attacking mass consisted of 14 divisions only.
In view of the relatively small force available, Conrad was compelled to reduce his front of attack. His original intention, apparently, had been to extend it to the north of the Brenta valley, though the main drive was to be to the south. With the troops at his disposal he could not afford this extension, and he made his effort between Rovereto and the Val Sugana (Upper Brenta). It seems obvious that with this limited force, operating in difficult country, Conrad could not have hoped to achieve the more ambitious results which he had urged would follow upon a successful attack from the Trentino. Assuming that he broke through and reached the plain, he could hardly expect to do more. But if his offensive were so far successful, if he had
once cleared the way to the plains then perhaps the stiff-necked Falkenhayn might change his mind, and take advantage of the opening offered by an Austrian success.
Cadorna's general line of argument, when rumours of attack began to arrive, resembled that of Falkenhayn. He believed he had shut the doors fast against any ordinary attack, and he did not think that Conrad could spare troops for an offensive on the grand scale, or that, if he could, he would make his big effort in the Trentino. Like Falkenhayn, Cadorna thought the railway communications insufficient. He assumed, moreover, that Conrad had reasonably accurate information about the forthcoming Russian offensive and would not risk attacking at such a distance when the Russian threat was imminent. But Conrad hoped to attack sooner than he eventually did; his troops were ready in April, but the snow caused a delay which gave rise to much impatience at Austrian headquarters. He had also persuaded himself that his troops in the east were strong enough to resist any pressure that could be brought against them.
Cadorna was sceptical of an offensive in strength, and thought that the reported movements in the Trentino signified a limited attack, to be undertaken with the object of hampering his offensive towards the east. In the late autumn and winter he had reduced the strength of the I. Army to the minimum in order to strengthen his attack on the Isonzo, and in reply to Brusati's expressions of anxiety regarding the adequacy of his forces during this period Cadorna pointed out that the require- ments of the Isonzo front made it necessary to reduce the numbers of the I. Army, and that in the event of a threat developing from the Trentino there would be sufficient warning to allow the reenforcement of the front in good time. He reminded Brusati, on various occasions, that the role of the I. Army was strictly defensive. He had already indicated, early in the campaign, the defensive lines to be prepared, and had on various occasions insisted on the necessity of strengthening these lines. During the first few months of the war the troops of the I. Army had advanced at various points beyond the limits laid down by Cadorna, and in these sectors the army was aligned for offensive action. This would not have mattered if the necessary defensive works had been carried out, but the energies of the troops had been directed to preparing elaborate works in advance positions not well suited for defence, and the positions chosen by Cadorna for the main line of resistance were in many cases untouched. Brusati had carried out successfully the initial part of his work, the reduction in length of the Trentino front. The original front of the I. Army, from the Stelvio to Croda Grande (east of the Val Cismon) is close upon 240 m. in length, but the advances made in the first weeks of the war had shortened the line by over 100 miles. The second part of the army's task, that of fortifying the 70 m. of front which could be considered feasible for the operation of troops in large numbers, had been neglected in certain important sectors.
It was on March 22 that the probability of an Austrian attack was first reported by the I. Army command, whose initial requests were granted at once, the transference of two brigades to the Isonzo front being countermanded, and four additional brigades being placed at Brusati's disposal. In his answering despatch Cadorna repeated the instructions to fall back upon the principal line of resistance in case of an enemy attack. On April 2 Brusati sent a further report upon the concentration of enemy troops in the Trentino, and stated that he had taken the steps which he considered to be most opportune in relation to the means at his disposal. In reply Cadorna detached two more divisions, the gth and zoth, from the general reserve in Friuli, to be held in reserve at Schio and Bassano, and gave an additional group of Alpine battalions to the I. Army. As a result Brusati wrote, on April 6, that the reserves given him allowed him " to view with complete confidence even the most unfavourable event." Although Cadorna was still sceptical in regard to an offensive in force, he increased Brusati's artillery strength by 18 batteries of middle-calibre guns and gave special orders for the supply and transport of ammunition. On April 21 at Cadorna's request Brusati sent a report upon the defensive
