system between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, accompa- nied by a map showing the various lines, stating that the condi- tions were " re-assuring," and that the third line of defence upon which Cadorna had laid special emphasis could be considered as being in a satisfactory state of efficiency. Three days later Bru- sati suggested the reenforcement of two sectors of the line, that between the Vallarsa and the Val Terragnolo, and the Tonezza sector, between the Val Terragnolo and the Astico. He asked for permission to split the oth Div., which had been given him as a reserve, and send a brigade to each of the sectors mentioned. He also asked for another division to be held in reserve about Vicenza. Cadorna was unwilling to break up the gth Div., and ordered that it should be held in reserve at Schio, within easy reach of the Vallarsa sector, while to reenforce the Tonezza sector he dispatched an additional brigade from the general reserve. He also detailed the 27th Div., in reserve on the Taglia- mento, to be ready as a further reenforcement and formed a further artillery reserve of 10 heavy batteries.
At the end of April Cadorna went to visit the lines in person. He found that while the front lines had been elaborately fortified, in various sectors the reserve lines which he had indicated as the " battle positions " were almost untouched, and parts of the front line were unsuitable for prolonged resistance. Between the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa and along the Val Terragnolo the Italian lines formed a dangerously exposed salient, running down from the high slopes and completely dominated by the Austrian guns on Monte Biaena, Monte Ghello, Monte Finonchio and the Folgaria plateau. In the Val Sugana the same fault was observable. The forward lines on Monte Armentera and Monte Salubio were poorly adapted for defence, but had been strongly fortified, while the line east of the Maso torrent, which Cadorna had indicated as the main line of defence, had undergone little preparation. Cadorna ordered the positions to be modified. The bulk of the heavy guns were withdrawn to the second line and the work of preparation was hastened on; but the enemy attack seemed imminent, and it was impossible to set about a complete reorganization under the immediate threat.
On the wings it was possible to improve the situation. In the centre the problem was different, for here the Italians were of necessity badly placed. The salient of Soglio 1'Aspio (4,375 ft.), between the frontier and the Upper Astico, was practically in the air, and could only be considered as an outpost. But the main line between the Posina and the Astico, which ran by Monte Maggio (5, 730 ft.), Monte Toraro (6,175 ft-), Campomolon (6,030 ft.) and Spitz Tonezza (5,512 ft.), was not satisfactory for defensive purposes. It was close under the Austrian guns and it had no depth. Behind the line the ground falls away south- eastward in a steep glacis that drops abruptly in the end to the Posina on the south and the Astico on the east. It was owing to the essential weakness of this line and its extension northward to the west of the Val d'Assa that Cadorna had ordered the preparation of a third line of defence that ran from Cima Portule (7,570 ft.) east of the Val d'Assa and round the southern rim of the Asiago basin by Punta Corbin across the Astico to the moun- tains south of the Posina. This line was shown as existing upon the map sent to Cadorna on April 21 by the I. Army command. In reality little had been done beyond the tracings on the map. The project had remained a project.
On May 8 Brusati was replaced by Gen. Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the VII. Corps (III. Army). A few days previously Cadorna had modified the system of commands in the threatened sector. Up to the time of his arrival on the I. Army front the whole line between Lake Garda and the mountains east of the Val Sugana had been included in the V. Corps command (Gen. Zoppi). The Val Lagarina and Val Sugana sectors were now placed under independent commands, and the long line held by the V. Corps was reduced to include only the hill country between the Vallarsa and the eastern edge of the Asiago plateau. On the eve of the Austrian attack the alignment of the I. Army was as follows: West of Lake Garda the line was held by the III. Corps (two divisions) under Gen. Camerana. The Val Lagarina sector, from the lake to Zugna Torta, was held by the
37th Div. under Gen. Ricci Armani (two brigades, three bat- talions of Alpini, with several weak battalions of territorial Militia). The Sicilia Bde. was arriving in the Adige valley to act as a reserve. The left-hand division of the V. Corps (the 35th) was in line between the Vallarsa and the Astico, the Roma Bde. right down upon the Val Terragnolo, backed by a ter- ritorial Militia regiment in Col Santo and two Alpini battalions holding the Borcola Pass. The Ancona Bde., freshly come into line, lay from Monte Maggio to Campomolon, while the Cagliari Bde. was echeloned forward in the Soglio d'Aspio salient, and a group of Customs Guards battalions held the edge of the Val d'Astico. Two brigades of the 34th Div. and a group of Alpini held the Val d'Astico and a line that roughly followed the frontier as far as Cima Manderiolo (6,665 ft-)- A third infantry brigade and two brigades of territorial Militia lay in immediate reserve. The right wing of the army, occupying the Val Sugana sector (extending to the Val Cismon), consisted of the XVIII. Corps under Gen. Etna, three infantry brigades, four battalions of Bersaglieri and six battalions of Alpini. The gth Div. lay at Schio, ready to regnforce the Vallarsa-Val d'Astico sector, while the loth Div. was at Bassano, and a group of Alpini was at Marostica. The 44th Div., freshly returned from Albania, was concentrating at Desenzano, and the 27th still lay on the Tagliamento, where the X. and XIV. Corps were also in read- iness to leave in case of need. In all Pecori-Giraldi had at his immediate disposal 130 regular battalions, even battalions of Customs Guards and 45 battalions of territorial Militia, the latter at very low strength and of small fighting value. The 44th Div., which was not ready to move at the beginning of the battle, brought the number of regular battalions up to 142. The artillery strength consisted of 851 guns, of which 348 were of heavy or medium calibre and 259 were light guns of position.
The Austrians had a great superiority in artillery, upon which they relied for breaking their way through the Italian lines. Between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana were concentrated some 2,000 guns, of which nearly half were of heavy or medium calibre, including 40 305-111111. howitzers, four 380*3 and two or three German 42o's. The attacking fofce was arrayed in two armies, one behind the other, Dankl's XI. Army in front with nine divisions, von Koevess's III. Army in support, with five divisions. The troops in the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana were not included in this force, which was to make its offensive between the two valleys, where only supporting attacks were to be carried out. Krauss, as chief-of-staff of the Archduke Eugene, was opposed to the disposition of the two armies and to the limitation of the attack to the hill country. He urged that the front of attack should from the outset be divided between Dankland von Koevess, and pressed for the adoption of his plan for the concen- tration of attacking masses in the valleys, especially in the Val Sugana. But the original plan, prepared in all its details by Conrad and his staff, was not modified; it would seem that the Archduke Eugene and his chief-of-staff had little freedom of action. The tactical direction of the attack was entrusted to Dankl, who had at his disposal some 180 battalions.
The offensive opened on May 14 with a very heavy bombard- ment along the whole line from the Val Lagarina to the Val Sugana; but the concentration of fire was most intense between the Vallarsa and the Upper Astico, and against this sector, the following day, the main infantry attack was launched. The plan was to attack first with the right wing of the XL Army, commanded by the Archduke Charles, supported not only by its own artillery but by flanking fire from the massed guns on the Lavarone plateau. When the right wing had made sufficient ground the left wing was to come into action against the Italian line in the Seven Communes, north of the Upper Astico. On the extreme right of the attack, between the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa, the Italians withdrew from their ill-chosen front lines, fighting steadily, and making the enemy pay for the ground gained. In the Val Terragnolo the Roma Bde. was run over by the enemy attack. Many prisoners were taken, and the second line, which was withdrawn in accordance with the general instructions given by Cadorna, came back in some disorder.
