The command of the 3oth Div. received two fresh brigades,
Forli and Piemontc, on June 7, after a furious attack which
gave the Austrians a footing on Monte Lemerle, and for 10 days
the division fought off repeated infantry attacks. On June 15
the Austrian command issued an army order saying that Monte
Lemerle would fall in two days, and that only three mountains
blocked the way to Milan. For four days the Austrians attacked,
making a last effort on June 18, when 20 battalions were sent in
against the Lemerle-Magnaboschi line in an attempt to drive
a wedge between the Italian 3oth and 33rd Divisions. The
attack failed completely, thanks to the heroic defence of the
Forli Bde., and the admirable work of the Italian field guns.
To the east of the Val Canaglia the result was the same, the
Liguria Bde. of the 33rd Div. holding their ground against re-
peated infantry attacks, backed by greatly superior artillery
fire. Weakness in artillery was Cadorna's main preoccupa-
tion for many days. In the early stages of the offensive the I.
Army had lost over 400 guns, including over 120 heavy and
medium calibre. The first reinforcements had to be sent to
strengthen the left wing. The next urgent need was north of
Asiago, where the 34th Div. was reenforced by guns sent up by
Enego, and in the Lower Astico, to stop the Archduke Charles.
The troops between Asiago and the Val Canaglia had very few
guns, and even when sufficient artillery reenforcements were
available Cadorna preferred first to strengthen his wings for the
counter-attack that he was already preparing.
The Archduke Charles made his last infantry attack on June 14, at the close of three days' heavy fighting for Monte Ciove, in which the Cagliari Bde. withstood repeated attempts to break through at this vital point. The rest of the division was equally staunch, and the troops were helped by the example of their commander. Petitti had established his divisional com- mand far forward on Monte Novegno, where it came under the heaviest shell-fire. All around the ground was pocked with shell- holes; several times telephonic communication was interrupted, so that orders had to be given by megaphone or bugle; on June 12 the majority of the divisional staff was put out of action by a direct hit. The command was obviously too far forward, but it was the knowledge of their general's presence, amid the same dangers as themselves, that kept the men firm in their places in spite of the long strain and terrible losses. The Cagliari Bde. lost two-thirds of its strength, and other units suffered nearly as heavily.
The last Austrian blow was struck on June 18, south of Monte Lemerle, in vain, when already the first move of the Italian counter-attack had taken place. Cadorna had declined to draw upon his new V. Army prematurely, as he wished to keep a " mass of manoeuvre " in hand against the possibility of a break-through by the Austrians; but by June 2 he felt him- self master of the situation. He had 12 divisions in the plain under Frugoni, and the attack was already slackening. The XXIV. Corps was detached from the V. Army and sent to the south of the Asiago plateau, as already described, and orders were given to the XX. Corps to concentrate north of the Val Frenzela and prepare to attack the Austrian left. The attack was not to be made until the position in the centre was assured, and it was to be accompanied by an advance from Pasubio upon Col Santo. On June 13 Cadorna took counsel with his generals, who were nearly unanimous in expressing a grave view of the situation. Bertotti was confident that he had the meas- ure of his adversary in the Pasubio sector; the others felt them- selves still hard pressed by the Archduke Charles and von Koevess's right wing. Cadorna had confidence in his own esti- mate of the situation, and confirmed the order for an attack by the XX. Corps, which came into action between the XIV. and the XVIII. The Alpine troops on the right of the Corps pushed forward quickly and occupied various important heights on the northern rim of the Asiago plateau. But the Austrians were now getting ready to go out of the salient and back to a strong line which they had already selected.
Attacking on May 25, all along the line, the Italians found the invaders in retreat. In some places rear-guards were left to
cover the withdrawal; in others the Italians, advancing cau- tiously, in some cases too cautiously, found no resistance until they had made considerable progress over the difficult ground. The counter-offensive, which was to be directed against the two sides of the Austrian salient, was never fully developed, for it was anticipated by the Austrians, who withdrew skilfully and in good order. The line chosen by Krauss ran from south of Rovereto in front of Col Santo to the Borcola Pass; thence along the rim of the Arsiero plateau, north of the Posina and east of the Upper Astico; thence north-eastward across the Val d'Assa to Monte Mosciagh, and thence northward to the old frontier. This gave a very strong defensive line, with ample depth east of the Upper Val d'Assa, which therefore remained entirely in Austrian hands, a useful line of communication in any case, and an invaluable opening in the event of further offen- sive action.
Cadorna was especially anxious to reach the Portule line, and he reenforced the troops in the Seven Communes (now under the command of Gen. Mambrotti, who had replaced Lequio) by four divisions of the V. Army, now available as a reserve on the understanding that they were not to be employed unless the situation should develop favourably. But the Austrians had a great advantage in position, and used it well. The Italian attacks, handicapped by the limitation imposed, made little headway, though they prevented the dispatch of Austrian units already under orders for the eastern front. Farther south, repeated attempts were made to retake Monte Cimone, which the Archduke Charles had wished to abandon, but which Krauss insisted should be held. Although Alpine troops gained a footing north of the summit they were subsequently blown off by a mine, and Monte Cimone, which rises sheer-sided, like a vast battleship, between the Astico and the Rio Freddo, completely dominating the Arsiero basin, remained in Austrian hands.
Cadorna relinquished the idea of a big counter-offensive as soon as he found a resistance which could only be overcome by long preparation and the use of artillery in mass. The fighting which took place after the first week in July was all directed to masking his intention to attack with all speed upon the Isonzo.
The Austrian attempt to break through ended in definite failure, and even its secondary object, that of preventing the Italian offensive on the Isonzo, was not attained. But the attack was well planned, and conducted with skill and deter- mination. The Austrian artillery fire was very destructive; the transport was admirably organized, and worked very well in spite of the great difficulties of the terrain; the infantry, most of them picked troops, fought with high courage and determination. Failure was due to the fact that the attack met with a resistance that went beyond Conrad's calculations. In the first days of the attack some Italian units, badly placed and badly handled, showed only a feeble opposition. In the weeks that followed, the men who held at Passo di Buole and on Pasubio, south of the Posina and east of the Val Canaglia and in the Seven Com- munes, outnumbered at first and always outgunned, completely broke up the attack that had begun so well. The casualty list shows the nature of the fighting. The Austrian losses were estimated at over 100,000 men; the Italian figures, up to the end of the counter-movement, are: 35,000 killed and 75,000 wounded, with 45,000 prisoners, many of whom should be count- ed among the wounded.
The success of the Italian resistance was primarily due to the power of the Italian soldier, when properly handled, to take hard punishment. It has already been said that in the initial phase of the battle the Italian leadership was at fault, and on this point much controversy has taken place, one party blaming Cadorna and another Brusati. In view of the facts and figures it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the chief responsibility lay with Brusati. On his own showing he had forces that he considered sufficient, and perhaps they might have been if they had been more skilfully disposed. Brusati had failed to realize the necessity of defence in depth, or the essentials of a good defensive line, but a graver error still was
