Santa; they came up from Anghebani and Chiesa in the Vallarsa and from the Val Terragnolo by the Borcola Pass. Bertotti had four brigades under his command, including the remains of the Roma, and the 6th Group of Alpini, and he changed his troops continuously. The conditions were very hard, and frost- bite was responsible for many casualties, for the snow still lay deep on the high ridges, but the spirit of the troops was proof against all trials, and it was against the iron lines of Pasubio that the Austrian offensive came to failure.
North-east of Pasubio, along all the rest of the mountain front to above the Val Sugana, the Austrians gained notable successes. The gap between the 35th and 34th Divs. had been filled by the arrival of the 3oth Div. (XIV. Corps), and the 28th was on its way, the three Divs. (34th, 3oth and 28th) now form- ing the XIV. Corps under Lequio. But von Koevess's attack had broken through the Italian line in the Seven Communes. For two days the Italian 34th Div. had fought off the attacks of the Graz (III.) Army Corps. On May 21 the order was given to retire to the line Monte Verena-Cima di Campolongo, and the stay on this line was short. Contact was lost with the left wing of the XVIII. Corps in the Val Sugana, and the Aus- trians turned the right wing of the division by a bold and skilful advance by way of the Porta Manazzo. A retreat was ordered to the Portule line, east of the Val d'Assa, which was supposed to be the principal line of resistance. The 34th was unable to stand on this line. Owing to an error in the transmission of an order the Alpine troops who were holding the positions of Cima Undici and Cima Dodici retired before the Austrians attacked, and uncovered the flank of the division, while on the same day (May 25) the attacking forces succeeded in occupying the im- portant position of Corno di Campo Verde (6,815 ft.). Next day the attack was continued from north and west, and the Italians were swept off the whole line between the Val d'Assa and the Val Galmarara. A number of prisoners and guns were lost, and prospects looked black for the Italians, though the 28th Div. was now coming into action. On May 26 the situa- tion was such that Cadorna thought it wise to make further preparations for a step which he had already considered and planned a retreat from the Isonzo and Cadoro. He ordered all heavy artillery not absolutely necessary for defensive pur- poses, and all stores beyond the minimum required for immediate supplies, to be withdrawn from the Isonzo front and brought south of Treviso, behind the Silo. With the possibility of a general retreat in view, it seemed necessary to withdraw the heaviest impedimenta in good time. Although Cadorna be- lieved that he could hold back the Austrian attack, he had no intention of omitting any precautions.
The Italian position looked unfavourable and worse was yet to come, but Cadorna's confidence was justified. The impetus of the Austrian attack was dwindling. The effort had been great, and losses had been very heavy. The attacking divisions were beginning to lose their offensive value, and the reserves were insufficient. By May 27 Conrad had been compelled to ask Falkenhayn to send to Italy a division of the Austrian XII. Corps, which belonged to Prince Leopold's Army Group. By the end of the month Cadorna was holding his own, although both Dankl and von Koevess were still making progress.
On May 27 Dankl's left wing was down in the Astico valley and close upon Arsiero, and on the following day his centre crossed the Posina in force and attacked the Italian 27th Div. on the southern slopes of the valley. Stiff fighting took place beneath Soglio di Campiglia and Pria Fora, and the Italians withdrew to the mountain line which had been hastily prepared from Forni Alti by Monte Spin to Pria Fora. Retiring on the night of May 29, the troops that were to fall back upon Pria Fora lost their way in the dark and kept too far south, halting on Monte Ciove, the ridge that joins Pria Fora to Monte Novegno and Monte Brazome. At dawn the mistake was realized, but the quick-following enemy were already in posses- sion of Pria Fora, which is almost impregnable from the south. A desperate attack failed to retrieve the error, and Pria Fora remained in possession of the Austrians.
The line now held by the Italians (27th and oth Divs.) was the last bulwark defending the plains in this sector, and both here and across the Astico the Austrians made a great effort to break through. The bulk of the 30th Div. was slowly pushed back across the Val Canagh'a, in spite of a prolonged and gal- lant resistance by the Grenadier Bde. on Monte Cengio. Al- though the Grenadiers finally lost the summit of Cengio, they held on to the lower slopes above Schiri, and Dankl was unable to make headway in the valley, while the right of the division was swung back to the western slopes of Monte Pau. For a long fortnight Dankl hammered at the line south of the Posina and east of the Val Canagh'a, but could not gain a yard. On June i the 27th Div. front was reduced, the remade 35th Div. under Gen. Petitti di Roreto coming into line in the Novegno sector, and the gth (Gen. Gonzaga) taking both sides of the Astico valley. Dankl's attack was specially directed against two points: Monte Pasubio, where troops of the VIII. and XV. Corps were thrown again and again to the attack, and the Novegno sector, where the Archduke Charles concentrated his main effort against Petitti's troops. The attack was bound to follow this direction. It has been suggested that the Arch- duke should have pushed straight for the plain, down the Lower Astico valley. If ground had been gained here it would have been useless. The weak point of the Austrian position was that their successes were gained on a constantly narrowing front. The wings of the Italian line had held firm, and it was above all necessary to gain room south of Arsiero. On June 2, 3, 4 and 5 massed infantry attacks were delivered south of the Posina, but no impression was made on the Italian lines.
Meanwhile von Koevess had been pushing back the Italians in the Seven Communes. On May 28 Asiago was evacuated, and farther north the 34th Div. retreated from east of the Gal- marara across the parallel valleys of Nos and Campomulo. Farther north again the Austrians gained ground on the Mar- cesina plateau and so came within 4 m. of Primolane in the Val Sugana, a point well behind the Italian lines in the valley. But communications were nearly impossible here, and von Koevess had to make his effort more to the south, narrowing still further the front of attack. An endeavour to gain ground in the Val Sugana had failed on May 26, and no other attempt was made in this sector, for which, in fact, there were no more troops available.
By June 2 Cadorna's V. Army was assembled in the Vicen- tine plain, and on June 4 Brusiloff broke through at Lutsk. The first news of the Russian attack did not perturb Austrian headquarters, though Gen. von Cramon was taken aback. Conrad thought that his line in the east was firmly held. In a few days the situation was changed altogether. But even before the news of the disaster had reached Bozcn it was clear that the offensive against Italy had failed. Von Koevess was to gain a little more ground. After four days' heavy fighting east of the Campomulo valley and towards the head of the Val Frenzela, on the evening of June 8 the Italian right on Monte Castelgom- berto was forced to retire from the summit of the mountain, but no ground was lost towards the Val Frenzela. The Austrians were only 3 m. from Valstagna, low down in the Brenta valley, but they had shot their bolt.
In spite of the news from the Russian front the attack was continued, south of Asiago and south of the Posina, for 10 more days. Here were the shortest routes to the plain, and here the Austrians had been able to bring up their guns in sufficient num- bers. The Archduke Charles continued his attacks against Petitti's division, and Kirchbach's I. Corps made a great effort against the Italian positions south-west of 'Asiago. With the arrival of reinforcements the Italian line was once more rear- ranged, Gonzaga's gth Div. passing to the X. Corps command (Gen. Grandi), the second division of the Corps (the 2oth) lying in reserve, while the XXIV. Corps (Gen. Secco) came in be- tween the X. and the XIV., its front-line division (the 32nd) taking over the gallant Grenadier Bde., which had suffered very severely in the Cengio and Val Canaglia fighting, and the 33rd being held in second line till June 7, when it replaced the 32nd.
