1919 preserved themselves for examination, the majority of whom were successful. Nor should sight be lost of the training of the rescue brigades in this connexion.
While the contribution of each and all of the factors referred to above cannot be ignored, the question arises whether some more fundamental cause may not be responsible for the greatly reduced number of accidents. Reference has already been made to the effect of the Minimum Wage Act of 1912 upon the rate of production of coal, and it is not inconceivable that economy of physical effort may have diminished the accident risk of the workers.
Statistics with regard to the mortality of miners show that al- though they appear to suffer more than the average from diseases of the respiratory system, the mortality of miners from phthisis is little more than one-half of the average, as is also that from al- coholism and liver diseases and from suicide. The mortality of miners from influenza, cancer, diseases of the nervous and circulatory systems and Bright's disease is also below the standard.
The virility of the miner as a class is further attested by the in- formation obtained in 1911 with regard to the fertility of marriage. The class showed a higher number of children born per family than in any other social class, but it was also shown that in no other class of the community is the rate of child mortality higher. The im- portance of the housing problem for miners will be obvious.
Position in ipzi. The year 1921 opened disastrously for the coal-mining industry owing to a wave of industrial depression as widespread as it was severe. This was followed by a dispute of unprecedented magnitude with regard to the future regulation of wages (see STRIKES). The output of coal during the first quarter of the year was at the annual rate of little more than 215,000,000 tons, while during the whole of the second quarter nearly all the pits were idle. Nor were the effects of the in- dustrial depression confined to the home market. When early in 1921 the restrictions on the supplies of coal for bunkering vessels and for export were finally removed, British supplies abroad came sharply into competition with those from the United States and with German coal supplied to France and Belgium by way of reparation.
Yet, disastrous as were the immediate consequences to the industry, signs were not wanting that the industry might be restored in the near future to a degree of efficiency not previously surpassed. The turmoil of recent years would have been in vain if it had not settled one or two fundamental questions in no uncertain measure. It was already clear that the time had not yet arrived when the State could with advantage to the com- munity take over the ownership of the coal-mines, notwith- standing the conclusions of the Coal Industry Commission of 1919. But it was not less clear that the principles which had hitherto governed the relations of capital and labour in the industry were wrong. The regulation of wages by reference to the selling price of coal with its evil corollary the limitation of supply had gone beyond recall. The proposal made by the mine-owners in 1921 to regulate wages and profits in accordance with the prosperity of the industry was based upon principles as fruitful as they were sound, and now that ways and means for the adoption of the proposal have been found, it is not too much to say that a key has been fitted to the gates of a new world.
The ability of Great Britain to maintain its position in- dustrially is largely dependent upon the existence of a cheap and plentiful supply of coal. Under efficient management no reasonable doubt can be entertained with regard to the ability of the industry to furnish these supplies, and certain qualities of coal produced are unrivalled. Moreover, their proximity to the sea ensures advantages which few other coal-producing countries possess, and it needs but a brief examination to show what abundant reserves of coal are still available.
Reserves. In 1904 the Royal Commission on coal supplies esti- mated the reserves of coal within 4,000 ft. of the surface at 141,636 million tons. Sir Aubrey Strahan, formerly Director of the Geolog- ical Survey of England and Wales, reexamined the evidence and he concluded that 178,727 million tons of coal remained unworked in the year 1910. The quantity available, as thus estimated, would be in close agreement with the earlier estimate when allowance is made for the coal raised during the interval and the quantities which must be left for the support of surface buildings, barriers, etc. The latest estimate was that made in the year 1915 by Prof. H. Stanley Jevons, according to which the reserves of coal were placed at 197,000 million tons within 4.000 ft. of the surface. When the necessary deductions have been made for loss in working and for the coal raised since
1910, the quantity available for use would be some 13,000 million tons greater than the previous estimate.
Having regard to the proved extensions of the concealed coal- fields of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Kent since the earlier estimates were framed, it may be assumed with some confidence that the reserves of coal available in 1921 amount to not less than 135,000 million tons, and might amount to 150,000 million tons, in addition to further considerable quantities at depths lower than 4,000 ft. or in concealed areas.
Some idea of the magnitude of the reserves of coal thus indicated will be gained from a consideration of the output since 1855 shown below. The quantities of coal shipped abroad and available for home consumption are added for comparison :
Period
Coal Raised
Coal ! Shipped Abroad
Coal Available ' for Home Consumption
1855 to 1860 1861 ' 1870 1871 ' 1880 1881 ' 1890 1891 ' 1900 ,1901 ' 1910 1911 ' 1920
Million 412-8
974-9 1,311-0 1,642-6 1,954-4 2.453-7 2.530-5
statute
38-5 94-0 187-2
3I4-7 457-8 732-8 654-3
tons
374-3 880-9 ,123-8
,327-9 ,496-6 ,720-9 ,876-2
Total 1855-1920
11,279-9
2.479-3
8,800-6
(R. F. T.) UNITED STATES
Previous to the lo-year period ushered in with 1911, bitu- minous coal production in the United States was scattered, uncoordinated and wasteful. The mines had a variable but large idle capacity, and the uncertainty of operations was at once a menace to the stability of the labour supply and to the maintenance of. an adequate output : the technique and prac- tice of storing coal were imperfectly developed, as was still the case to a great measure in 1920; the seasonal fluctuations of demand were uncompensated. These conditions were essen- tially the product of past circumstances excessive competi- tion, over-development of resources, and inadequate prices at the mine mouth, which led to poor engineering and low recoveries of values. The technology of production during the World War period 1914-8 showed great improve- ment, and there was evidence of growing industrial efficiency in extracting coal, although this progress was accompanied by excessive prices and an approach to monopolistic conditions. Bituminous and anthracite formed over a third of all U.S. freight in 1920, but transportation was the weakest link in the supply. Continuous mining depends on an unbroken move- ment of coal-cars past the mine mouths; and the number of coal-cars has never been equal to the full capacity of the devel- oped mines. Unless railroad equipment becomes more nearly adequate, every period of industrial prosperity must result in a car shortage.
The United States had in 1920 the largest coal reserve of any country about 3,527,000 million out of a total world reserve of 7,900,000 million tons, and a good reserve of each of the several classes of coal. For many generations there will be no danger of a shortage except of anthracite, good coking coal, and the highest grades of steam coal, which in 1920 were being actively mined. Each year found anthracite more of a luxury. Three thousand million tons of hard coal had been consumed, and the thinner, deeper and poorer seams were being mined. If the rate of consumption in 1920 continued, the United States would use up more anthracite between 1920 and 1940 than it did in the preceding 100 years. It is bitu- minous coal, therefore, that will support the future industrial life of the United States. According to geologists the country had in 1920 upward of 1,400,000 million tons of the various grades of true bituminous coals in addition to 49,863 million tons of semi-bituminous, 987,514 million tons of sub-bitu- minous and 1,093,290 million tons of lignite. Of these total deposits, however, less than 5 % were high-grade coals. Almost all the production before 1920 came from this better class of
1 Including the coal equivalent of coke and manufactured fuel exported and the coal shipped as bunkers by vessels engaged in the foreign trade.
