fuel. The earliest depletion of steam and gas coals will come in the fields that have supplied the great manufacturing districts of the eastern states.
Throughout the greater part of the country the large operating coal companies owned both surface and mineral rights. In certain districts coal land that sold in 1910 for $50 an ac. brought $700 in 1920. Seams that had netted the owners royalties of 6 to 10 cents a ton were often leased on a royalty basis of 30 cents per ton. In the Rocky Mountain region the Government sold the coal rights, but the state school lands of Colorado and Wyoming were generally leased at royalties of about 10 cents a ton. In the state of Washing- ton a considerable area of the bituminous district was owned by the Northern Pacific railway, which had opened up the territory and had secured land grants from the Government. The royalty was from 15 to 25 cents a ton. In Alaska, in the Matanuska and Bering river bituminous fields, and in the Nenana lignite field, the Government offered the coal for leasing at 2 cents a ton for the first period, under restrictions providing for conservation and reasonable prices to consumers. Some units were taken up in the Matanuska and Bering river fields, but as the measures are badly contorted and the coal-beds difficult to trace progress was slow, and in 1920 pro- duction had scarcely begun. In 1920 the Alaskan Railway Commis- sion was working some mines temporarily at Chickaloon and Esak creek to obtain a supply of coal pending the development of other mines by lessees. Congress, in opening the coal lands in Alaska for leasing, reserved tracts of not exceeding 7,680 ac. and 5.120 ac. respectively in the Matanuska and Bering river fields, for the use of the navy. In the western states the Government still owned large areas of coal and lignite lands generally remote from railways and difficult of access, but containing enormous reserves. In 1920 the Gebo mine at Gebo, Wyo., was the only one leased to an operating company by the Government, but the extension of a leasing system similar to that proposed for Alaska will ultimately be effected.
In the United States the two branches of coal-mining anthracite and bituminous present totally different aspects. In fact, it has become almost an axiom that what is true of the anthracite industry is untrue of the bituminous industry. The anthracite industry is well organized, and railroad con- nexions make it notably efficient and powerful. Bituminous coal, on the other hand, is so widely distributed on both public and private lands that no organization of private companies was ever able to control the industry. All centralized control of coal production was always opposed by Congress and the general public. Only during the World War did the United States attempt to exercise authority ovr commercial mining and the sale of coal. A fuel administration was created, and coal was shipped under its instruction and at prices fixed by it. Government control practically disappeared with the war. There was a growing feeling, however, that production and distribution should be classed as a public utility and regulated.
In the 10 years from 1891 to 1900 the average annual work- ing time of the mine workers in the anthracite regions ranged from 150 to 203 days, with a mean average of 176 days. During this period the entire anthracite industry was demoralized. A great strike occurred in the hard-coal region in 1902. President Roosevelt appointed a commission, and the anthracite industry emerged from the difficulties plus a Board of Conciliation, com- posed of representatives of the operators and the miners, which was still in power in 1920. Under this plan the annual working time in the hard-coal mines increased gradually to 229 days in 1910, about 30% over the annual average working time of the to-year period preceding the appointment of the Board. From 1911 to 1920 the annual average never fell below 230, and the mean was 255 days. The better conditions for miners in the anthracite field after 1902 were not solely due to increased annual working time. Between 1902 and 1920 there was also an increase in wages of something like 85 per cent. In the period 1900-10, the production of anthracite per man per day increased materially, but the next decade, 1910- 20, showed a drop, due to the reduction of the length of the working-day from nine to eight hours.
In 1920 it seemed practically impossible to duplicate in the bituminous fields the conditions existing in the anthracite re- gion. The anthracite mines all lie in a small area of one state, Pennsylvania. The collieries were all owned by a few large companies, which rendered it possible to centralize the control in a few men. But bituminous coal in 1920 was mined in 27
states, various producing districts competing for the same markets. It was because of this wide distribution of soft coal that it had never been possible to bring about unified action. Yet production managed to keep pace with the country's normal industrial growth. The industry grew from an output of 111,000,000 tons in 1890, from mines whose aggregate capac- ity was estimated at 152,000,000 tons and which employed 192,000 men, to the record figures of 1918, when the output was 579,000,000 tons, the mine capacity approximately 715,000,000 tons, and the mine workers numbered 615,000.
Analysis of the records over the 3O-year period 1890-1920 shows that coal output and labour employed during this period increased largely, and that the production of the average mine-worker was greater. Output fell off, however, in the years of general business depression 1894, I 94> I 98, 1911 and 1914. Mine capacity kept well in advance of output, largely because of ever-increasing ex- penditures in mine equipment, which also largely account for the increased average production per man underground from 579 tons in 1890 to 1,134 tons ' n 1918.
The considerable time lost in the soft-coal industry is shown by the fact that in only seven of the years during the period from 1890-1919 was lost time less than 25% of the working year. That coal-mines are idle for many days in the year is familiar to everybody acquainted with the industry; but what is not generally realized is the amount of time lost. During the 1890-1919 period, out of 308 possible work- ing days a year, the bituminous mines were idle on the average 93 days. Ten times during that period the time lost exceeded 100 work- ing days. The greatest loss was in 1894, when the average for all mines was 137 days, or 44% of the working year. The smallest loss occurred in 1918, the year of record production; yet even then the mines were closed down for one cause or another for the equiva- lent of 59 days out of 308 nearly one-fifth of the time. These figures for lost time indicate only the days that the mines were not operated. Absenteeism of a part of the force when the mines were ' running still further reduced the output. The greatest extremes in output occurred in 1914, when the rate of production rose in March to 123 % of the monthly average for the year and fell in April to 66 %. The high rate was nearly twice the low. In that year two influences were at work: the normal seasonal fluctuation was intensified and distorted by the biennial wage negotiations. The normal April slump was aggravated by strikes, in anticipation of which there had' been anxious buying in March. The year 1914 may be taken as a somewhat exaggerated example of the fluctuation to be expected in an " even " year the year of biennial wage adjustment. In one respect, however. 1914 was not typical. The autumn peak came in Sept., and was followed in the last quarter of the year by a de- pression which was one of the effects of the outbreak of the World War. In other years the peak was reached in November.
When monthly fluctuations represent seasonal fluctuations in demand only, uninfluenced by labour disturbances, as in 1913, such a year may be accepted as a fair type of the " odd " year in local production, when the biennial adjustment is not a factor. In such a typical year the capacity required during the month of maximum demand will be from 35 to 40 % greater than in the month of mini- mum demand. In other words a mine capacity and a labour force sufficient for Nov., if working full time, would be employed in April only 70 to 75 % of the time ; and as in actual practice the mines never attain 1 00%, or full time, even in Nov., but under the very best of conditions reach only 80 %, the time of employment to be expected during April is about 59%. Rate of mining in April 1919 was only 50 %, or 24 hours out of a 48-hour week. The highest weekly per- centage of full time averaged by full-time bituminous mines was 86-8, during July 7-13 1918. The average for that particular month was 84-4. In Sept. 1918 an average of 84-9% w-as reached. In Nov. 1917, however, when the demand was intense but the zone system and other features of wartime control of distribution were not in force, the percentage averaged was only 75^3. To put it in another way, even in years of active demand the inequalities in the summer and winter buying of coal render inevitable a long period in which the labour and capital engaged in the industry cannot work more than 27 to 30 hours out of a 48-hour week. This is not the measure of working time necessary to meet demand. The 3O-hour week is almost invariable during springtime in the bituminous coal industry.
Under the conditions obtaining in 1920 there was a third set of fluctuations in addition to the annual and seasonal fluctuations in production. The railways work seven days a week; the mines only six. Over Sunday the carriers catch up in their work of placing cars, and in consequence of the better car supply the miners work longer on Monday, but later in the week their hours show a gradual de- cline, accentuated on Saturday by holiday absenteeism. Even if the mines should obtain full time on Monday, which in practice they never did. they could not expect to work more than 86% of the time on Friday and 79% on Saturday. But the Monday rate never in practice gets up to 100% and the performance on the latter days of the week is correspondingly defective. A significant, if rough, relation exists between the loss of working time in the soft- coal industry and the degree of unionization. Those bituminous
