later hour. At nightfall the very few guns still to go were hurried
off to the jetties. Then the troops along the front were quietly
withdrawn in successive groups, the fine weather continuing to
the end and work at the beaches proceeding without a hitch.
Finally the parties still in the trenches slipped away, and when
dawn broke the Turks, who had first ascertained that something
unusual was afoot from the explosion of a vast mine in the Anzac
area, and from conflagrations on the beaches where the few
stores to be abandoned were being destroyed, discovered that the
invaders were gone. Twenty-four hours later the long spell of
calm, a godsend to Godley and Byng, came to an end.
Practically nothing worth mentioning had been left behind at Suvla. At Anzac, where conditions favoured the retreating troops less, it had been necessary to destroy some valuable war material at the last moment, and a few worn-out guns had pur- posely been abandoned. The casualties in the two areas on the final night had amounted to two. The relaxing by the Allies of their frail hold upon the outer coastline of the Gallipoli Peninsula had been effected more successfully than the most sanguine amongst them had permitted themselves to hope for. Yet, for a week subsequent to their receiving the glad tidings from the Aegean, the British Government remained irresolute with regard to the policy to be pursued at Helles. Then, on Dec. 28, Monro received the expected sanction for evacuating that area also, and Birdwood promptly grappled with this fresh problem.
Taken unawares and signally out-manoeuvred at Anzac and Suvla, Liman von Sanders perceived that his antagonists would probably retire from Helles also, and he took measures accord- ingly. He had at this time 21 divisions at his disposal, while there were only four British divisions to oppose them at Helles (the last French division left for Salonika during Dec.). The Turks, therefore, now possessed a huge numerical preponder- ance in the theatre of war. They moreover enjoyed an even more marked superiority in respect to artillery, and this the Ottoman commander-in-chief hastened to turn to account; the heavier guns which had been sweeping the Anzac and Suvla areas for months past were promptly transferred to the high ground over- looking the extremity of the peninsula or to positions on the Asiatic side of the Straits from which the extremity of the peninsula could be effectively taken in flank.
The same principles as those which had been so successfully applied during the evacuation of the northern areas, were put in force at Helles. The work of removing stores, war material, animals and personnel was to be carried out on successive nights, the fighting force ashore was to be gradually reduced, the front line of trenches was to be held up till the very last the final night being fixed provisionally for the Sth-gth and the detach- ments vacating it were to hurry straight off to the beaches. So as to deceive the enemy, bombing and rifle fire were to be practised nightly up till 11:30 P.M., after which all activity was to cease. Two possible eventualities had especially to be feared the sea might get up, or a heavy bombardment of the beaches might be instituted by the Turks while the final evacuation was in progress. As the staff fully foresaw, the enemy would exert greater vigi- lance than had been the case while the withdrawals had been in progress from the northern areas, these having given the Ottoman authorities warning of what was likely to happen. It ought also to be mentioned that there was a greater accumulation of im- pedimenta at Helles than there had been at either Anzac or Suvla, so that even if the weather were to remain favourable, it was certain that material of great value would have to be destroyed to prevent its falling into the enemy's hands.
Embarkation operations were carried on almost entirely at " V " and " W " beaches, at both of which there were provisional breakwaters in existence furnishing some shelter when there was an onshore breeze. The weather, as it turned out, was none too favourable on several of the preliminary nights, but, owing to its direction, the wind did not greatly retard the work of re- moval. The enemy's guns gave a good deal of trouble at the beaches, and caused many casualties. Although steps were taken to conceal what was in progress, the Turkish staff were aware that preparations for evacuation were in full vigour; but they could
not foresee the date on which the final flitting would take place, nor could they make sure how far the number of combatants within the British lines had been reduced. With the object apparently of ascertaining the strength of their opponents, the Ottoman forces on the afternoon of Jan. 7 delivered a half-hearted attack upon the left of the British position, following on a violent bombardment; but the assailants were driven off with little difficulty. Nor would they seem to have discovered how weakly held the trenches were; for a considerable proportion of both infantry and artillery had been withdrawn by that date, as only two more nights remained according to the programme. That night the troops still left at Helles were reduced by one-third, and, on the next day breaking fine, it was decided to complete the operation on the following night as intended at the start.
The right half of the British were to withdraw by " V " beach and the left half by " W " beach, except that the final detach- ments on the extreme left, representing the i3th Division, were to be got off at Gully beach. A large number of guns had been retained ashore in view of the danger of a determined attack by the Turks on the 8th, when the lines were thinly held; it had been decided to abandon several of these, worn-out ordnance being earmarked for the purpose. The artillery still remaining to be embarked was for the most part got afloat during the early hours of darkness, and the infantry followed ; but the wind soon began to rise ominously, blowing home from W. and S.W., and as the hours passed the situation at the beaches became dis- quieting. The last detachments to quit the trenches moved off simultaneously all along the front at 11:45 p - M -> without the enemy noticing their departure, and they were embarked suc- cessfully at " V " and " W " beaches according to schedule in spite of the heavy seas. But the detachments designated for Gully beach could not all be got off at the exposed point, and those left over had to march on to " W " beach at the last moment and were not afloat till nearly 4 A.M., their embarkation being effected with great difficulty owing to the surf. Just before the last boats sheered off the masses of stores which it had been necessary to abandon were set on fire, and only from the glare set up by this conflagration were the Turks made aware that their opponents had evaded them yet again.
Although the evacuation of Helles without appreciable loss in personnel reflected great credit on the British staff and the troops concerned in it, as also on the Royal Navy, whose work at the beaches was carried out under great difficulties, the escape of the final remnants of the Dardanelles army from the Gallipoli Peninsula was facilitated by the negligence of the troops opposed to them. Had the Turks kept befitting guard on the night of the 8th-oth, aware as they were that their antagonists contemplated departure, they must have detected that the British trenches had been vacated. Effectual pursuit might not have been practicable ; but the guns could have been turned on to the beaches, of which the range was exactly known, and embarkation, impeded as it was by the rough water, could hardly have been carried out without many casualties.
After a few days taken up in collecting the troops from Helles in their different divisions at Lemnos, what was left of the Dardanelles army was shipped to Egypt, whither most of the forces from Anzac and Suvla had already proceeded. The total loss of the Allies' military forces in the eight months' contest mounted up to 130,000 killed, wounded and missing.
Most authorities on the art of war agree that the collapse of the Entente in this memorable campaign was primarily due to the abortive naval effort to force the Dardanelles. By embarking on that venture the fleet gave the Turks sufficient warning of what was in store to ensure that, on the date on which Sir I. Ham- ilton's army was ready to land, the defenders should be in a posi- tion to bring it to a standstill. The only chance of the invaders achieving their object after the first week of land fighting de- pended on their being joined by very substantial additional forces in a region where a belligerent fighting on the defensive in home territory, as the Osmanlis were, enjoyed marked strategical and tactical advantages. But neither the British nor the French could afford to divert great military resources from the main theatre
