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homa," " Utah ") a total of 41 in British waters. It had 9 battle-cruisers and 39 cruisers and light cruisers, and attached to it were no less than 7 destroyer flotillas, mustering 167 de- stroyers (nth, Capt. Roger Rede; izth, Capt. H. M. Leveson- Gower; 13th, Capt. Arthur B. S. Button; i4th, Capt. H. R. Godfrey; isth, Capt. R. Rowley-Conwy; 3rd, Capt. Ed. Ruther- ford; 2oth, Capt. Berwick Curtis, and 2ist), and 5 submarine flotillas (loth, nth, I2th, I3th, I4th) with 48 submarines.

The British losses had not been small. They amounted to 254 vessels, of which the greatest number had fallen to enemy submarines.

sea was kept open for the troops and trade of the Allies, and the shores of Great Britain and France were kept safe from invasion. Germany's path to the ocean was barred. It may be said that the path of German submarines was not barred, but German submarines merely attempted to do laboriously and slowly what a couple of German battle-cruisers appearing unopposed in the Channel could have done at once. And though the submarine was powerful against merchant shipping, it accom- plished much less against the fleet. Not a single dreadnought was sunk by it during the war, and except in the narrow waters of the Adriatic no battle-fleet was ever kept in harbour by fear

British Warship Losses.

A, Action ; B, Submarine ; C, Mine ; D, Destruction to avoid capture ; E, Block-ship ; F, Internal explosion ; G, Collision ; H, Wreck ;

J, Accident ; K, tfnknown.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

J

K

Total

Tonnage (dead- weight)

Dreadnoughts Pre-Dreadnoughts Battle-Cruisers

I

5

i 4

i

i

2 \ / 3

200,735 63,000

Cruisers , Light Cruisers Aircraft-Carriers Minelayers . Gunboats

5 i

i

2

5 3 i i i i

i

2

I I

'(,

i i

i

2

i

2

13

12

3

2

6

5

158,300

46,255 27,488 11,000

4,235 8,125

Coast Defence Ships

I

1 1

i

i

i 18

5,700 22,630

Flotilla Leaders . Destroyers . Torpedo-Boats . Submarines . Patrol Boats Armed Merchant Cruisers Armed Boarding Steamers Coastal Motor- Boats

I

16

3

i i

5

i

7

2

4

ii 9

20 I

4 i i

i

9

2

i

i

12

4 4 i

i

2

's

4 4

2 I

4 3

i

21 2 I

3 64 n 54

2 17 13 13

5,204 52,045 2,230

43,649 1,226 179,169 23,799

85

Of auxiliary craft 815 had been sunk, including 246 trawlers, 244 colliers, 130 drifters, 44 oilers, 24 motor-launches and 18 minesweepers. Of the total 289 (35-4%) had been sunk by submarine, 225 (27-7%) by mine, and 77 (9-4%) had been wrecked. The losses of the other Allied navies were not so heavy in comparison.

Comparative Naval Losses.

Great Britain and

Dominions

2

II

3

13

12

64

54

France

4

5

13

12

Italy .

I

3

i

2

9

7

Japan United States .

I

i

i

2

i

2

2

Russia (to 1918)

2

2

2

18

IS 1

Germany (to Nov. II

1918) .

I

i

6

17

68'

200

Austria

2

I

3

6

II 1

Turkey

2

I

3

1 Approximate.

t

Though the figures give a very meagre picture of the colossal ramifications of the war, they leave ample room for comment. The submarine inflicted and suffered most of the damage done in the war. It was the most active and most dangerous service. In the North Sea Great Britain and the United States main- tained a force of 46 capital ships (battleships and battle-cruisers) against the German 23, in numbers a twofold, in gun-power a threefold superiority. In the Mediterranean, France and Italy could muster 12 dreadnoughts against Austria's scanty three. What was the use of this immense superiority in battleships if it could not bring the German navy to action? The answer is that it represented the outlook of 1913, not of 1918. The French, Italian and U.S. dreadnoughts had been laid down before the war, and could not be converted into destroyers at a moment's notice.

The work wrought by sea-power, envisaged as a whole, was evident enough. German trade was swept off the sea. The

of submarines. The submarine, like the mine, must be regarded as an adjunct of the capital ship and not a substitute for it. It was countered by anti-submarine flotillas and convoys working under the aegis of the battle-fleet, which except in the case of the raids on Dover preserved them immune from attack. Again, the unrestricted use of the submarine involved the defiance of neutrals, an attitude which after the experience of this war few Powers will care to adopt. Each class of ship has its virtues, and naval strength cannot be expressed in terms of any single type. The various types are complementary to one another. The capital ship represents the highest synthesis of guns, protection and speed which the level of technical knowl- edge can supply. The submarine can attack the battle-cruiser, but the destroyer and aircraft can drive off the submarine, and the former can be driven off by the light cruiser, which in its turn can not approach the battle-cruiser.

The fact that there was no great decisive battle has made some doubt the further use of the battleship. It is true that the opportunity lost at Jutland was never wholly redeemed. The battle in war represents the economy of the decisive blow. Vast resources of personnel and material had to be kept locked up in the Grand Fleet, which a decisive battle would have re- leased for the war against the submarine. The German fleet remained, too, something much more than a " fleet in being," for by guarding its minesweepers from attack it kept the Bight open for its submarines and took an active part in their campaign. The Grand Fleet still barred its way to the west but in con- junction with the minefield the German ships held the door of the Baltic and exercised an active command there. But though the capital ship still retains its place in naval war its particular design and its relative status leave large room for discussion. One may well ask why millions should be spent in giving it bulges to render it unsinkable. The " Moltke " was hit twice by torpedoes and did not sink. Again, do we not strain too much after the heaviest possible gun? The " Von der Tann " had n-in. guns and the " Queen Mary " i3'5-in., but the former blew up the latter. These questions, however, belong rather to gunnery and tactics than to naval strategy.

The war left the world still on the horizon of other poten-