tialities. Submarines and aircraft never actually cooperated in a fleet action, though the value of the former in reconnaissance work was clearly demonstrated in the later stages of the war. In deep and narrow stretches of waters, however, it became almost supreme. Thus in the Adriatic the Austrian battle- ships dared not venture out and the Allied battleships dared not venture in. The power of the mine was one of the lessons of the war, and the combination of a minefield supported by the heavy guns of a fleet or by forts remained insurmountable to a fleet alone; the mines prevented ships approaching the fort or fleet, and the forts and fleet prevented minesweepers approach- ing the mines. This problem can only be solved by capturing the forts as the Germans did at Osel in 1917, but even there three battleships were severely injured by mines. The mine must not be regarded as a purely defensive weapon. It can be and was very offensive, and at the Sound and Dardanelles was too strong for the stronger fleet.
Certain outstanding lessons remain from the war. Invasion becomes more hazardous than ever in the face of numerous and powerful aircraft, while aircraft carriers with opposing aircraft are necessarily enormous vessels and very vulnerable to attack. The truism that ships cannot engage forts was proved to be true. The power of the minefield was clearly demonstrated. Certain fallacies in evidence before the war received a severe shock. One of these used to be embodied in the expression that the sea is all one, but the war showed that the North Sea was one and the Baltic another. Maritime geography remains a dom- inating factor in naval war.
When the war broke out, grave doubts arose as to the ad- visability of sending a British army to France in the face of an undefeated German fleet. Maritime geography and the Dover Straits permitted this to be done in safety. The war was dominated by the fact that Germany's path to the ocean was barred by the solid bulk of Great Britain, and that both navies were working close to their main magazines of repair and supply. The full strength of all the combined weapons, air, sea and submarines, can only be exerted within a reasonable distance of one's own bases, and the navy fights with greatest advantage that fights in the vicinity of its great bases and industrial centres. Very different would be the conditions of a war 5,000 m. away. The development of aircraft, and the necessity of a host of auxiliary craft, tend to produce what may be called areas of maximum control for each power. Within its own area a navy tends to be supreme. The farther away it goes the heavier becomes its task. A war at a great distance would be waged under a heavy handicap, and would tend towards the conditions existent between Venice and England in the isth century. They were too far apart to go to war.
It is barely possible for a single mind to envisage all the aspects of so colossal a war, or to gauge precisely the relative parts played in the victory by economic, naval and military pressure. But this at least may be said. If the British navy in 1914-8 had an even greater task to face than anyone dreamt of when King George had described it as the " Sure Shield " of its country at the outbreak of war, it could feel that this confidence had not been misplaced when the memorable day came for Beatty to receive the surrender of the German fleet under the Cross of St. George and the Stars and Stripes. (A. C. D.)
NAVIES: see SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING.
NAVY, DEPARTMENT OF THE (United States): see ADMIRALTY ADMINISTRATION (section United Stales).
NEAL, DAVID DALHOFF (1838-1915), American painter (see 19.320), died in Munich, Germany, May 2 1915.
NEBRASKA (see 19.323). The pop. in 1920 was 1,296,372, an increase of 104,158, or 8-7%, over the 1,192,214 of 1910, as against an increase of n-8% in the preceding decade. The foreign-born whites decreased from 176,662 in 1910 to 149,652 in 1920. The density of pop. was 16-9 per sq. m. as against 15-5 in 1910. The urban pop. (in places of 2,500 or more) was 405,306, or 3 I- 3% of the whole, as against 310,852, or 26-1% of the whole, in 1910; the rural pop. was 891,066, or 68-7%, as against 881,362, or 73'9% i
The five cities having in 1920 a pop. over 10,000 were:
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1920
1910
I ncrease per cent
Omaha. Lincoln Grand Island Hastings North Platte
191,601 54,948 13,947 1 1,647 10,466
124,096
43,973 10,326 9,338 4,793
54-4 25-0
35-1 24-7 118-4
A conspicuous feature of the census returns was the continuing decrease of farming pop. in the older counties. Out of 93 counties 33 showed a decrease in total pop. and 43 showed a decrease in rural pop. during the decade. This rural decrease was in the part of the state where land sold at the highest price. The increase of pop. was almost entirely in three localities: Omaha, the chief industrial centre; Lincoln, the state capital; and the Scottsbluff irrigated region in the North Platte valley.
Agriculture. In the decade 1910-20 farms tended to become fewer and larger, as shown by the following figures:
1920
1910
Farms, total number .... Total ac. in farms .... Average size of farm (ac.) . Improved land ....
124,417 42,225,475
339-4 23,109,624
129,678 38,622,021 297-8 24,382,577
The decrease in the number of farms was due to improved machin- ery (especially farm tractors), making the farming of larger units more economical, and to the higher price of land, making more diffi- cult its purchase by persons of small means. The increase in size of farms was partly due to homesteads of 640 ac. taken in the sand- hill part of the state under the Federal Kinkaid Homestead Act. All but a few thousand rough acres of the public domain in Nebraska had been claimed by settlers by 1921. In 1920 Nebraska ranked sixth among the states in area of cultivated lands. It was first in production of hay and of alfalfa; second in production of winter wheat; third in corn; third in combined production of wheat, oats and corn. About 1,000,000 ac. were in woodland, of which half or more had been planted by settlers.
Production of the principal crops for the years 1910 and 1920 is shown in the following table :
1920
1910
Ac.
Bus.
Ac.
Bus.
Corn . All wheat . Oats . Barley . Rye . Potatoes .
7,560,355
3,592,995 2,400,062
255,503 264,370
85,439
255,544,816 60,560,416 83,037,162 7,424,615 3,751,104 8,435,554
6,595,o88 2,732,166 2,543,858 H5,957 71,339 98,483
178,925,128 45,151,052 71,562,877
2,333,199 822,648 5,330,138
Great progress was made in the decade in production of alfalfa and sugar beets. The comparative figures are as follows:
IQ2O
1910
Ac.
Tons
Ac.
Tons
Alfalfa. Sugar beets.
1,232,947 78,675
3,527,689 750,000
701,455 8,517
1,883,661, 105,369
Growing potatoes on a commercial scale became a large industry in western Nebraska during the decade, about 8,000,000 bus. being produced annually.
The number of live stock on farms was :
1920
1910
Horses . Mules . Cattle . Hogs . Sheep .
961,396
99,847 3*154,265 3,435,690 573,217
971,279 79,652 2,567,392 3,435,724 240,116
Farm tenantry increased during the decade as follows:
1920
1910
Farms occupied by owners . ! Farms occupied by renters
69,672 53.430
56 42-9
79,250 49,441
61-1 38-1
The percentage of tenants is greatest in the richer agricultural counties. About three-fourths of the tenants are renters for share rent. The landlord's share of grain crops is usually one-third of the small grain, two-fifths of corn, one-fourth of potatoes, one-fifth of sugar beets, one-half of the hay in stacks. In 1920 the total number of farm mortgages filed was 19,838 and their amount $116,440,626. The total number released was 17,514 and their amount $78,654,818. Most of these transactions arose from purchase and sale.
The Farmers' Cooperative and Educational Union became an organization of about 35,oop members in Nebraska during the decade. Its leading purpose is collective buying and selling. From it developed the Grain Growers, Inc., an organization covering all the states, with the purpose of handling the whole grain crop of the United States and securing better returns for the producer.