it would seem, rather by the doctrine of the resolute offensive then in favour in the French Army than by the orders of Gen. de Castelnau; they laid down that the heights of Baronville and Morhange, reached the previous evening, should be secured and that the right should then endeavour to disengage the XV. Corps and facilitate its attack.
On Aug. 20 the nth Div. attacked the front Morhange- Racrange, in conjunction with the XV. Corps; to the left, the 3pth Div. the line Brehain-Baronville. About 6:30 A.M. Gen. de Castelnau stopped this offensive, which he con- sidered inopportune, and ordered that the right of the XX. Corps should support the XV., while the left should hold and fortify the position then held by it and should even prepare a second position farther south. But these arrangements were upset by the enemy taking the offensive; the left of the XX. Corps (39th Div.), heavily assailed, had to retire on Chateau Salins, involving the withdrawal of the right (nth Div.), which fell back on Lidrequin, and of the 68th Reserve Div., which withdrew from Lenoncourt to its position of Aug. 19. The situation of the II. Army became so perilous that at 4 P.M. Gen. de Castelnau ordered the retreat. The corps were moved away that night, with the intention of re-forming their most sorely tried units farther south; rear guards facing N.E. from Mai- zieres to Fresncs en Saulnois were to cover the withdrawal.
These movements were carried out that evening and night, and during Aug. 21, under the protection of the XX. Corps and the 68th Reserve Div., which had orders to hold on to Chateau Salins as long as possible and to fall back thence on St. Nicolas. The remainder of the army reached the area Dombasle-Lune- ville, and were there reenforced by two reserve divisions, the 64th and 74th; the 73rd Reserve Div., forming part of the mobile garrison of Toul, moved to the N.W. of Nancy, and the II. Cavalry Corps (less the 6th Cavalry Div. which was left under the orders of Gen. Dubail) was on Aug. 22 transferred from the I. to the II. Army and was ordered to cover the latter's right. The enemy at first followed slowly, but soon violently attacked the XVI. Corps at Crion and Lionviller, and forced it back over Luneville, whence it went back to reform in the Xermamenil area. Finally, while the XX. Corps was waging a series of suc- cessful actions in the heights of Flainval, before retiring on St. Nicolas, the remainder established themselves on the W. bank of the Meurthe, the XVI. Corps holding the hills of Belchamps, the 74th Reserve Div. astride the Luneville-Bayon road, the XV. Corps at Haussonville and Ferrieres, and the 64th Reserve Div. in the Sappais plateau. The Grand Couronne was still held by the i8th Div. (IX. Corps), the dispatch of which to the S. had been delayed, and by the 59th and 68th Reserve Divisions. The offensive of the II. Army, as well as that of the I., had thus been a complete failure. Various factors contributed to this result, the most important being the French inferiority in mate- rial and the insufficient preparation of the attacks.
Meanwhile the I. Army also had stopped its retreat. On Aug. 23 Gen. Dubail laid down that its mission henceforward would be to forbid any new hostile advance and refit so as to be in a condition to resume the offensive in the near future; it was also to support the II. Army, which was being heavily attacked, on its left. This was the object of a three weeks' battle, the first act of which was to take place on the Mortagne. On Aug. 23 Gen. Dubail ordered the VIII. Corps, supported on its left by the cavalry division, to operate against the flank of the Germans then attacking the right of the II. Army. The VIII. and XIII. Corps, forming the I. Army's left wing, were holding the line Damas aux Bois-Anglemont.
On Aug. 24 the II. Army was attacked on the front Hausson- ville-Borville. The VIII. Corps was directed to take the offen- sive in the direction of Venezey-Moriviller, while the XIII. Corps, covering its right, moved to the vicinity of Menarmont, ready to face N. or E. according to circumstances. These movements, carried out on Aug. 24 and 25, were of considerable assistance to the II. Army, before which the enemy fell back on Aug. 26 to the north-east. Next day the VIII. Corps reached the Mor- tagne, but from Aug. 28 to Aug. 30 it could do no more than
repulse the enemy's attacks, without itself getting forward. On Aug. 30 and 31 the Germans, entrenched to the E. of the river, on the heights of Domptail, held up the French advance, but were themselves unable to make any progress. The utility of the VIII. and XIII. Corps' action was all the greater, as at this time the II. Army was being heavily assailed, first in the direction from Luneville to Charmes, and then in the Grand Couronne. It appears, indeed, to have been the Germans' first intention to advance with the VI. Army along this former line, and with the VII. by Raon 1'Etape and Rambervillers on Charmes, their common effort being directed to forcing what is usually known as " the gap of Charmes." The I. Army was further weakened by the departure from its position on the right of the XIII. Corps, and of the XXI. Corps, which left to join the IV. Army in Champagne, arriving there in time to take part in the last days of the battle of the Marne.
From Sept. 5 to 7 the VIII. and XIII. Corps merely main- tained their positions. On Sept. 6 the German VII. Army, which faced the French I. Army, was dissolved by order of the supreme command. Two of its corps joined the VI. Army, now left alone in Lorraine; the staff and one corps were sent W. to reenforce the German right wing, heavily engaged with Maunoury (French VI. Army) on the Ourcq. On Sept. 7, as the enemy in front of the VIII. and XIII. Corps seemed to be weakening, an attempt was made to resume the French offensive; and on Sept. 9 the VIII. Corps was ordered to capture St. Pierremont and Magnieres by a night attack; the XIII. Corps and a provisional corps formed of troops already on the army front, and put into line in place of the XXI. Corps, were also to attack farther to the east.
The operation thus projected was a success only on the right and in the centre; the VIII. Corps attack failed. At this moment the I. Army was still further and more seriously weakened by the arrival of orders for the transfer of the XIII. Corps elsewhere. While it was being transported to the W. of the Oise, where it was to prolong the left of the VI. Army, the I. Army consoli- dated its recent gains. On Sept. 12 the VIII. Corps attacked towards Domptail and Azerailles, and the 7ist Reserve Div., which had replaced the XIII. Corps, towards Baccarat, and the provisional corps towards Raon 1'Etape. By the evening the I. Army had reached the Meurthe; unfortunately the pursuit was stopped by another transfer, this time of the VIII. Corps on Sept. 13 to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, where another German offensive was being prepared. The left wing of the army (7ist Reserve Div. and provisional corps) took up position along the Meurthe from Raon 1'Etape to Azerailles. The fighting known as the battle of the Meurthe now came to an end.
Meanwhile the XXI. and XIV. Corps, on the right of the I. Army astride the Meurthe, had also attempted to carry out the mission assigned to them by Gen. Dubail, to stop the enemy's advance, and prepare for a resumption of the offensive. Their first efforts met with little success; in fact, up to Aug. 27 they had lost ground; and the 44th Div., which was being brought up from the Vosges to reenforce the I. Army's left, had to stop and support them (Aug. 25). On Aug. 26 the right of the XIV. Corps was driven back in the Ban de Sapt; next day, the enemy entered Ste. Die, and the withdrawal of the s8th Reserve Div. from Anozel pass uncovered the eastern flank of the XIV. Corps, which fell back from Nompatelize and then from La Bourgonce (Aug. 29). The Germans endeavoured to cut off the corps from the Vosges and menace the I. Army's right flank; and successful though costly counter-attacks by the XIV. Corps on Aug. 30 recovered both Nompatelize and La Bourgonce. On Aug. 31 and Sept. i its right maintained itself at Anozel; on Sept. 3 the corps held a line thence to Rougiville and the N. edge of the forest of Mortagne, but its situation remained anxious up to and including Sept. 6. Not till Sept. 7, when the army had consolidated its line in the Vosges, could the XIV. Corps make a little progress; it then accentuated its offensive, reoccupied Ste. Die on Sept. 1 1 and reached the Meurthe along its whole front, as the VIII. Corps, the 7ist Reserve Div. and the provisional corps had done. By this time the " Vosges
